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This thesis examines the impact of financial media on UK merger and acquisition (M&A) 
deals from several perspectives. The Chapter 2 examines the impact of financial media on 
M&A performance using UK M&A data from 1981 to 2010. The results show that, both in 
the short run and long run, deals with media coverage outperform deals without media 
coverage. Moreover, the results indicate a significantly negative correlation between media 
pessimism and post-merger performance both in the short run and long run. These findings 
suggest that pre-merger news released by influential financial media has a large impact on 
market reactions to M&A announcements, consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the negative correlation between media pessimism and acquirer returns suggests 
that high media pessimism about M&As leads to downward pressure on market prices.  
 
Chapter 3 examines how media coverage and media pessimism influence takeover outcomes, 
based on the same database as in the first chapter. It is generally believed that financial 
newspapers directly impact investor sentiment concerning both individual stocks and the 
market as a whole (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Joe et al., 2009; Ferguson et al., 2012; 
Jegadeesh and Wu, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Garcia, 2013). Moreover, M&As often occur due 
to either takeovers or tender offers and usually require bidders to buy the target stock for 
more than its current market value (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). However, Branch et al. (2008) 
state that about 10% of announced takeover attempts fail, including those withdrawn by the 
acquirer or rebuffed by the target firm. Failure usually consists of withdrawn or pending 
takeovers. Successful takeovers are contractual agreements in which both acquirers and 





Chapter 4 tests the different impacts of media pessimism in hot and cold markets. This paper 
is primarily motivated by the growing importance of media sentiment among merger waves. 
The principle result suggests that acquirers are subject to less media pessimism when the deal 
is announced during a hot market valuation period. Moreover, the results also show that 
acquirers obtain significantly higher short-run announcement returns for deals announced 
during hot markets with low media pessimism and significantly lower long-run returns for 
deals announced during cold markets with low media pessimism. The finding is in line with 
early investigations by Petmezas (2009), who states that managers undertaking takeovers 
during hot markets can earn positive returns in the short run and earn insignificant returns 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Motivation 
This thesis investigates the relation between stock market reactions to merger and acquisition 
(M&A) deals and quantitative media information. Financial newspapers are generally believed to 
play an important role in disseminating information. Therefore, financial media (quality and 
quantity) have a direct impact on investor sentiment concerning either the whole market or 
individual stocks and hence significantly affect market reactions to M&A deals. There are few 
studies on media’s relation with the financial market. As Tetlock (2007) shows, news content can 
predict the future movements of the whole stock market. More specifically, Tetlock et al. (2008) 
suggests that media reports can predict an individual firm’s stock returns. 
 
M&As are among the largest corporate events that attract high media attention (Hayward, 
Rindova, and Pollock (2004), Malmendier and Tate (2008)). Recent studies examine the relation 
between the media and financial markets in providing sentiment to media coverage. Fang and 
Peress (2009) suggest that media reports can predict an individual firm’s stock returns, providing 
informational content to media news and thus alleviating informational frictions in the stock 
market. New information released by the financial media naturally affects stock market 
valuations. Ahern and Sosyura (2013) suggest that managers might manipulate the media 
coverage during the negotiation period, which can generate a short-lived run-up in bidders’ 
prices. 
 
While the literature shows that the financial media have a strong influence on firm stock 
performance, a significant gap remains. To the author’s best knowledge, only a few papers 
examine the relation between the financial media and corporate events such as M&As. Therefore, 
the original motivation of this paper is to fill this important gap. M&A deals are expected to 
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interact with the financial media through two major channels. First, stock market reactions to a 
takeover announcement are generally believed to mainly reflect investor recognition of this 
corporate event. Since investor recognition can vary with news reports released by the financial 
media, a significant relation between financial news and acquirers’ abnormal returns around 
takeover announcements is expected. In addition, Tetlock et al. (2008) demonstrate that the 
fundamental information transmitted by financial news can resolve information asymmetry. Such 
news provides additional information for investors to adjust their prospects in M&A deals and 
valuations. Thus an acquirer’s long-term post-merger performance should be affected by media 
reports as well. 
 
2. Media Coverage and Sentiment 
This thesis adds to the literature examining media sentiment/coverage and asset returns. Liu, 
Sherman, and Zhang (2008) examine the interaction between the volume of media coverage and 
the final offer prices of initial public offerings (IPOs) using the level of media interest as a proxy 
for investor attention. They argue that, due to their frequent intercommunications, the opinions of 
journalists and investors on Wall Street will be highly correlated, implying that media coverage 
can proxy for information revealed to underwriters by such investors during book building. Any 
additional information gained from investors is therefore ‘second hand’ and has the potential to 
be biased by the opinions of the investors themselves. Second, journalism is very rarely neutral. 
The social psychology literature examining the media argues that consumers seek ‘interpretation’ 
and coherent and entertaining presentation rather than raw information (Hayakawa, 1940; Jensen, 
1979; Severin and Tankard, 1992). To meet this need, journalists frame their stories on behalf of 
their readers, selecting facts while omitting equally credible ones and introducing salience to 




Engleberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2010) provide supporting evidence that investors follow 
explicit media recommendations from studying market reactions to stock recommendations made 
on the popular US CNBC TV show Mad Money. They observe temporary overnight abnormal 
returns positively associated with the recommendations made but present evidence that these did 
not reflect fundamental information or lead to long-term abnormal returns. Political economy 
studies also present evidence that media reports influence the sentiments, beliefs, and decision 
making processes of media consumers in a direction consistent with the bias observed in the 
media consumed (e.g. Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, 2003; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergen, 2009). 
Finally, journalists are not passive agents restricted to rebroadcasting information from a 
prospectus. Investigative journalism is a key part of media’s role in financial markets and has 
been shown to be relevant in enforcing corporate law (Borden, 2007) and deterring and detecting 
fraud (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, 2010). 
 
Other studies have used media as a proxy for investor attention. Fang and Peress (2009) report 
that stocks that receive no media coverage earn higher returns than those that do, consistent with 
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. Barber and Odean (2008) report that retail 
investors are net buyers of stocks that are featured in the news. Using advertising in the media as 
a similar measure, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) show that firms that spend more on 
advertising have more individual and institutional investors, while Chemmanur and Yan (2009) 
show that firms who spend more on advertising experience larger stock returns initially but 
smaller returns in subsequent years. Da et al. (2010) use search volume data from the online 
search engine Google as a measure of investor attention. Contrary to Liu et al (2009), they 
provide evidence that increased investor attention in an IPO issue creates higher first-day returns 
followed by a significant long-term reversal. In doing so, they question the assumption of Liu et 
al (2009), Barber and Odean (2008), Fang and Peress (2009), and others, that media coverage and 
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investor attention are automatically correlated, suggesting that, in the modern information age, 
the volume of media available creates a poverty of attention among investors. 
 
This thesis adds to the literature examining the influence of quantitative measures of semantic 
media content on market reactions to M&A deals. Tetlock (2007) was among the first to examine 
media’s influence on market prices using such techniques, analysing the language in a regular 
Wall Street Journal column. The author showed that a high frequency of words from the 
pessimism category of the Harvard Psychosocial Dictionary predicted short-term downward 
pressure on prices. Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macsskassy (2008) present evidence that a 
qualitative measure of language in media related to earnings announcements conveys 
fundamental information. Loughran and McDonald (2010) refine the Harvard Psychosocial 
Dictionary used by Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008) and show their new word lists 
capture fundamental information from firms’ 10-K filing reports. 
 
Henry and Leone (2009) and Tetlock (2007) find that negative words have a much stronger 
correlation with stock returns than positive words do. Many papers also suggest that the 
frequency of negative words in an article decides its tone (Das and Chen 2007, Davis et al. 2011, 
Loughran and McDonald 2011). Therefore, the method proposed by Tetlock et al. (2008) are 
employed to measure media sentiment. Because this formula focuses on the negative words, the 
media pessimism score stands for the level of media sentiment. 
 
3. Main Findings 
Chapter 2 examines two aspects of the impact of the financial media on M&As: media pessimism 
and media coverage. Acquiring firms with positive media coverage in the pre-merger period are 
expected to outperform those with negative media coverage. This outcome is predicted by both 
the information and sentiment hypotheses of media sentiment. To distinguish the dominant 
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hypothesis in the case of M&As, both the short-run performance and long-run performance of 
takeover deals are examined. Media coverage can eliminate information asymmetries (Fang and 
Peress, 2009). Travlos (1987) argues that the performance difference between stock and cash 
acquisitions is due to the signalling effect of overvaluation in stock acquisitions and this 
difference is expected to be more pronounced for deals with low media coverage. 
 
Using a sample of UK M&A deals conducted during 1981–2010, this paper examines the market 
reactions to M&A events based on different levels of media coverage and media pessimism. In 
contrast to the previous literature, which focuses on the relation between financial media and the 
entire stock market, this thesis sheds light on one of the most representative corporate events, the 
M&A, to further investigate the effect of media news on financial markets. 
 
To conduct the empirical research, a unique, comprehensive data set was manually collected that 
contains 274,201 financial news articles, as well as data on 251 bidders. The M&A deals are split 
into subsamples according to their levels of relative media coverage and pessimism. To evaluate 
the performance of M&A deals, both the short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and 
long-term buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for each firm are calculated. Comparing the 
average CARs of the two subsamples, the results in chapter 2 show that the market appears to 
favour takeover deals announced by firms with media coverage over those without. Moreover, 
the results also indicate that deals with lower pessimism earn a higher return. These findings 
appears to hold in the longer term, supporting the informational dissemination hypothesis of 
media news.  
 
Chapter 3 examines how media coverage and media pessimism influence takeover outcomes in 
takeover deals, that is, whether financial news influences the success of takeovers. The literature 
suggests that the media can influence takeover outcomes in two ways. First, Fang and Peress 
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(2009) show that stocks without media coverage outperform those heavily covered by the media 
by 3% per year. Therefore, there is a hypothesis that deals with high media coverage prior to the 
merger announcement have a lower possibility of success than deals with low media coverage 
prior to the announcement. On the other hand, Li (2006) finds that text-based information 
measures can potentially offer a more independent test of market efficiency, since many of the 
quantitative measures (e.g. counts of media coverage) are significantly correlated, so different 
anomalies possibly reflect the similar empirical regularity. In addition, Buehlmaier (2012) uses 
text-based media content and shows that news content is positively related to takeover success. 
Tetlock et al. (2008) also state that negative words convey negative information. Therefore, there 
is another hypothesis of a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and 
takeover success. 
 
The empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses. The results show that deals with low 
media coverage have higher completion rates than deals with high media coverage. This finding 
is consistent with the findings of Fang and Peress (2009), who state that stocks with no mass 
media coverage outperform those heavily covered by the media. The authors argue that deals 
with lower media coverage lead to less investor recognition and stocks with low levels of investor 
recognition must offer higher stock returns to compensate their shareholders. Moreover, Asquith 
et al. (1983) find that gains during the takeover announcement period are larger if the takeover is 
successful. In addition, Liu and McConnell (2013) state that the media play an important role in 
changing shareholders’ and managers’ interests, which could result in the abandonment of 
value-reducing takeover attempts. Further, Joe et al. (2009) suggest that individual investors 
appear to react negatively to the exposure of media coverage. 
 
This chapter also investigates the correlation between media pessimism and takeover outcomes. 
The empirical results indicate that deals with low media pessimism levels have lower completion 
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rates than deals with high media pessimism. This finding is in line with early investigations by 
Buehlmaier (2012), who indicates that news content is positively related to takeover success. The 
findings are also related to those of Tetlock (2007), who states that textual sentiment has a 
potentially strong impact on stock returns and trading volumes; Tetlock et al. (2008) and Davis et 
al. (2011), who indicate that a highly pessimistic media forecast places downward pressure on the 
market because negative words that convey negative information can be used to forecast low 
corporate earnings prices; and Samuelson and Rosenthal (1989), who find a positive relation 
between stock prices and the chance of tender success. 
 
Chapter 3 is motivated by the growing importance of media sentiment in merger waves. 
Bouwman et al. (2009) and Vadnais (2012) suggest that takeovers during cold markets are very 
different from those during hot markets in terms of volume, premiums, and methods of payment. 
This paper is the very first to consider this connection between different market valuations, media 
sentiment, and market reactions to M&A announcements. This is a unique setting, since both hot 
and cold markets have distinctive characteristics that can lead to very different market reactions. 
 
The empirical result of this chapter suggests that acquirers are subject to high media pessimism 
when the deal is announced during a hot market valuation period. Moreover, the results show that 
acquirers obtain significantly higher announcement returns for deals announced during 
high-valuation markets in conjunction with high media pessimism. The finding is in line with 
early investigations by Petmezas (2009), who states that takeovers during hot markets lead to 
positive returns in the short run and lead to insignificant returns during cold markets. Moreover, 
in the long run, the returns will reverse and negative returns are observed in both hot and cold 
markets. This result is also consistent with the findings of Bouwman et al. (2009), who find that 
bidding firms earn significantly higher returns during hot markets and their announcement returns 
are significantly negative for takeovers announced in cold markets. The results are of interest to 
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investors who wish to understand how net trader positions influence market returns and how this 
relation could change in different macroeconomic environments. The results also have 
implications for academics and market practitioners seeking to understand the relationship 
between news sentiment and market movements for different market valuations. 
 
4. Contribution 
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature. Chapter 2 is the first using UK data to 
investigate the relation between financial media and M&As based on stock market performance. 
Extending previous literature on the interaction between financial media and stock market 
movements, this paper refines the research window. The event window is specified by the most 
important of corporate events, the M&A. This thesis finds substantial empirical evidence that 
media news from popular financial newspapers has a significant impact on stock market reactions 
to takeover announcements. News stories are classified into two data sets, by media pessimism 
and media coverage. And this thesis comprehensively investigates the overall picture and 
discovers the impact of media pessimism/coverage on short- and long-term reactions to takeover 
announcements, methods of payment, deal outcomes, as well as market valuations and merger 
waves. The conclusion of this chapter has further implications for investor sentiment research and 
suggests that media sentiment could be considered an effective proxy for investor sentiment. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by first testing the influence of media coverage and media 
pessimism on the likelihood of deal success or failure. While the previous literature considers 
many factors that could influence takeover outcomes, this chapter empirically shows that 
pre-announcement media pessimism/coverage plays an important role in determining deal 
outcomes.
1
 In addition, previous research regarding the financial media focuses mainly on the 
                                                        
1
 Strategic vision and fit, deal structure, due diligence, pre-merger planning, post-merger integration, external factors, 
negotiation outcome, the nature of the recommendations of the target directors, and bid premium levels and offer 
price revisions are also shown to be important in discriminating between successful and failed takeovers (Epstain, 
2005; Fabel and Kolmar, 2012; Henry, 2003).  
19 
 
US market (Birza and Lott, 2011; Akhtar et al., 2012); however, the UK and US media are very 
different. As Shaw (1999) suggests, the UK media are more independent, whereas the US media 
are more conformist. Using UK media data, this chapter provide new insights to the literature. 
 
Chapter 4 tests the effect of media pessimism regarding takeovers deals under different stock 
market valuations. Since takeover quantities and media pessimism in hot markets are quite 
different from those in cold markets, the effects of media pessimism should be tested separately. 
This study fills the gaps in the previous literature, since it is the first to consider such an issue. 
Furthermore, Severin and Tankard (1992) suggest that journalism is very rarely neutral. The 
social psychology literature examining the media argues that consumers seek interpretation and 
coherent and entertaining presentation rather than raw information. The results indicate that 
media pessimism tends to be more positive towards M&A announcements when the deals are 
conducted during a hot market, which suggests that media pessimism could exhibit forms of 
herding and lead to different market reactions to M&A deals. 
 
The rest of the thesis is arranged as follows: Chapter 2 is the first empirical chapter and 
investigates media pessimism and bidder short- and long-run performance. Chapter 3 looks into 
the correlation between the media and takeover outcomes. Chapter 4 examines the media’s 





base on the nature of the media study, one could not possibly to obtain all media article due to the 
time constrain, ideally , I should collect universal media data and calculate the sentiment index 
from it. This will be another extension I plan to do in the future.   
                                                        
2




The existing textual analysis using standard dictionary to calculate sentiment index, however there 
is no "weight" for each positive and negative words. for example, " good " and excellent will be 
given the same weight at existing methodology. I would like to carry out another research to 
identify the weights for all positive words and negative words by examine the usage frequency in a 
universal financial media data base.  
 
6. Further Research Directions 
There are many opportunities for further research that emerge on the back of the empirical 
findings of this thesis. The results indicate that pre-announcement media coverage has a 
statistically significant post-announcement effect. Further research could analyse the persistence 
in this media coverage over time, post-announcement in order to ascertain whether there is any 






Chapter 2. Media Sentiment and Bidder Performance: Evidence 
from UK M&As 
 
1. Introduction 
Research on media pessimism and its interaction with acquirer return is a relatively new area that 
has received substantial attention in the last few years. This chapter examines how media 
coverage and pessimism can influence acquirer returns in takeover deals, based on a universal 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) data draw from the UK market. Shiller (2000) indicates that 
market sentiment is motivated by news content and finds that media coverage has a major impact 
on stock trading and returns. In the case of a merger deal, the media disseminates information to 
market participants and plays a crucial role in shaping investor expectations about the combined 
firms’ future value. Moreover, the increase in media coverage has a significant and positive effect 
on stock returns in the short-term and has an opposite effect in the long-term (Barber and Odean 
(2008); Da et al. (2011)). Further, high media pessimism leads to downward pressure on market 
prices (Tetlock (2007)). 
 
It is generally believed that financial newspapers directly impact investor sentiment concerning 
both individual stocks and the market as a whole (Antweiler and Frank (2004); Chen et al. (2013); 
Garcia (2013); Ferguson et al. (2012); Jegadeesh and Wu (2012)). Tetlock (2007) shows that 
news content can predict future stock market movements and Chen et al. (2013) find opinions 
expressed in both articles and commentaries can predict future stock returns. However, Das and 
Chen (2007) find no evidence that sentiment has predictability in future returns and trading 
volumes. Moreover, Carretta et al. (2011), Henry (2008), and Tetlock et al. (2008) conclude that 
pessimistic news brings about lower future stock returns, while Antweiler and Frank (2004) find 
that positive news leads to negative returns the next day. In addition, Tetlock et al. (2008) suggest 
that negative words in news can predict individual firms’ stock returns, while Buehlmaier (2012) 
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proposes that positive news content can predict stock returns. Studies also find that media reports 
of a firm’s previously unreleased fundamental information can predict future performance. 
 
While the literature shows that the financial media have a strong influence on firm stock 
performance, a significant gap exists in the research: The study of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) is one of the important components of the corporate finance literature and it has received 
significant attention in the last few decades. Moreover, M&As are major corporate events and 
usually receive large amounts of media attention, using merger announcements as a testing 
ground to examine media sentiment and market reactions should generate meaningful 
implications for the two schools of literature. However, no existing papers examine the relation 
between the financial media and major corporate events such as M&As. Second, previous 
research has focused on the US market and the relation between financial news and stock returns 
(e.g., Birza and Lott (2011); Akhtar et al. (2012)). However, the UK media and US media are 
very different. As Shaw (1999) suggests, the UK media are more independent, whereas the US 
media are more conformist. Therefore, this chapter’s primary motivations are to fill these two 
important gaps. 
 
Based on the literature on financial media and market reactions to corporate events, the media 
can influence merger returns in two ways. First, since the financial media can influence investor 
recognition and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis states that the greater the media 
coverage, the lower the information asymmetry, the higher investor demand to buy stocks, which 
should drive prices upwards accordingly; Therefore a significant relation between media 
coverage around merger announcements and acquirer abnormal returns is expected to observed. 
However, previous M&A research states that stock market reactions to takeover announcements 
are critical. According to Knapp et al. (2005), market reactions to takeover announcements are 
significantly negative. In addition, Dutta and Jog (2009) suggest positive market reactions to 
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takeover announcements, but with prompt corrections to such overreactions. Bhanot et al. (2014) 
state that news announcements offer additional and exclusive information to market investors to 
influence the future performance of the financial industry within the Eurozone. It is generally 
believed that stock market reactions mainly reflect investor recognition of such corporate events. 
Second, Tetlock et al. (2008) demonstrate that fundamental information transmitted by financial 
news resolves the problem of information asymmetry; therefore financial news can provide 
additional information for investors with which to evaluate their prospects in M&A deals and 
hence reduce information asymmetry. Garcia (2013) shows that the ability to forecast stock 
returns by using news content is concentrated around recessionary periods. Moreover, Tetlock 
(2007) states that high media pessimism leads to downward pressure on market prices. Therefore, 
a negative and significant relation between media pessimism around merger announcements and 
acquirers’ abnormal returns is expected to observed. 
 
The empirical result is consistent with the hypotheses. The result shows, over the short run, deals 
with media coverage outperform deals without media coverage. The finding is in line with early 
investigations by Shiller (2000) and Barber and Odean (2008), who indicate that the returns of 
stocks covered by the media should be much higher than those of stocks without media coverage 
due to information recognition. As Buehlmaier (2012) suggests, media coverage can lessen 
information asymmetry between targets and acquirers since it releases information on future firm 
value. However, the finding is inconsistent with of Fang and Peress (2009), who show that stocks 
without media coverage outperform those heavily covered by the media by 3% per year. The 
result is probably due to the nature of UK data – in that the sample consists of many small firms – 
and therefore, based on a differential information hypothesis that suggests that more 
pre-announcement information is available on large firms than on small firms (Atiase (1985)), a 




Moreover, by employing a media pessimism formula based on negative words, the result shows 
that pre-merger media pessimism exhibits a significant negative relation with both short-run and 
long-run acquirer returns. That is, greater media pessimism leads to a lower takeover return. This 
finding is consistent with those of Carretta et al. (2011), Henry (2008), and Tetlock (2007), who 
argue that high media pessimism leads to low investor sentiment, resulting in a decrease in stock 
prices. 
 
Apart from media coverage and media pessimism, many other factors can influence takeover 
performance. Fuller et al. (2002) state that returns are greater when stocks are the method of 
payment. However, most studies show that the operating performance of all-equity acquisitions is 
significantly worse than that of bids consisting of cash (for the United States, see Ghosh (2000), 
and for the United Kingdom, see Carline et al. (2002), and Martynova and Renneboog (2011). 
Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that low-leverage firms are likely to increase equity 
when market valuations are high and high-leverage firms tend to raise funds when their market 
valuations are low. In the long run, value bidders gain higher abnormal returns than glamour 
bidders do around takeover announcements. However, the reverse is the case in the short run 
(Lang et al. (1989); Servaes (1991); Rau and Vermaelen (1998)). This chapter considers these 
factors as well. 
 
This chapter provides clear contributions to the literature. It is the first to use M&A data to test 
the relation between media coverage (pessimism) and market efficiency in major corporate events. 
Such M&As attract media attention and therefore both firm-specific information and market 
information are available for empirical investigation. In contrast to the previous literature, which 
focuses on the relation between financial media and the entire stock market, this study 
specifically investigates the effect of media news on M&As. The large amounts of media 
coverage around takeover announcements could provide the perfect test ground for this relation, 
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since such an experiment would be less prone to selection bias in the media data. Second, given 
that the UK is the second largest financial centre in the world, this study extends previous 
research by investigating whether and how the influence of media coverage and pessimism on 
bidder performance can offer new evidence. Third, not only the impact of media coverage but 
also the influence of media pessimism in both the short run and long run is examined. The 
findings have practical implications for the investor sentiment literature and suggest that media 
pessimism could be considered an effective proxy for investor sentiment. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and formulates the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and empirical methodology. Section 4 
shows the main results, Section 5 presents the discussions about the results, followed by a 
robustness test in Section 6. And Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, the relevant literature is reviewed and the hypotheses for the first chapter’s 
research questions are shown as well. 
 
2.1 Takeover waves 
A great number of studies indicate that takeovers occur in waves. The academic literature shows 
five complete waves, in the early 1900s, 1920s, 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. Firm events are 
mixtures of two activities important to firm finance: investment decisions and financing decisions. 
The latter includes stock repurchases, seasoned equity offering (SEOs)3, and initial public 
offerings (IPOs)4. Rau and Stouraitis (2011) analyze takeover waves accompanied by other 
corporate activities. After examining a large and comprehensive data set from 1980 to 2004, the 
authors show that stock issuance activities are negatively correlated to the stock repurchases. 
                                                        
3
 A seasoned equity offering (SEO) refers to a new equity issue by an already publicly traded firm. 
4
 
An initial public offering (IPO) is a kind of public offering where security shares in a firm are sold to the public on 
a stocks exchange for the first time. 
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Apart from that, significantly positive correlations between different forms of stock issuance exist 
at the industry level. Moreover, the results of autoregressive models demonstrate a distinct 
pattern in lagged events. Lagged SEO volume forecasts future IPO volume and both the SEO and 
IPO volumes forecast future stock-financed takeover volume. Lagged stock-financed takeovers 
can also predict future repurchase events. In addition, the results of a bootstrap simulation 
method demonstrate that even though different corporate activity waves overlap, each wave has a 
time pattern. Just as the vector autoregressive analysis shows, takeover waves with stock 
financing occur after the stock issue waves, with SEOs preceding IPOs and, finally, stock 
repurchase waves. 
 
According to the neoclassical efficiency hypothesis, firm managers concentrate on efficiency 
when they plan firm takeovers. By buying targets and taking equity issuance, they make 
investments in positive net present value projects or take advantage of growth opportunities. The 
neoclassical efficiency hypothesis states that payment methods should not be associated with 
making acquisitions. Moreover, the market misvaluation hypothesis states that rational managers 
profit from irrational market misvaluations by issuing stock in exchange for cash or other 
corporations. However, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that the neoclassical theory that focuses 
upon industry-specific shocks is imperfect, since it does not explain aggregate merger waves and, 
whether stock or cash is used to pay the shareholders of acquired firms, it also has difficulty 
reconciling stock market evidence. 
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) note that all waves have common factors: They are preceded 
by industrial or technological shocks and occur in a positive political and economic environment, 
coinciding with fast credit expansion and stock market booms. The M&As toward the end of a 





Bhagat et al. (2005) and Harford (2005) demonstrate that the total announcement wealth effects 
of M&As in periods outside surging takeover waves are always significantly lower than the gains 
earned during upward-moving takeover waves. Both studies also reveal that the highest combined 
M&A gains are realized at the beginnings of takeover waves. This finding is also confirmed by 
Moeller et al. (2004) for the fifth takeover wave, whose second half (i.e., 1998–2001) includes 
the takeovers with the largest losses. However, a study of diversifying acquisitions reflects a 
different picture: Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003) present evidence that diversifying takeovers are 
associated with insignificant abnormal returns for combined firms in the first halves of the 
takeover waves, with significant abnormal gains in their second halves.  
 
Examining the fourth takeover wave in the 1980s, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that the 
rate of takeover activities is directly associated with economic shocks. The evidence suggests that 
the density and time series of these activities are differentiated by industry and that the activities 
cluster in a few particular industries. Furthermore, most of these industries experienced great 
fundamental shocks during the sample period, which are considered the cause of M&A waves. 
The results show that proper research design should consider not only macroeconomic but also 
industry-level factors. 
 
2.2 Takeover motivations 
2.2.1 Good bidders acquire bad targets 
Martin and McConnell (1991) investigate the disciplinary role of corporate takeovers by 
employing a sample of 253 successful tender offer takeovers that took place between 1958 and 
1984. A firm’s takeover is categorized as disciplinary if there is top manager turnover in the target 
firm shortly after the M&A and other types of takeover are categorized as non-disciplinary. The 
authors employ two sets of empirical tests and the results suggest that the takeover market plays a 
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significant role in controlling top managers and aligning the incentives of senior executives with 
the interests of stockholders. Moreover, the authors also classify takeovers as hostile or friendly 
and, for both samples, the rate of turnover in top senior corporate executives increases 
considerably after M&A activities. Furthermore, the results indicate that tender offer M&As 
create value for the shareholders of the involved firms, irrespective of the motivation. 
 
Martin and McConnell (1991) compute the cumulative average prediction errors (CPEs) and 
cumulative industry-adjusted returns (CIARs) for the full sample of 253 successful takeover 
target firms and show that information leakage regarding M&As has an effect on security returns 
during the pre-takeover period. The authors’ evidence shows that all acquired firms perform 
better than the market; however, they perform worse than others in their industry peer group. 
Moreover, the statistics reveal an industry effect in the pre-takeover performance of tender offer 
targets. 
 
Martin and McConnell (1991) also indicate that acquired firms of M&As with changes in senior 
corporate executives following the takeover perform much worse than those acquired firms with 
no change in senior corporate executives. In addition, the data are in line with the hypothesis that 
M&As are a device to discipline the top executives of poorly performing firms. Additionally, the 
findings indicate that if the bidder’s managers successfully take control of the acquired firm and 
decide to change the senior corporate executives, they will seek possible replacement candidates 
from both within the acquired firm and in external labor market, without consideration of the 
candidate’s previous affiliation. Moreover, the results indicate that bidders consider changing the 
top manager of non–value-maximizing target firms rather than the other senior executives, 





Furthermore, for both the hostile and friendly samples, the turnover rate in the top manager goes 
up significantly in the two years after a successful takeover, although it does not differ 
considerably between the two samples. In addition, neither the hostile nor the friendly sample 
shows any differences between disciplinary and non-disciplinary takeovers and the pre-takeover 
performance of acquired firms of disciplinary takeovers is not different from that of 
non-disciplinary takeovers. Finally, the results suggest that the M&A gains to bidders and targets 
appear to be the same, whether the takeover is disciplinary or non-disciplinary. Further, the level 
of competition among bidders as measured by the number of multiple- and single-bidder contests 
is the same in both disciplinary and non-disciplinary takeovers. 
 
2.2.2 Factors influencing takeover performance 
Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (1995) note that M&As act as a substitute for outside directors when 
viewed as an alternative control device. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the discipline 
associated with corporate mergers extends beyond top management to affect the restructuring of 
the whole board. The nature of the discipline depends on the composition of the acquired firm 
board prior to the merger. Disciplinary mergers have two outcomes: (1) For inside-dominated 
acquired firms, the number of inside directorships is reduced while the number of outside 
directorships remains the same. (2) For outside-dominated boards, the number of inside 
directorships increases while the number of outside directorships decreases. Accordingly, the 
board is recomposed to a more even balance between outside and inside directorships. 
 
Fuller et al. (2002) employ a sample of 3135 takeovers and find that bidders are more likely to 
obtain higher stock returns when buying a private firm or subsidiary and are more likely to suffer 
losses when purchasing a public firm. Moreover, the return is greater when the target is a large 




Grinblatt and Titman (2002) suggest that the stock return of a bidder at the time of a takeover 
announcement may reveal more information about how the market is re-evaluating the acquirer’s 
business than about the value of takeover. Therefore, the return at the time of announcement 
cannot truly reflect the takeover’s expected effect on profitability. Similarly, Hietala, Kaplan, and 
Robinson (2003) find that a takeover announcement reveals information about the potential 
synergies of the combination, the standalone values of the acquirer(s) and target(s), and how the 
value will be distributed between them. It is hard to isolate these three effects in mergers. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that equity market timing is a significant aspect of actual 
financial policy and examine how equity market timing influences capital structure in the long 
and short run. The authors propose the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of 
previous efforts to time the market because past market valuations significantly influence capital 
structure in a statistically robust manner. The market-to-book ratio is utilized to measure market 
timing opportunities and the results are in line with the hypotheses that market timing has a 
significant and persistent influence upon capital structure, with persistence tested three ways. 
What is more, Baker and Wurgler find that low-leverage firms are likely to increase equity when 
market valuations are high and high-leverage firms tend to raise funds when their market 
valuations are low. In addition, their findings indicate that market valuation fluctuations have 
strong influences on capital structure that persist for at least a decade. 
 
The earlier research focuses on three theories, the first of which is trade-off theory. Firms with 
considerable investment opportunities and growth lose the most when overhanging debt stops 
fresh capital from being raised or leads to inefficient bankruptcy negotiations and, ultimately, lost 
investment opportunities. In addition, the evidence shows that variations in the market-to-book 
ratio have a decades-long influence on capital structure. The second is pecking order theory. This 
theory considers the market to book as a measure of investment opportunities and the results 
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suggest that periods of many investment opportunities are likely to decrease leverage. Moreover, 
the results show high market-to-book ratio firms reduce leverage by issuing equity, not by 
retaining earning, and leverage is more strongly determined by past market-to-book values. The 
last theory is managerial entrenchment theory. High valuations and excellent investment 
opportunities assist equity finance, allowing managers to become entrenched. These managers 
may then avoid increasing debt to rebalance in later periods. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) propose the market timing theory. There are two versions of equity 
market timing that have the same capital structure dynamics. The first one, with a dynamic form, 
involves rational investors and managers and adverse selection costs that vary across time or 
across firms. Firms are likely to announce equity issues after releasing information, which might 
decrease information asymmetry. Moreover, if the costs deviations from an optimal capital 
structure are smaller than the resulting variation in issuing costs, past variations in the 
market-to-book ratio may have a continuing influence. The second version involves irrational 
investors or managers and time-varying mispricing. Investors issue equity when they think its 
cost is too high. In sum, much of Baker and Wurgler’s evidence shows that marketing timing is a 
significant aspect of actual financing decisions. 
 
2.3 The M&A process 
The earlier literature does not strictly distinguish between sources of takeover financing and 
methods of payment. Recent papers focus on bidder financing decisions. One of the most 
representative works is that of Martynova and Renneboog (2009), the first to empirically examine 
sources of financing along with payment media. The authors investigate bidding firms’ choices of 
transaction financing sources in European M&As during 1993–2001. They highlight that the 
decisions of payment means and financing sources in a takeover are driven by different factors. 
The results indicate the financing decision in a takeover bid is affected by pecking order 
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preferences, the need for flexibility in managing corporate funds, and the corporate governance 
environment, all of which are related to the costs of external capital. Martynova and Renneboog 
conduct multinomial and nested logit analyses to show that bidders have systematic preferences 
for particular financing sources that depend on the characteristics of the firm and the takeover. 
The authors also find that the payment means decision is indirectly influenced by the acquiring 
firm’s large shareholders’ desire to keep control after the transaction and the intention of the 
acquiring firm’s shareholders to buy out all the shareholders or to share the risk of the merger 
with the acquired firm’s shareholders. Moreover, the bidder’s financing decision has considerable 
influence on the market’s reaction to the takeover announcement. Finally, Martynova and 
Renneboog conclude that the way a takeover deal is financed signals significant information to 
the market about the quality of the bidder and the profitability of the M&A activity. 
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find over the six months prior to or after the takeover 
announcement, the M&A returns to the bidding firm’s shareholders are significantly negative in 
M&As involving equity financing. The analysis reveals that a negative price revision follows the 
takeover announcement when the M&A involves equity financing. It also confirms that investors 
interpret bank provision of funding to mean the takeover is profitable and all-equity-financed 
takeovers are associated with considerably lower announcement returns compared to cash and 
debt financing. The results show that transaction financing sources are a significant determinant 
of bidding firm share price reactions to M&A announcements, as well as of payment methods. 
Moreover, Martynova and Renneboog also find that announcements of equity financing in 
takeovers bring about lower returns for the acquirer shareholders. One explanation for this 
finding is that investors consider an equity payment a signal that the bidding firm’s shares are 
overvalued and therefore decrease the share price after equity financing is announced. Another 
explanation is the market considers equity payment as a negative signal that the quality of the 
acquired firm and its potential acquisition synergies are uncertain, because investors think the 
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bidding firm is likely to pay with equity to share the risks with the acquired firm’s shareholders. 
 
Dividing samples of takeovers into tender offers and mergers, Schwert (1996) and Franks and 
Harris (1989) illustrate that the shareholders of acquired firms earn significantly higher premiums 
in tender offers than in mergers. Since the means of payment in mergers is usually equity, 
whereas cash bids prevail in tender offers, the authors also find that all-cash bids are more 
profitable for target shareholders than all-equity ones. However, even within each takeover type 
subsample (mergers, friendly acquisitions, and tender offers), Franks et al. (1988), Andrade et al. 
(2001), and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find evidence that all-equity bids trigger lower target 
returns than all-cash bids. 
 
Most studies show that the operating performance of all-equity acquisitions is significantly worse 
than that of bids consisting of cash (see, e.g., Ghosh, 2001, for the United States and Carline et al., 
2002, for the United Kingdom). 
 
2.4 Bidder returns in M&As 
Numerous studies show mixed results for bidder returns. Market reactions to merger 
announcements depend on the bidder’s payment method, motives, and pre-merger financial 
condition, among many other factors. Neoclassical theory states that mergers can create synergy 
by combining firms and therefore the market should react positively to merger announcements. 
On the other hand, behavioral finance theory offers alternative explanations, such as market 
timing and the overconfidence hypothesis. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) show that acquisitions are the best strategy for acquirers, since they 
might benefit from positive perceived synergies. In addition, the shareholders of the bidding firm 
can contribute to its earnings by undertaking mergers and thus take advantage of high valuations. 
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Both target and bidding firms’ managers can take advantage of acquisitions by getting good jobs 
or cashing out by selling shares and by increasing their equity’s long-term value, respectively. 
Shleifer and Vishny’s arguments are consistent with Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) conclusions, 
that firm M&As create positive gains and that the shareholders of both the acquired and acquiring 
firms benefit from takeovers. 
 
After examining the interactions between the merger gains and q ratios of acquired and bidder 
firms in a sample of 704 takeovers and tender offers, Servaes (1991) finds that M&As are larger 
when the acquired firm performs poorly (has a low q ratio) and the acquiring firm has excellent 
performance (has a high q ratio). Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find that “the probability of 
receiving a takeover bid is positively related to tangible assets, and negatively related to firm size 
and to the net change in institutional holdings.” Unlike traditional approaches, which focus on 
firm-level characteristics to explain unperfected investment behavior and investment cash flow 
sensitivity, Malmendier and Tate (2005) propose that the key firm decision maker’s personal 
characteristics are also significant. Moreover, by regressing investment on cash flow, the 
interaction of overconfidence and cash flow, and the overconfidence measure, the authors find a 
strong positive relation between managerial overconfidence and investment cash flow sensitivity. 
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that, in the long run, value bidders gain higher abnormal returns 
than glamour bidders around takeover announcements. However, the reverse is the case in the 
short run; that is, the stock prices of firms with high book-to-market ratios increase much more 
than those of their peers with low book-to-market ratios around merger announcements. The 
authors’ evidence indicates that this is because when the attraction of a takeover is evaluated, not 
only the acquirer’s management but also the market overestimates the acquirer’s past 
performance, which is reflected by the acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Fama and French (1993) 
propose a methodology controlling for low book-to-market firms’ returns where below-average 
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returns would show no constant negative abnormal returns. Servaes (1991) and Lang et al. (1989) 
show that short-horizon announcement returns are negatively correlated with book-to-market 
ratios. 
 
By examining the post-acquisition stock returns from 947 acquisitions, Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
show that bidders paying for takeovers by issuing stocks gain significantly negative abnormal 
returns and cash bidders gain significantly positive abnormal returns in the five years after a 
takeover. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) report that acquisition premiums are “positively 
correlated with proxies for past managerial performance such as recent organizational success 
and media praise for the CEO.” Just as their vector autoregressive analysis shows, takeover 
waves with stock financing occur after stock issue waves, with SEOs followed by IPOs and, 
finally, stock repurchase waves.  
 
On the other hand, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) argue that the media have no effect on M&As 
because increased exposure to media information is not necessarily related to an accurate 
understanding of global events. Moreover, different news sources have strong correlations with 
attitudes toward the West and terrorist activities. However, a number of articles still argue that 
media coverage has an effect. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) examine the causal relation between 
the media and stock market reactions. In particular, they investigate whether media coverage of a 
financial event influences investor behavior. One of their main results is that trading in each of 
the 19 markets is strongly associated with local newspaper coverage of the announcement. 
Moreover, the authors contribute to the growing number of studies investigating the influence of 
the media on actual outcomes. Their results show that local media coverage has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the logarithm of the dollar trading volume. Controlling for local 
trading, pre-existing demand, and home bias, Engelberg and Parsons estimate the pure effect of 




By examining the cross-sectional relation between expected stock returns and media coverage, 
Fang and Peress (2009) suggest that the media play an important role in reducing informational 
friction and influence stock pricing, even when they do not provide real news. Additionally, the 
authors argue that stocks without media coverage obtain higher returns than securities with high 
media coverage. The argument is stronger for small securities and securities with low analyst 
following, high individual ownership, and high idiosyncratic volatility. Media coverage is 
positively related to idiosyncratic volatility, which suggests that media coverage facilitates the 
integration of information into stock prices. Media coverage also has a positive correlation with 
analyst forecast dispersion, which suggests that the media do not bring about a convergence of 
opinions. Finally, Fang and Peress show that the breadth of information dissemination influences 
security returns. 
 
2.5 Financial media and stock market returns 
Textual analysis is a subset of the finance literature on qualitative information. Loughran and 
McDonald (2010) find that negative word categorizations are an efficient way to measure media 
tone and show their significant correlation with other financial variables. Compared with the 
Harvard list, the Fin-Neg list has more significant correlations with stock returns when media 
articles and SEOs are examined. Loughran and McDonald therefore concentrate on the Fin-Neg 
list’s more regular word cataloging approach to measure tone. 
 
However, other papers prefer alternative approaches founded on vector distance, probability 
ratios, naïve Bayes categorizations, and other categorization algorithms. Li (2009) investigates 
the advantages of employing a statistical method over word categorization and argues that 
categorization may not adequately capture influence for corporate filings because of the lack of a 
readily available dictionary. Tetlock (2008) considers the disadvantages of employing approaches 
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that “require the estimation of likelihood ratios based on difficult to replicate and subjective 
classification of texts’ tone.” 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2010) also uncovered a measurement problem in which, if the Harvard 
dictionary is used, about three-fourths of the negative word counts in 10-K5 filings are not 
typically negative in a financial news context. The authors introduced two methods to resolve this 
issue: First, they generated a word list that included typically negative words in financial reports; 
second, they constructed a term-weighting scheme that reduces the influence of high-frequency 
words and gives lower-frequency words greater influence. Either method can reduce the noise 
caused by word misclassification. Furthermore, Loughran and McDonald created five other word 
categorizations, based on positive, uncertain, litigious, strongly modal, and weakly modal words, 
respectively. 
 
Carretta et al. (2011) analyze the relation between the mass media and stock returns, using Italy’s 
key financial media. Their results show that stock returns are likely to increase after ownership 
news if the firm has not been profitable when the news is released; otherwise, returns tend to 
decrease. This finding means public investors react negatively to ownership news about 
profitable firms and are likely to sell their securities. The results also indicate that “the tone and 
content of corporate governance news are not statistically significant related to cumulative 
abnormal returns6” (hereafter CARs; Carretta et al., 2011). The authors suggest that investors can 
determine the type of corporate governance event only prior to the news release, since after its 
publication individual investors are affected by its content and tone. Moreover, the authors find 
that stock returns are negatively influenced by news when changes occur to the board of directors 
of profitable firms. 
                                                        
5 Form 10-K is an annual report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission  that comprehensively 
summarizes a firm‘s performance. 
6 Cumulative abnormal return(CAR) is the sum of abnormal returns. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are often 




Tetlock (2007) examines the relation between media content and stock market activity. The 
author suggests that a highly pessimistic media forecast places downward pressure on market 
prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals and that unusual optimism or pessimism predicts 
high market trading volume. Furthermore, pessimistic forecasts seem to have a particularly large 
negative influence that reverses itself in small stocks quite slowly. 
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) investigate the utilization of a quantitative language measure to forecast 
corporate earnings and stock returns. They present three main findings: First, within 
corporation-specific news stories, part of the negative words that convey negative information 
can be used to forecast low corporate earnings. Second, corporate share prices react to such 
information with a short delay. Third, the predictability of earnings and stock returns from 
negative words is strongest for stories that concentrate on fundamentals. Tetlock et al. (2008) 
conclude that “linguistic media content captures otherwise difficult to quantify aspects of firms’ 
fundamentals” that investors rapidly impound into share prices. However, the authors show only 
that negative word counts have predictability and do not consider the effect of positive words. 
 
Buehlmaier and Zechner (2013) present strong evidence that information in the financial media is 
not fully impounded in security prices. The authors also demonstrate that media content 
influences takeover arbitrage returns but the results for media coverage are not significant. 
Moreover, media information released on the announcement day includes information proven to 
be largely unrelated to the likelihood of deal completion. The authors do not provide any strong 
evidence supporting a certification role for the media. 
 
Based on Tetlock’s (2008) finding, Garcia (2013) examines the sentiment effect on asset prices by 
investigating financial news from The New York Times in the 20th century. Employing the 
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fractions of negative and positive words as a proxy for media pessimism, Garcia shows that the 
ability to forecast stock returns by using news content focuses on recessionary periods. Moreover, 
predictability is especially strong on Mondays and following holidays, since readers have more 
time to read the news before the afternoon of the trading day. Additionally, Garcia argues that the 
effect partially reverses after the next four trading days. In sum, investor sentiment has an 
important impact during recessions. 
 
In addition, Vadnais (2012) concentrates on the media’s influence on pricing and the completion 
of takeover transactions in the high-tech industry. The author suggests that average media 
sentiment about takeover transactions has a positive correlation with the final price of the 
acquired firm. However, the author finds no evidence that media sentiment affects the probability 
of takeovers being withdrawn or completed. Moreover, the transaction size and amount of media 
coverage strongly influence the extent to which media sentiment affects a takeover transaction’s 
pricing, with greater transaction size and news coverage associated with stronger media sentiment 
influence. Finally, the author concludes that the media not only covey information to investors, 
but also have a strong influence on the financial markets and a strong ability to affect the 
high-tech industry landscape. 
 
After examining news about gross domestic product growth, unemployment, retail sales, and 
durable goods, Birza and Lott (2011) find that the news about gross domestic product growth and 
unemployment significantly affects stock returns. However, the correlations between stock 
returns and news about durable goods and retail sales are statistically insignificant. 
 
Schumaker et al. (2012) pair the Arizona Financial Text system, a financial news article 
prediction system, with a media sentiment analysis tool. They conclude that subjective news 
articles facilitate forecasting the direction of price and obtain a 3.30% stock return with an 
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uncomplicated trading engine. After investigating the role of author attitude among the financial 
articles, they also state that news articles with a negative attitude make it easier to forecast the 
direction of price and achieve a 3.04% return. Moreover, they note that their system is effective in 
forecasting price decreases in news articles with positive sentiment (53.5%) and negative/neutral 
sentiment (52.4%). 
 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) suggest a firm uses media coverage to affect and manipulate its stock 
price after a takeover. They state that acquirers in fixed exchange ratio takeovers release more 
media coverage when they start the takeover negotiations in private before the public 
announcement. During this period, the stock exchange ratio is already established. In addition, 
acquirers in floating exchange ratio indicate do not show apparent differences in news release 
issuance in this period. This strategy leads to short-lived increases in the new coverage and the 
valuation of acquirers. The authors also find that media management has an influence on takeover 
gains and there is a positive relation between the increase in media coverage during takeover 
negotiations and the firm’s share of takeover gains. 
 
Barber and Odean (2008) propose that the buying behavior of individual investors is more 
heavily influenced by media attention than their selling behavior is because individual investors 
only sell stocks that they already own and most hold relatively few common stocks in their 
portfolios. Moreover, the buying behavior of individual investors is more heavily influenced by 
attention than the buying behavior of professional investors, because investors can, individually, 
consider the merits—both economic and emotional—of selling each stock they own and 
individual investors do not devote themselves to full-time stock research. The authors conclude 
that attention-driven buying is also driven by the complexity involved in individual investors 




Buehlmaier (2012) note a positive relation between news content and takeover success. The 
media measure constructed by naïve Bayes is the most significant explanatory variable, with a 
large marginal effect and goodness of fit. Ohl et al. (1995) show that relevant news content 
during M&As is influenced not only by a firm’s press releases but also by media access to the 
firm’s executives. 
 
Focusing on Russia during 1999–2002, Dyck et al. (2008) find that media coverage has a crucial 
effect on corporate governance and can be influenced by the parties involved. The authors also 
note that a firm’s intrinsic newsworthiness and the Hermitage fund result in foreign media 
coverage of major corporate governance abuses. 
 
Using equity data and a new panel data set of news counts for 23 emerging markets, Veldkamp 
(2006) shows that when asset market volatility increases, news coverage intensifies and that more 
news coverage is correlated with higher asset prices and greater cross-market price dispersion. 
 
Da, Zhi, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) states two reasons why more Google searches with investor 
overconfidence may lead to stronger stock price momentum: First, according to Gilovich, Griffin, 
and Kahneman (2002), many psychological studies find that people have more confidence if they 
obtain more information or expertise. Second, when people search on Google for stock 
information, investors may be influenced by the same information sets and their private signals 
have more correlations with each other. 
 
After comparing reactions to earnings announcements on Fridays with those on other weekdays, 
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) find that Friday announcements are followed by a higher delayed 
market response. The delayed response is 60% of the total response on Friday and 40% of the 
total response on other weekdays. Considerable returns can be earned by investing a portfolio in 
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the differential Friday drift. The authors find investors undertake fewer work-related activities on 
Fridays than on others weekdays and the limited attention may lead to investors underreacting to 
earnings information. Eventually, investors realize the mispricing and incorporate the information. 
The authors conclude that limited attention leads to underreaction to information, which plays a 
crucial role in post-earnings announcement drift. 
 
Examining evidence of post-news drift, Chan (2003) finds results in line with the idea that 
investors underreact to information. The underreaction is strongest following bad news. Moreover, 
the subsequent reversal in extreme price movements is inconsistent with public news. Chan also 
notes that trading frictions, such as short-sale constraints, show a significant relation with the 
pattern of post-bad news drift. First, Stocks with negative public media coverage also have 
negative drift. However, stocks with positive news have few negative drift. Chan explains that 
stocks prices are slowly react negative public media coverage. Second, stocks without media 
coverage in the event month have a tendency to reverse in the following month even considering 
the controlling variables such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, and influences of liquidity. This 
result supports the view that investment practitioners always overreact to the movements of 
spurious stock price. This lead to "excess" volatility and trading volume and then also cause the 
stock price reverse. In sum, investors are slow to react to information and overreact to price 
movement are two major thought among investors. Moreover, investors respond to media 
coverage slower in small stocks than large ones.  
 
Solomon (2012) investigates how positive and negative media coverage influence stock prices by 
examining the influence of investor relations firms. The results show that the investor relations 
firms "spin" their customers' news by generating more positive media coverage releases then 
negative media coverage releases, and then increases returns of announcements. Solomon also 
reports that positive news increasing the expectations of investors and negative news creating the 
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disappointment of investors. 
 
2.6 Hypothesis development 
Based on the above findings, this paper examines whether the financial media influence takeover 
gains. Both short-run and long-run abnormal returns are examined. As Shiller (2000) shows, 
market sentiment is motivated by news content. The author also proposes that media coverage 
has a major impact on stock trading and returns. Moreover, according to Merton’s (1987) investor 
recognition hypothesis, a firm with greater investor recognition should experience higher demand, 
which should drive its price up accordingly. A firm covered by the media should therefore follow 
such a pattern, as stated in the hypothesis below. In addition, Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2013) 
state that more frequent news releases are associated with lower information asymmetry. This 
intuition is formalized in the following hypothesis. 
H1: Deals with media coverage prior to the merger announcement should outperform deals 
without such media coverage in both the short run and the long run. 
 
As Tetlock (2007), Tetlock et al. (2008), and Fang and Peress (2009) show, both the attitude and 
coverage of the financial media have significant impacts on the stock market, for example, 
affecting investor sentiment and resolving information asymmetry. This finding suggests that 
when a takeover is announced, news stories previously released by the financial media can 
partially influence market reactions to bidder stock prices. This section evaluates media attitude 
via media sentiment. Moreover, Henry (2008) states that abnormal returns are higher, since the 
attitude of the news release is more positive and Chen et al. (2013) find that the pessimistic 
sentiment in online articles is negatively related with abnormal returns in the short run. Therefore, 
greater bidder’s media pessimism triggers lower post-merger abnormal returns. This leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H2: There is a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and market responses 
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to takeover announcements in both the short run and long run. 
 
To sum up, this paper proposes that the financial media affect two functional aspects of stock 
market reactions around M&A events. First, news stories released by the financial media partially 
bias market and investor sentiment and an effect is quickly reflected in firm stock price 
movements. Thus H1 examines whether this function is still valid for the announcement returns 
of M&A deals. On the other hand, H2 is more concerned with the relation between merging firms’ 
post-merger performance and the financial media over both the short run and long run. As already 
noted, merging firms’ post-merger stock performance is an important criterion in judging the 
success of takeover deals. The second function of the financial media is the disclosure of 
unreleased information and the resolution of potential information asymmetry. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The analysis uses three types of data: M&A data, UK media data, and stock price and accounting 
data. The data were collected from three databases. First, M&A data on public bidding firms 
between November 30, 1981, and January 1, 2010, were obtained from the Thomson One Banker 
Deals database. The deal must be successfully completed and the acquirers and targets must be 
UK firms. Moreover, following standard M&A research practices, strongly regulated industries 
such as utilities and financial institutions are excluded. According to the criteria shows, there are 
11829 deals in the M&A data. 
 
Second, all media data were manually collected from the LexisNexis database, which includes 
four influential UK media sources: the Financial Times, The Times, Guardian, and the Mirror. 
These sources released 274,201 media articles between November 30, 1981, and January 1, 2010, 
covering 251 UK firms. (Since this chapter checks pre-merger media coverage, the media data 
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period is longer than the merger data’s.) As Table 2.1 shows, these top four media sources 
comprise more than 98% of the total media sources.  
 
Third, stock price and accounting data were obtained from Datastream. The data includes the 
daily stock prices, book-to-market ratios, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA)7, leverage, price-to-earnings (PE)8 ratios and market values. All of 
them are collected between November 30, 1981 and January 1, 2010. Moreover, FTSE All-Share 
Index levels data is between November 30, 1981 and January 1, 2013. It is three years longer 
than other data, because the 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated in 36 months 
following the takeover announcement. 
 
To match the data from the three different databases, a unique identifier is required. Thomson 
One Banker and Datastream both use the Datastream code as a firm identifier. Since the raw 
media data do not have Datastream codes, manual searches for these firms’ name in the media 
database were carried out to ensure each article to match with a Datastream code. The STATA 
program was used for the data cleaning and matching processes in this chapter. After controlling 
for anomalies and matching the three databases, a final sample containing 4,384 completed deals 
carried out by 1,116 UK public bidders is obtained, with 989 deals covered by media news within 
365 days before the takeover announcement. 
[Insert Table 2.1 Here] 
 
3.2 Methodology 
To calculate the media pessimism for each firm prior to its M&A announcement, the words in 
each article are compared with the positive and negative word lists of Loughran and McDonald 
                                                        
7 EBITDA refers to a firm's earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final 
accounting of its income and costs. The EBITDA of a firm show people about the current operational profitability of the firm's 
business. 
8 PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year. 
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(2010). In this case, the numbers of positive and negative words and the total number of words 
are obtained.9 In the most recent version of the word lists, 353 words are positive and 2337 
words are negative. 
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) define the media sentiment score as the standardized fraction of negative 
words in each news story, measured by 
 
    
                   
                
                         (1) 
    
        
    
                                 (2) 
 
where  
   
 is the mean of Neg and      is the standard deviation of Neg over the prior 
calendar year. Standardization is necessary if Neg is nonstationary. The variable neg is the 
stationary measure of media pessimism and is employed in the regression analyses. 
 
Each article is given a pessimism score and an arithmetic average score is calculated for each 
bidder. Similar results from using more than one formulas are obtained, such as the quantity of 
positive words minus the quantity of negative words, divided by the sum of positive and negative 
word counts or total words (Rees and Twedt 2012). However, Henry and Leone (2009) and 
Tetlock (2007) find that negative words have a much stronger correlation with stock returns than 
positive words do. Many papers also suggest that the frequency of negative words in an article 
decides its tone (Das and Chen 2007, Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012, Loughran and McDonald 
2011). Therefore, the method proposed by Tetlock et al. (2008) to is employed measure media 
pessimism. Because this formula focuses on the negative words, the media pessimism score 
stands for the level of media sentiment. 
                                                        





Accounting data, such as daily stock prices, book-to-market ratios, and price indices, are all 
obtained from Datastream and matched with the media data by Datastream code. Campbell, Lo & 
MacKinley (1997) point out that an investor use cumulative abnormal returns to measure firm 
performance and Fama (1998) argues that BHARs can predict significant long-run abnormal 
performance, even if none is present due to short-run influences. Therefore, this study uses two 
primary metrics to quantify short- and long-run market reactions: cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) and buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs).  
 
To control for the BHAR skewness problem, a bootstrapping methodology is adopted to calculate 
the unbiased critical value. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that bootstrapping is an effective 
methodology that is robust to problems that have a negative influence on standard long-run 
statistical significance tests. 
 
The short-term analysis follows the methodology of Brown and Warner (1980) and Fuller, 
Stegemoller and Netter (2002). Abnormal returns are defined as anything earned above a normal 
return for the security in question. To establish whether or not the market does react efficiently to 
the M&A announcement, a normal return for each acquirer should be established. The normal 
acquirer return is defined as the difference between the acquirer’s return and the market’s return 
on each day of the event window (Brown and Warner, 1980; Fuller et al., 2002), denoted: 
 
                                                                                                         (4) 
 
Where ri is the return for acquirer i and rm is the return of the underlying market benchmark. In 
this paper, the FTSE Allshare is used as the benchmark as opposed to FTSE 100, 250 or 350 




For each event window, the abnormal returns are summated across the event day to generate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each deal: 
 
         
 
                              (5) 
 
Where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for acquirer i. The null hypothesis is that for each 
sample, there is no statistically significant CAR generated so that CARi = 0, i.e. the media does 
not have a significant impact on investors or indeed the market reacts quickly, within the event 
window, to the arrival of information related to the M&A. The alternative is that there is a 
statistically significant profit generated such that CARi ≠ 0, i.e. the media does have a significant 
impact on investors or indeed the market reacts slowly to the arrival of information related to the 
M&A.  
 
Finally, the BHARs measure the difference between compounded actual returns and compound 
predicted returns: 
                                                     
 
            
 
           (6) 
 
where Rit is the arithmetic return (including dividends) at time t on security i and Rmt is the 
arithmetic return at time t on the value-weighted FTSE All-Share Index. 
 
In the Univariate Test, to examine the effects of media pessimism, the media pessimism score is 
sorted into two media pessimism portfolios after deals are ranked by the pessimism score from 
highest to lowest, the top 50% for high media pessimism and the bottom 50% for low media 
pessimism. 
 
All hypotheses are tested by employing ordinary least squares regression models. To examine the 
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relation between the level of media pessimism and stock returns and to test whether the media 
data have any stock return predictability, following regressions are run in this chapter: 
 
                                                                  (7a) 
                                                                 (7b)  
                                                                 (8a) 
                                                                 (8b) 
 
The media coverage and media pessimism for the days prior to the takeover announcement are 
regressed, respectively, and then compare them to determine which affects the stock returns most 
significantly. To investigate the effects of media coverage existence, the entire merger sample is 
split into two subsamples, with media coverage and without media coverage. The key variable 
MC is the media coverage in the 365 days prior to the takeover announcement. It is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if there are articles covering takeover news are published on a 
given period, and takes the value zero if there are none articles about the takeover news. The key 
variable MP is media pessimism in the 365 days prior to the takeover announcement. It is a 
continuous variable rather than a dummy variable. The level of media pessimism depends on the 
textual analysis, which divides words into positive and negative subsamples by using the 
financial news word lists created by Loughran and McDonald (2010).  
 
The method of payment and market value are the main variables. Travlos (1987) reports that the 
use of equity as a payment method in takeovers signals to the market that the acquirer is 
overvalued, while an all-cash payment indicates potential undervaluation of the acquirer. 
Therefore, two payment method dummy variables are included: Stock and Cash. The stock 
variable, Stock, takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% equity to buy the target firm and 
the cash variable, Cash, takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% cash financing to pay for 
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the target. Moreover, a lag in the key return predictability variables’ size (measured as the natural  
logarithm of the market value) is included, as for Tetlock et al. (2008), as well as the logarithm of 
the acquirer’s size, Ln(Size), defined as the acquirer’s market value measured one month before 
the deal announcement. 
 
In addition, the multivariate tests include a series of control variables that have a significant 
influence on acquirer returns according to previous studies. First, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find 
that value acquirers (with a high book-to-market ratio) outperform glamour acquirers (with a low 
book-to-market ratio) after a takeover. This may due to ‘performance extrapolation’ and hubris, 
which lead to poorer takeover decisions by glamour acquirers. Second, Lang et al. (1994) report a 
strong negative relation between firm leverage and firm future growth during 1970–1989. Jensen 
(1986) and Stulz (1990) suggest that leverage brings about poor investment opportunities and 
helps prevent firm overinvestment. Third, a firm’s EBITDA indicates its current operational 
profitability. Fourth, Travlos (1987) states that the relative size variable is used to account for 
difficulties in measuring abnormal returns due to the larger size of bidders relative to the size of 
their targets. Fifth, Brealey and Myers (1996) state that the PE ratio is part of the everyday 
vocabulary of investors in the stock market. Sixth, an increase in a stock’s media coverage could 
temporarily increase investor attention to this stock, resulting in a price run-up followed by a 
correction (Barber and Odean, 2008; Huberman and Regev, 2001). Therefore, the following 
variables are also included: the book-to-market ratio (B/M Ratio), defined as the acquirer’s book 
value divided by its market value; leverage (Leverage), defined as the amount of debt used to 
finance a firm’s assets; EBITDA (EBITDA); the relative size of the transaction (Relative Size), 
defined as the deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value, measured one month before the 
deal announcement; the PE ratio (PE ratio), measured as a firm’s current share price compared to 
its per-share earnings; and the run-up stock return of the acquirer measured over a window from 
365 to 28 days before the announcement (Run-Up). Moreover, hostile, public, tender, and 
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diversification are dummy variables that take the value of one for hostile, tender, and diversifying 
mergers, respectively, and zero otherwise. Moreover, hostile, public, tender and diversification 
are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and diversifying mergers, 





4. Main Results 
4.1 UK M&A deal transaction values 
Figure 2.1: Volatility of the UK M&A deal transaction values of the FTSE 100, 1981–2010. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the volatility of UK M&A deal transaction values of the FTSE 100 during 
1981–2010. There are three waves and the total value of transactions peaks first in 1989–1990. 
After that, the transactions decrease and subsequently peak in 1999–2000. In the middle of 2000, 
M&A activity collapsed and the value of takeover deals decreased and remained significantly 
below the peak of 1999–2000 until the end of 2010. After 2003, takeover market activity picked 
up but slowed down again in 2007 due to the worldwide sub-prime and credit crisis (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2009). 
 
4.2 Sample descriptive statistics 
4.2.1. Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 include two summary statistics for a sample of UK acquisitions and focuses on 
media coverage and media pessimism respectively, including the total number of observations, 
means, medians, and standard deviations of the financial, asset, and ownership structure variables 
under the media coverage classifications. The UK sample comprises 4,384 deals. Within 365 days 
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before the takeover announcements, 989 deals are covered by the media and 3,395 deals are not. 
Moreover, media pessimism level is also classified into high pessimism and low pessimism, and 
494 deals are covered by the news with high pessimism and 494 with low pessimism. 
 
In Table 2.2, the firm size of acquirers with media coverage is equal to £1.28 trillion, on average, 
while acquirers without media coverage have a mean size of £600.92 billion. These statistics 
show that the size of acquirers with media coverage is much greater compared to that of those 
without media coverage. This result is consistent with Chan (2003) and Da et al. (2011), who 
report a positive relation between firm size and the number of news articles released because of 
the costs faced by reporters in finding available information on small firms. Fang and Peress 
(2009) also find that large firms are much more likely to be covered by the media and firm size 
has a significant influence on media coverage. In Table 2.3, the average firm size of acquirers 
with high media pessimism is equal to £1467.47 billion, on average, while those with low media 
pessimism have a mean size of £1085.16 billion. These statistics show that the size of acquirers 
with high media pessimism is much greater than for those with low media pessimism.  
 
The results of Table 2.2 show 36.68% of transactions are fully financed by cash and only 5.04% 
are fully financed by stock. The rest of the transactions are financed by a mix of cash and stock. 
Most acquirers in the United Kingdom prefer cash payments in takeovers. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009) explain that the announcement of equity financing in takeovers is supposed to 
bring about lower returns for the acquirer’s shareholders. The reason is investors think an equity 
payment is a signal that the bidding firm’s shares are overvalued and therefore decrease the share 
price after equity financing is announced. 
 
Moreover, in Table 3.2, the average market-to-book value of acquirers with media coverage is 
3.08, while that without media coverage is 2.88. It shows that the market-to-book value of 
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acquirers with media coverage is larger than that of acquirers without media coverage. In Table 
2.3, the average market-to-book value of acquirers with media coverage is 2.91, while that 
without media coverage is 3.25. It shows that the market-to-book value of acquirers with low 
media pessimism is also much larger than that of acquirers with high media pessimism. 
According to the previous literature, market-to-book ratio has predictive ability for stock returns 
(Fama and French (1992), Rosenberg et al. (1985) , Strong and Xu (1997)) and stocks with lower 
market-to-book ratios earn higher returns (Chen (2011)). Therefore, the results indicate that 
acquirers without media coverage outperform that with media coverage, and acquirers with high 
media pessimism obtain higher returns than that with low media pessimism.  
 
In Table 2.2, the price to earnings ratios of acquirers with media coverage is 17.68, while that 
without media coverage is 18.2. It indicates that the price to earnings ratios of acquirers with 
media coverage is larger than that of acquirers without media coverage. In Table 2.3, the price to 
earnings ratios of acquirers with media coverage is 17.03, while that without media coverage is 
18.34. It shows that the price to earnings ratios acquirers with low media pessimism is also much 
smaller than that of acquirers with high media pessimism. According to Houmes and Chira 
(2015), a lower price–earnings ratio (P/E ratio) will be accompanied by a higher rate of return. 
Therefore, the results indicate that acquirers with media coverage outperform that without media 
coverage, and acquirers with low media pessimism obtain higher returns than that with high 
media pessimism. 
 
Both results of run-ups in Table 2.2, and 2.3 are positive. According to Meulbroek (1992) and 
Servaes (1991), a positive run-up implies that it may be caused by information leakage to the 





[Insert Table 2.2 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.3 Here] 
 
4.2.2. Univariate Analysis: Media Coverage  
This section reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and media coverage in the 
1981–2010 sample, based on univariate tests. The results are stratified once more according to 
known determinants highlighted by the previous literature: the method of payment (i.e. cash 
versus stock) and acquirer size (i.e. large versus small). 
 
Table 2.4 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 11-day CARs for the full samples of 
deals with and without media coverage. The stocks are divided into a group with no media 
coverage and a group with media coverage and their difference is analysed. The results in Panel A 
show that over the 11-day event window, those deals with media coverage earn announcement 
returns of 1.5% (p-value: 0.000) and deals without media coverage earn returns of 1.2% (p-value: 
0.000). Cash financed deals with media coverage earn announcement returns of 1.6% (p-value: 
0.000) and deals with no media coverage earn 1.4% (p-value: 0.000) announcement returns. 
However, the two-sample statistical analysis between these two groups shows that the difference 
between takeovers with and without media coverage is 0.2% (p-value: 0.313) and insignificant in 
the short run, even when the method of payment of considered. This finding does not support the 
first hypothesis that media coverage significantly increases an acquirer’s returns. 
 
Panels B of Table 2.4 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 11-day CARs for large 
firms. Over the 11-day event window, for large acquirers, those deals with media coverage earn 
announcement returns of 1.0% (p-value: 0.000) and deals without media coverage earn returns of 
0.2% (p-value: 0.207). The two-sample statistical analysis between these two groups shows that 
for large acquirers, takeovers with media coverage statistically outperform takeovers without 
56 
 
media coverage in the short run by 0.8% (p-value: 0.013), on average. And considering about the 
payment, mixed financed deals also show a significant difference between deals with and without 
media coverage.  
 
Panels C of Table 2.4 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 11-day CARs for small 
firms. Over the 11-day event window, for small acquirers, those deals with media coverage earn 
announcement returns of 4.3% (p-value: 0.000) and deals without media coverage earn returns of 
2.2% (p-value: 0.000). The two-sample statistical analysis between these two groups shows that 
for small acquirers, takeovers with media coverage statistically outperform takeovers without 
media coverage in the short run by 3.2% (p-value: 0.004), on average. When acquirers choose 
cash as the payment method, the results show that deals with media coverage earn 0.061% 
(p-value: 0.000) abnormal returns, while deals with no media coverage earn 0.023% (p-value: 
0.000) abnormal returns. The two-sample statistical analysis between these two groups shows 
that for small acquirers, takeovers with media coverage statistically outperform takeovers without 
media coverage in the short run by 3.8% (p-value: 0.008), with the cash payment. 
 
Panel D shows the results of the two-sample statistical analysis of the difference between large 
and small firms in the short run. First, the results indicate that for the whole sample, small firms 
outperform large firms by 1.8% (p-value: 0.000). For cash financed takeovers, small firms also 
outperform large firms by 2.1% (p-value: 0.000). For mixed financed takeovers, small firms also 
outperform large firms by 1.8% (p-value: 0.000). Second, for takeovers covered by news, small 
firms outperform large firms by 3.3% (p-value: 0.000). For cash financed takeovers covered by 
news, small firms also outperform large firms by 5.4% (p-value: 0.000). For mixed financed 
takeovers, small firms also outperform large firms by 1.8% (p-value: 0.000). Third, for takeovers 
with no media coverage, small firms outperform large firms by 1.9% (p-value: 0.000). For cash 
financed takeovers covered by news, small firms also outperform large firms by 1.9% (p-value: 
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0.000). For mixed financed takeovers, small firms also outperform large firms by 2.3% (p-value: 
0.000). 
 
 [Insert Table 2.4 Here] 
 
Table 2.5 presents the means and preliminary analysis of long-run performance with and without 
media coverage over a 12-month holding period after the announcement of takeovers. The results 
of Panel A show that deals with media coverage earn announcement returns of 4.3% (p-value: 
0.000), while deals without media coverage lose 1% (p-value: 0.088) announcement returns. Both 
of these results are positively significant and cash-financed takeovers with media coverage earn 
5.8% (p-value: 0.000) long-run returns which is significantly positive. Mixed-financed takeovers 
with media coverage earn 3.1% (p-value: 0.000) long-run returns while those without media 
coverage lose 2% (p-value: 0.000) long-run abnormal returns. Moreover, the two-sample 
statistical analysis between takeovers with and without media coverage shows that takeovers with 
media coverage statistically outperform takeovers without media coverage in the long run by 5.3% 
(p-value: 0.000), on average. Moreover, both cash-financed takeovers and mixed-financed 
takeovers with media coverage statistically outperform takeovers without media coverage in the 
long run by 5.0% (p-value: 0.004) and by 5.1% (0.001), respectively.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.5 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 11-day CARs for small 
firms. It shows large acquirers without media coverage lose 4.3% (p-value: 0.000) in 
announcement returns. Moreover, Panel B shows that cash-financed takeovers without media 
coverage lose a significant average of 3.3% (p-value: 0.017) returns in the long run and 
mixed-financed takeovers lose 5.3% (p-value: 0.000) returns. In addition, the two-sample 
statistical analysis between these two groups shows that large acquirers with media coverage 
statistically outperform takeovers without media coverage in the long run by 4.9% (p-value: 
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0.003). And mixed-financed takeovers with media coverage statistically outperform takeovers 
without media coverage in the long run by 6.0% (p-value: 0.012). 
 
Panel C of Table 2.5 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 11-day CARs for small 
firms. It indicates that small acquirers with media coverage earn 17.8% (p-value: 0.000) 
announcement returns, while acquirers without media coverage earn announcement returns of 2.6% 
(p-value: 0.011). Moreover, cash-financed takeovers with media coverage earn returns of 21.6% 
(p-value: 0.001) and mixed-financed takeovers with media coverage earn returns of 16.9% 
(p-value: 0.001). In addition, the results also demonstrate that small firms with media coverage 
outperform those without media coverage by 15.2% (p-value: 0.000). For cash-financed 
takeovers, small firms with media coverage outperform those without media coverage by 17.7% 
(p-value: 0.008), and for mixed-financed takeovers, small firms with media coverage outperform 
those without media coverage by 14.8% (p-value: 0.004). 
 
Panel D of Table 2.5 shows the results of a two-sample statistical analysis between large and 
small firms. It indicates that takeovers in small firms statistically outperform takeovers in large 
firms by 17.2% (p-value: 0.000) and 6.9% (p-value: 0.000), with and without media coverage, 
respectively. Moreover, Panel D also shows that cash-financed deals in small firms statistically 
outperform takeovers in large firms by 2.2% (p-value: 0.002) and 7.2% (p-value: 0.001), with and 
without media coverage, respectively. Mixed-financed deals in small firms statistically 
outperform takeovers in large firms by 16.2% (p-value: 0.003) and 7.3% (p-value: 0.000), with 
and without media coverage, respectively. 
 




4.2.3. Univariate Analysis: Media Pessimism  
Table 2.6 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 11-day CARs with high and low 
pessimism. Media pessimism is assigned based on the highest 50% and the lowest 50%. The 
stocks are divided into a high-pessimism group and a low-pessimism group and the difference 
between them is computed. The results in Panel A show that those deals with high media 
pessimism earn 1.3% (p-value: 0.000) short-run abnormal returns, while deals with low media 
pessimism earn 1.7% (p-value: 0.000) short-run abnormal returns. Cash-financed deals with high 
media pessimism earn 1.0% (p-value: 0.020) short-run abnormal returns, while deals with low 
media pessimism earn 2.1% (p-value: 0.000) short-run abnormal returns. Mixed-financed deals 
with high media pessimism earn 1.5% (p-value: 0.000) short-run abnormal returns, while deals 
with low media pessimism earn 1.4% (p-value: 0.000) short-run abnormal returns. The results are 
all significant. However, the difference between high- and low-pessimism deal returns is negative 
0.4% (p-value: 0.343) and not significant. For cash-financed deals, the difference between high- 
and low-pessimism deal returns is negative 1.1% (p-value: 0.076), which is statistically 
significant.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.6 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 12-month BHARs for 
large firms. The result indicates that, for large acquirers, deals with high media pessimism earn 
announcement returns of 1.0% (p-value: 0.008), while deals low media pessimism earn 1.1% 
(p-value: 0.008) announcement returns. Both of these results are positively significant and 
cash-financed takeovers with low media pessimism earn 1.0% (p-value: 0.079) long-run returns 
which is significantly positive. Mixed-financed takeovers with high media pessimism earn 1.4% 
(p-value: 0.014) long-run returns while those low media pessimism also earn 1.4% (p-value: 
0.021) long-run abnormal returns. However, the difference between large acquirers with 
high-pessimism news and those with low-pessimism news is insignificant, even if the payment 
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method is considered.  
 
Panel C of Table 2.6 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 12-month BHARs for 
small firms. The result indicates that, for small acquirers, deals with high media pessimism earn 
announcement returns of 3.5% (p-value: 0.009), while deals low media pessimism earn 4.7% 
(p-value: 0.000) announcement returns. Both of these results are positively significant and 
cash-financed takeovers with low media pessimism earn 7.2% (p-value: 0.000) long-run returns 
which is significantly positive. Mixed-financed takeovers with high media pessimism earn 3.2% 
(p-value: 0.057) long-run returns while those low media pessimism also earn 3.2% (p-value: 
0.002) long-run abnormal returns. However, the difference between small acquirers with 
high-pessimism news and those with low-pessimism news is insignificant, even if the payment 
method is considered.  
 
Panel D of Table 2.6 shows, in the low-pessimism column, the difference between small and 
large acquirers is 3.7% (p-value: 0.000) and positively significant. In the high-pessimism column, 
the difference between small and large acquirers is 2.5% (p-value: 0.064) and also positively 
significant. These findings indicate that small acquirers earn higher announcement returns than 
large acquirers in both takeovers with low-pessimism news and high-pessimism news over the 
short run. Moreover, in takeovers with low or high media pessimism, small cash acquirers 
statistically outperform large cash acquirers by 6.3% (p-value: 0.001). 
 
[Insert Table 2.6 Here] 
 
Table 2.7 presents the means and preliminary analysis of 12-month BHARs with high- and 
low-pessimism. The results show that deals with low pessimism earn 7.2% (p-value: 0.000) 
long-run returns, cash-financed deals with low pessimism earn 9.5% (p-value: 0.000) long-run 
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returns, and mixed-financed deals with low pessimism earn 5.9% (p-value: 0.002) long-run 
returns. The difference between deals with high and low media pessimism is -5.9% (p-value: 
0.003) and negatively significant. For cash-financed takeovers, the difference between deals with 
high and low media pessimism is -7.4% (p-value: 0.010) and negatively significant. For 
mixed-financed takeovers, the difference between deals with high and low media pessimism is 
-5.8% (p-value: 0.034) and negatively significant. These results show that highly pessimistic 
acquirers earn lower returns than less pessimistic acquirers, even the payment methods is cash or 
mixed. This result supports the second hypothesis. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.6 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 12-month BHARs for 
large firms. The result indicates that, for large acquirers, deals with high media pessimism lose 
announcement returns of 3.6% (p-value: 0.035), while deals low media pessimism earn 5.9% 
(p-value: 0.003) announcement returns. Cash-financed takeovers with high media pessimism lose 
4.7% (p-value: 0.074) long-run returns while takeover with low media pessimism earn 7.2% 
(p-value: 0.000) long-run returns. Mixed-financed takeovers with low media pessimism earn 6.6% 
(p-value: 0.032) long-run returns. The two-sample statistical analysis between these two groups 
shows that for large acquirers, takeovers with low pessimism statistically outperform takeovers 
with high pessimism in the long run by 9.6% (p-value: 0.000), on average. When acquirers 
choose cash as the payment method, the two-sample statistical analysis between these two groups 
shows that for large acquirers, takeovers with low pessimism statistically outperform takeovers 
high pessimism in the short run by 9.9% (p-value: 0.005). 
 
Panel C of Table 2.6 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the 12-month BHARs for 
small firms. The result indicates that, for small acquirers, deals with high media pessimism earn 
announcement returns of 17.7% (p-value: 0.018), while deals low media pessimism earn 17.8% 
(p-value: 0.000) announcement returns. Cash-financed takeovers with low media pessimism earn 
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22.1% (p-value: 0.000) long-run returns. Mixed-financed takeovers with high pessimism earn 
17.1% (p-value: 0.062) abnormal returns and those with low media pessimism earn 16.7% 
(p-value: 0.009) long-run returns. However, the difference between small acquirers with 
high-pessimism news and those with low-pessimism news is insignificant, even if the payment 
methods are considered.  
 
Panel D of Table 2.7 indicates that in the low-pessimism column, the difference between small 
and large firms is 11.9% (p-value: 0.009). In the high-pessimism column, the difference between 
small and large firms is 21.4% (p-value: 0.007). Both of the results show that takeovers with low 
pessimism and with high pessimism in small firms outperform takeovers with large firms. The 
result is also significant in the columns for pure cash and low pessimism. 
 
Takeover abnormal returns with media coverage are higher, on average, than those without media 
coverage in the long run. However, there is no evidence to show that takeover abnormal returns 
with media coverage are higher, on average, than those without media coverage in the short run, 
except when cash is the payment method. In addition, takeover abnormal returns with low media 
pessimism are higher, on average, than those with high media pessimism in the long run. 
However, there are no significant results showing the relation between takeover abnormal returns 
and media pessimism in the short run. 
 
 [Insert Table 2.7 Here] 
 
4.2.4. Multivariate Analysis: Media Coverage  
Univariate analysis is unable to take more factors into account because of its inherent limitations 
and it is unable to examine the relations between different factors. Correlations or inversions 
cannot be modelled using univariate analysis. Moreover, multivariate tests may be expected to 
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create more accurate predictions than univariate tests (Preez and Witt 2003). Therefore, 
multivariate analysis with additional controls is employed to examine the relations between 
takeover returns and media coverage and between takeover returns and media pessimism. 
 
The results of a multivariate analysis for media coverage are reported in Table 2.8. This section 
reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and a media coverage dummy in the 
1981–2010 sample with 4384 takeover deals, based on multivariate tests. All regressions include 
variables for size, method of payment, the book-to-market ratio, run-up, public deals, diversifying 
deals, tender offers, hostile, PE ratios, EBITDA, leverage, year, and industry as controls. Since 
winsorization replaces extreme data values with less extreme values, accounting variables at the 5% 
and 95% levels are winsorized to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
 
First, the 11-day CAR(-5, 5) values for 365 days of media coverage during the period of 11 days 
before the takeover announcements to 11 days after the announcements are computed. The key 
independent variable is the media coverage dummy for a stock in a given period. Column (1) in 
Table 2.8 shows that the p-value is 0.055, which is statistically significant, and the estimated 
coefficient is 0.005 and positive. These findings indicate that 365-day media coverage is 
positively correlated with short-run firm returns. The result is therefore in line with the univariate 
tests and with the findings of Fang and Peress (2009): Financial media coverage has a significant 
impact on the stock market. 
 
Second, Table 2.8 also reports the 12-month BHAR results for media coverage sample. Column 
(2) in Table 2.8 shows that the p-value is 0.000, which is statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient is 0.069 and positive. This result indicates that the 365-day media coverage is strongly 




The findings are related to those of Shiller (2002) and Barber and Odean (2008). Shiller (2000) 
notes that media coverage has a major impact on stock trading and returns. Moreover, Barber and 
Odean (2008) propose the investor recognition hypothesis as an explanation of the role media 
coverage plays in stock prices. According to this hypothesis, in deciding which stocks to buy 
among a large amount of available stocks, investors prefer those that catch their attention and 
then filter through these stocks according to their investment preferences. Hence, media coverage 
plays a crucial role in influencing investor choice in both the short run and long run. The returns 
of stocks covered by the media should be higher than those without media coverage because 
investors receive more information and know more about the condition of the firms. The results 
are consistent with the findings of Barber and Odean (2008) and show that the 11-day CARs and 
12-month BHARs are highly correlated with media coverage, since they display a positive and 
statistically significant (at the 10% confidence level or less) relation when media coverage is 
within 365 days before the takeover announcements. 
 
Over both the short run and long run, the size of the bidding firms 365 days before a takeover is 
shown to be statistically and negatively related to bidding firm returns. This finding indicates that 
the larger a firm, the lower the long-run return for its shareholders. This result is consistent with 
that of Fama and French (1993) regarding the influence of size on firm returns. The logarithm of 
the EBITDA of bidding firms is shown to be statistically positively related to bidding firm returns. 
The variables Cash and RelativeSize are shown to be positively related to acquirer abnormal 
returns when the news covers a period 365 days prior to the announcement. Moreover, the run-up 
and market-to-book ratio are positively related to long-run firm returns while Leverage is 
negatively related to long-run returns. In addition, the other control variables, Stock, PE ratio, 
Public, Diversification, Hostile, and Tender are all generally found to be unrelated to short-run 
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 [Insert Table 2.8 Here] 
 
4.2.5. Multivariate Analysis: Media Pessimism  
The results of a multivariate analysis are reported in Table 2.9. This section reports the empirical 
relations between takeover returns and a media pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample with 989 
takeover deals, based on multivariate tests. First, the 11-day CAR(-5, 5) values for 365 days of 
media pessimism are computed during the period 11 days before the takeover announcement to 
11 days after the announcement. The key independent variable is the media coverage dummy 
about a stock in a given period. Column (1) in Table 2.9 reports that its p-value is 0.012, which is 
statistically significant, and the estimated coefficient is -0.004. These findings indicate that the 
365-day media pessimism is negatively correlated with short-run firm returns. Second, Table 2.9 
also reports the 12-month BHAR results for the media coverage sample. Column (2) in Table 2.9 
indicates that its p-value is 0.002 and the estimated coefficient is -0.022. These findings are 
consistent with the short-run results and indicate that the 365-day media pessimism is negatively 
correlated with long-run firm returns. In other words, the lower the media pessimism, the higher 
the firm returns in the long run. 
 
Similar to the media coverage sample, over both the short run and long run, the size of bidding 
firms during the period between 365 days and one day before the announcement date is shown to 
be statistically and negatively related to bidding firm returns. This finding indicates that the larger 
a firm, the lower the long-run returns for its shareholders. This result is consistent with that of 
Fama and French (1993) regarding the influence of size on firm returns. The logarithm of the 
EBITDA of the bidding firms is shown to be statistically positively related to bidding firm returns. 
                                                        
10
 The results show that the influence of media coverage and media sentiment is strongest in small acquirers. Fama 
and French (1993) suggests that small equities have higher average returns than large equities and higher average 
returns are thought as compensation for higher risks. 
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Moreover, RelativeSize is positively related to returns, while the Public variable is negatively 
related to firm returns in the short run. In addition, the other control variables – Stock, Cash, 
MTBV, Run-up, Leverage, PE Raito, Public, Diversification, Hostile, and Tender – are all 
generally found to be unrelated to short-run and long-run bidding firm returns. 
 
[Insert Table 2.9 Here] 
 
The findings are consistent with those of Tetlock et al. (2008), who demonstrate that fundamental 
information transmitted by the financial news resolves the problem of information asymmetry. 
Therefore, financial news can provide additional information for investors with which to evaluate 
their prospects in M&A deals and hence reduce information asymmetry. Moreover, this result is 
in line with the findings of Durnev and Mangen (2011) and Tetlock (2007), who state that high 
media pessimism forecasts a decrease in future stock returns. In addition, using textual analysis 
software to quantify the tone in press releases, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) discover similar 
findings, that higher levels of pessimistic are associated with lower future return on assets. 
However, these findings are not consistent with those of Huang et al. (2013), who report that 
abnormal positive tone in the earnings press release is associated with poor future earnings in the 
long run. Managers tend to mislead investors through tone manipulation. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
In this section, a number of robustness tests and explore a number of alternative explanations. To 
use different event window are briefs described, the short-run pre-announcement window is 
changed from 11 days to 5 days and the long-run window is changed from 12 months to 36 
months. Most of the results are consistent with the main findings when different event windows 




The results of the robustness test for media coverage are reported in Table 2.10. First, the 5-day 
CAR(-2, 2) values for 365-days media coverage during the period of 2 days before the takeover 
announcements to 2 days after the announcements are computed. The key independent variable is 
the media coverage dummy for a stock in a given period. Column (1) in Table 2.10 shows that the 
p-value is 0.058, which is statistically significant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.004 and 
positive. These findings indicate that 365-day media coverage is positively correlated with 
short-run firm returns. Second, Table 2.10 also reports the 36-month BHAR results for media 
coverage sample. Column (1) in Table 2.10 shows that the p-value is 0.000, which is statistically 
significant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.171 and positive. These findings indicate that 
365-day media coverage is positively correlated with long-run firm returns. 
 
[Insert Table 2.10 Here] 
 
The results of the robustness test for media pessimism are reported in Table 2.11. First, the 5-day 
CAR(-2, 2) values for 365-days media pessimism during the period of 2 days before the takeover 
announcements to 2 days after the announcements are computed. The key independent variable is 
the media pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (1) in Table 2.11 shows that the 
p-value is 0.212, which is insignificant, and the estimated coefficient is -0.001. These findings 
indicate that 365-day media pessimism is not correlated with short-run firm returns. Second, 
Table 2.11 also reports the 36-month BHAR results for media coverage sample. Column (1) in 
Table 2.11 shows that the p-value is 0.016, which is statistically significant, and the estimated 
coefficient is 0.044 and negative. These findings indicate that 365-day media pessimism is 
negatively correlated with long-run firm returns. 
 





The analysis so far suggests a positive relation between media coverage and 11-day cumulative 
abnormal returns. Moreover, a negative relation between media pessimism and 12-month buy and 
hold abnormal returns is also shown in the analysis. However, the potential endogenous relation 
between CAR/BHAR and media coverage/media pessimism is a concern in the analysis. 
Endogeneity can arise due to unobservable heterogeneity when unobservable firm-specific 
factors affect media coverage, media pessimism, CAR and BHAR. 
 
The instrumental variables method is applied to address endogeneity. Following prior studies 
(e.g., El Ghoul et al. (2011)), the media coverage published between 365 days and 730 days 
before the takeover announcements is used as the instrumental variable in this thesis. The results 
of the instrumental variables are reported approach in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.12. The 
coefficients on the fitted value of media coverage are significantly positive for CAR11, 
suggesting that the positive relation between media coverage and 11-day cumulative abnormal 
returns holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the instrumental variables methodology. 
Moreover, The coefficients on the fitted value of media pessimism are significantly negative for 
BHAR12, suggesting that the positive relation between media pessimism and 12-month buy and 
hold abnormal returns holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the instrumental variables 
methodology. 
[Insert Table 2.12 Here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the question of whether media coverage and media pessimism can influence 
bidder return in M&As during the period of 1981-2010 for UK market. Controlling for firm size, 
method of payment and acquirer/target industry. The empirical results indicate that, over the short 
term, deals with media coverage outperform deals without media coverage. Moreover, the result 
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shows a significantly negative correlation between media pessimism and post-merger 
performance in the long term. 
 
The first hypothesis proposes that deals with media coverage prior to the merger announcement 
should outperform deals without such media coverage. Theoretically, this is based on the market 
sentiment theory by Shiller (2000) and investor recognition theory by Merton (1987). Market 
sentiment theory proposes that market sentiment is motivated by news content and media 
coverage has a major impact on stock trading and returns. Moreover, scheduled news 
announcements contributes to reduce information uncertainty, and unscheduled news 
announcements increase information uncertainty (Jiang et al. (2012)). This outperformance 
remains even after controlling for a number of known anomalies. However, there is no relation 
between media pessimism and long-run abnormal returns. This result is consistent with Bradley 
et al (2008) who states that long-run stock returns will not be affected by analysts' research 
coverage.  
 
Furthermore, a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and market response 
to takeover announcements has been found from the empirical results which indicate that there is 
a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and market response to takeover 
announcements over the long run but not over the short during the takeover event. The results are 
in line with Chan (2003) who states that stocks with media coverage in the event month have a 
tendency to reverse in the long run because investment practitioners overreact to the spurious 
movements of stock price in the short-run. However, The results are in contrast to the view of 
Tetlock (2007), who found that high media pessimism predicts downward pressure on market 
prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals, and unusually high or low pessimism predicts 




The results indicate that the media coverage and media sentiment have statistically significant 
influences on firm performance which open up many future research avenues, one area  
particularly interest is to analyse whether media coverage and media sentiment influence the 
failure or success of takeover deals. And media coverage quantity can also be examined, that is, 
whether deals with high media coverage prior to the merger announcement outperform deals with 




Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Media Sources 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of media sources, including four main media sources. Other media sources 





Number of news items Percentage 
Top four media sources 270,967 98.821 
Financial Times 143,017 52.158 
The Times (London) 56,694 20.676 
The Guardian (London) 45,465 16.581 
The Mirror 25,791 9.406 






Table 2.2 Summary Statistics: Media Coverage 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample and focuses on the media coverage. The media coverage variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if there are 
articles covering takeover news are published on a given period. Table 2.2 presents the overview of the variables with media coverage which is published within 365 days before the 
takeover announcements and the variables without media coverage data. This table also presents the total number of observations, means, medians and standard deviations of the 
financial, asset, and ownership structure variables under the media coverage classifications. The total number of observations is 4384 deals. There are 989 deals with media coverage 
and there are 3395 deals without media coverage. The CAR (-5,+5) is acquirer's 11-day cumulative announcement abnormal return. The CAR is measured by using the formula 
         
 
   . The BHAR (0, +12) is 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return measured from the announcement date. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured using the formula 
               
 
            
 
   . Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of 
acquirer divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement measured using 
the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's 
earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its income and costs. PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a 
firm's current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock. Relative size is measured as the deal value 
divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and 
diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
 
  All Sample With Media Coverage No Media Coverage 
  Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N 
Media Coverage 0.23 0.42 0 4384 1 0 1 989 0 0 0 3395 
CAR 0.01 0.07 0.01 4384 0.01 0.06 0.01 989 0.01 0.07 0.01 3395 
BHAR -0.06 0.33 -0.06 4384 0 0.31 0.02 989 -0.07 0.34 -0.08 3395 
Stock 0.05 0.22 0 221 0.04 0.19 0 37 0.05 0.23 0 184 
Cash 0.37 0.48 0 1608 0.43 0.49 0 422 0.35 0.48 0 1186 
Run-up 0.13 0.34 0.12 4384 0.12 0.32 0.11 989 0.14 0.35 0.12 3395 
Size 753.03 1193.34 234.86 4384 1275.21 1480.29 553.57 989 600.92 1048.11 168.33 3395 
MTBV 2.92 2.27 2.21 4384 3.08 2.29 2.39 989 2.88 2.26 2.15 3395 
PE 18.09 10.05 15.2 4384 17.68 9.11 15.4 989 18.2 10.31 15.1 3395 
RelativeSize 0.11 0.15 0.04 4384 0.08 0.13 0.03 989 0.11 0.15 0.05 3395 
Leverage 26.18 17.96 25.54 4384 28.39 18.06 27.14 989 25.54 17.88 24.96 3395 
Public 0.12 0.33 0 4384 0.13 0.34 0 989 0.12 0.32 0 3395 
Diversification 0.52 0.5 0 4384 0.47 0.5 0 989 0.53 0.5 1 3395 
EBITDA 10.55 1.51 10.46 4384 11.4 1.35 11.32 989 10.3 1.47 10.14 3395 
Tender 0.09 0.28 0 4384 0.09 0.29 0 989 0.08 0.28 0 3395 
Hostile 0.01 0.09 0 4384 0.01 0.08 0 989 0.01 0.09 0 3395 
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics: Media Pessimism 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample and focuses on the media pessimism. News is published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. After a 
pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top half are then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom half are classified as low 
pessimism. The deals are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large firms, while the bottom 33% are classified as small firms. Table 2.3 presents the overview of 
the variables with high media pessimism and with low media coverage. This table also presents the total number of observations, means, medians and standard deviations of the 
financial, asset, and ownership structure variables under the media coverage classifications. The total number of observations is 4384 deals. There are 989 deals with media coverage 
and there are 3395 deals without media coverage. The CAR (-5,+5) is acquirer's 11-day cumulative announcement abnormal return. The CAR is measured by using the formula 
         
 
   . The BHAR (0, +12) is 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return measured from the announcement date. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured using the formula 
               
 
            
 
   . Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of 
acquirer divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement measured using 
the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's 
earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its income and costs. PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a 
firm's current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock. Relative size is measured as the deal value 
divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and 
diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Media Pessimism Sample High Media Pessimism Low Media Pessimism 
  Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N 
Pessimism -0.02 0.6 0.01 989 0.02 0.04 0.01 494 -0.06 0.85 0 494 
CAR 0.01 0.07 0.01 4384 0.01 0.06 0.01 494 0.02 0.06 0.01 494 
BHAR -0.06 0.33 -0.06 4384 -0.02 0.31 0.01 494 0.02 0.3 0.02 494 
Stock 0.05 0.22 0 221 0.03 0.17 0 15 0.04 0.21 0 22 
Cash 0.37 0.48 0 1608 0.44 0.5 0 217 0.41 0.49 0 204 
Run-up 0.13 0.34 0.12 4384 0.09 0.32 0.09 494 0.15 0.31 0.12 494 
Size 753.03 1193.34 234.86 4384 1467.47 1534.71 752.49 494 1085.16 1400.15 437.46 494 
MTBV 2.92 2.27 2.21 4384 2.91 2.1 2.33 494 3.25 2.46 2.51 494 
PE 18.09 10.05 15.2 4384 17.03 8.61 15.1 494 18.34 9.55 15.65 494 
RelativeSize 0.11 0.15 0.04 4384 0.07 0.13 0.02 494 0.09 0.14 0.03 494 
Leverage 26.18 17.96 25.54 4384 29.6 18.37 27.75 494 27.23 17.68 26.13 494 
Public 0.12 0.33 0 4384 0.14 0.35 0 494 0.13 0.33 0 494 
Diversification 0.52 0.5 0 4384 0.48 0.5 0 494 0.46 0.5 0 494 
EBITDA 10.55 1.51 10.46 4384 11.62 1.32 11.61 494 11.17 1.36 11.08 494 
Tender 0.09 0.28 0 4384 0.1 0.29 0 494 0.09 0.28 0 494 




Table 2.4 Univariate Tests: Media coverage in the short-run 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 11-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample. The CAR is measured by using the formula          
 
   . 
The media coverage published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. The No Media sample contains those deals which are not covered by the news while the With 
Media sample relates to those deals which are covered by the news. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). The deals 
are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large firms, while the bottom 33% are classified as small firms.Column Differential relates to the 
differential performance between deals with media coverage and without media coverage (With Media -No Media). Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix 
is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates to larger acquirers as measured as those firms in the highest one third of bidders once 
ranked by their market value(Large Firms); Panel C relates to small acquirers as measured as those firms in the lowest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Small 
Firms); and Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C -Panel B). The p-value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test 
for CARs. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively.   
 
  All 
 
No Media With Media 
 
Differential (With Media - No Media) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.012 0.014*** 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.002 
p -Value 0.000 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.580 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.311 0.000 0.313 0.585 0.493 0.574 
N 4384 1608 221 2555 3395 1186 184 2025 989 422 37 530         
Panel B: Large Firms   
Mean 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006 0.005** 0.002 0.004* 0.008 0.000 0.010*** 0.006 -0.001 0.014*** 0.008** 0.002 -0.009 0.014*** 
p -Value 0.001 0.019 0.477 0.015 0.207 0.088 0.390 0.965 0.000 0.105 0.970 0.000 0.013 0.668 0.641 0.002 
N 1461 620 70 771 927 386 51 490 534 234 19 281   
   
Panel C: Small Firms   
Mean 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.000 0.023*** 0.043*** 0.061*** 0.037 0.032*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 0.037 0.009 
p -Value 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.237 0.302 
N 1461 459 90 912 1355 420 81 854 106 39 9 58   
   
Panel D: Differential (Panel C - Panel B)   
Mean 0.018*** 0.021*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.008 0.023*** 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.037 0.018*   
   




Table 2.5 Univariate Tests: Media coverage in the long-run 
 
This table reports the acquirer long run 12-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the full sample. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured using the formula 
               
 
            
 
   . The media coverage published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. The No Media sample contains those deals which are 
not covered by the news while the With Media sample relates to those deals which are covered by the news. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the 
previous calendar year (in millions). The deals are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large firms, while the bottom 33% are classified as small 
firms. Column Differential relates to the differential performance between deals with media coverage and without media coverage (With Media -No Media). Cash is deals financed 
using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates to larger acquirers as measured as those 
firms in the highest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Large Firms); Panel C relates to small acquirers as measured as those firms in the lowest one third of 
bidders once ranked by their market value(Small Firms); and Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C -Panel B). The p -Value is 
shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for BHARs. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively.   
 
  All 
 
No Media With Media 
 
Differential (With Media - No 
Media) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.043*** 0.021** 0.001 -0.010 -0.010* 0.008 -0.009 -0.020*** 0.043*** 0.058*** 0.051 0.031** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.060 0.051*** 
p-Value 0.000 0.010 0.976 0.157 0.088 0.413 0.724 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.313 0.025 0.000 0.004 0.284 0.001 
N 4384 1608 221 2555 3395 1186 184 2025 989 422 37 530         
Panel B: Large Firms   
Mean 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006 0.005** -0.043*** -0.033** -0.031 -0.053*** 0.005 -0.004 0.089 0.007 0.049*** 0.029 0.120 0.060** 
p-Value 0.001 0.019 0.477 0.015 0.000 0.017 0.493 0.000 0.683 0.843 0.315 0.716 0.003 0.184 0.197 0.012 
N 1461 620 70 771 927 386 51 490 534 234 19 281   
 
    
Panel C: Small Firms   
Mean 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.026** 0.039 0.010 0.020 0.178*** 0.216*** 0.070 0.169*** 0.152*** 0.177*** 0.060 0.148*** 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.000 0.011 0.034 0.817 0.110 0.000 0.001 0.574 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.643 0.004 
N 1461 459 90 912 1355 420 81 854 106 39 9 58   
 
    
Panel D: Differential (Panel C - Panel B)   
Mean 0.018*** 0.021*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.041 0.073*** 0.172*** 0.220*** -0.019 0.162***   
   





Table 2.6 Univeriate Tests: Media pessimism in the short-run 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 11-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample. The media coverage published within 365 days before the 
takeover announcements. The CAR is measured using the formula          
 
   . After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top 
half are then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom half are classified as low pessimism. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar 
year (in millions). The deals are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large firms, while the bottom 33% are classified as small firms. Column 
Differential relates to the differential performance between deals with high media pessimism and with low media pessimism (High -Low). Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 
100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates to larger acquirers as measured as those firms in the highest one 
third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Large Firms); Panel C relates to small acquirers as measured as those firms in the lowest one third of bidders once ranked by their 
market value(Small Firms); and Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C -Panel B). The p-Value is shown in parentheses and is 





Low Media Pessimism High Media Pessimism 
 
Differential (High - Low) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.009 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.010** 0.016 0.015*** -0.004 -0.011* 0.007 0.001 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.373 0.000 0.343 0.076 0.756 0.874 
N 4384 1608 221 2555 494 204 22 268 494 217 15 262         
Panel B: Large Firms   
Mean 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006 0.005** 0.011*** 0.010* -0.019 0.014** 0.010*** 0.003 0.020 0.014** -0.001 -0.006 0.039 0.000 
p-Value 0.001 0.019 0.477 0.015 0.008 0.079 0.371 0.021 0.008 0.521 0.424 0.014 0.875 0.408 0.226 0.963 
N 1461 620 70 771 233 104 10 119 301 130 9 162   
 
    
Panel C: Small Firms   
Mean 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.039 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.039 0.033 0.032* -0.012 -0.033 -0.006 0.000 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.315 0.002 0.009 0.113 0.624 0.057 0.415 0.244 0.933 0.997 
N 1461 459 90 912 69 25 6 38 37 14 3 20   
 
    
Panel D: Differential (Panel C - Panel B)   
Mean 0.018*** 0.021*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.063*** 0.058 0.018 0.025* 0.036 0.013 0.017   
   
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.856 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.181 0.118 0.064 0.151 0.849 0.301         
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Table 2.7 Univariate Tests: Media pessimism in the long-run 
 
This table reports the acquirer long run 12-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the full sample. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured by using the formula 
               
 
            
 
   . The media coverage published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are 
ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top half are then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom half are classified as low pessimism. Size is measured as the average 
market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). The deals are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large firms, while the 
bottom 33% are classified as small firms. Column Differential relates to the differential performance between deals with high media pessimism and with low media pessimism (High 
-Low). Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates to larger 
acquirers as measured as those firms in the highest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Large Firms); Panel C relates to small acquirers as measured as those firms 
in the lowest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Small Firms); and Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C -Panel 





Low Media Pessimism High Media Pessimism 
 
Differential (High - Low) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.043*** 0.021** 0.001 -0.010 0.072*** 0.095*** 0.018 0.059*** 0.013 0.020 0.098 0.002 -0.059*** -0.074** 0.080 -0.058** 
p-Value 0.000 0.010 0.976 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.768 0.002 0.365 0.349 0.296 0.925 0.003 0.010 0.468 0.034 
N 4384 1608 221 2555 494 204 22 268 494 217 15 262         
Panel B: Large Firms   
Mean 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006 0.005** 0.059*** 0.051** 0.061 0.066** -0.036** -0.047* 0.119 -0.036 -0.096*** -0.099*** 0.058 -0.102 
p-Value 0.001 0.019 0.477 0.015 0.003 0.029 0.651 0.032 0.035 0.074 0.370 0.141 0.000 0.005 0.733 0.010 
N 1461 620 70 771 233 104 10 119 301 130 9 162   
 
    
Panel C: Small Firms   
Mean 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.178*** 0.221*** 0.066 0.167*** 0.177** 0.207 0.078 0.171* 0.000 -0.014 0.013 0.004 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.521 0.009 0.018 0.242 0.837 0.062 0.995 0.919 0.993 0.965 
N 1461 459 90 912 69 25 6 38 37 14 3 20   
 
    
Panel D: Differential (Panel C - Panel B)   
Mean 0.018*** 0.021*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.119*** 0.170** 0.004 0.101 0.214*** 0.255 -0.041 0.208**   
   
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.856 0.000 0.009 0.015 0.977 0.121 0.007 0.149 0.960 0.033         
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Table 2.8 Multivariate Tests: Media Coverage 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 11-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) and acquirer 
long run 12-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the full sample. The media coverage 
published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. The CAR is measured by using the formula 
         
 
   . The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured by using the formula            
 
   
             
 
   . Column (1) reports the results for the media coverage samples in the short run while 
Column (2) refers to the media coverage samples in the long run. Size is measured as the average market value 
of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of acquirer 
divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the 
acquirer prior to the takeover announcement measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of 
total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. 
EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from 
final accounting of its income and costs. PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market 
share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% 
stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market 
value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy 
variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The 
mean of CAR and BHAR are reported with the p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% 












Media Coverage 0.005* 0.069*** 
 
(0.055) (0.000) 
STOCK -0.000 0.026 
 
(0.930) (0.362) 
CASH 0.004* 0.026** 
 
(0.057) (0.017) 
WRUNUP_365_7 0.002 0.080*** 
 
(0.600) (0.000) 
WLNMV -0.013*** -0.154*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
WMTBV 0.001 0.016*** 
 
(0.188) (0.001) 
WPE 0.000 0.001 
   WRelativeSize 0.041*** 0.100** 
 
(0.000) (0.022) 
WLeverage -0.000 -0.001** 
 
(0.345) (0.015) 
Public -0.019*** -0.022 
 
(0.000) (0.250) 
Diversification 0.002 -0.010 
 
(0.499) (0.366) 
WLNEBITDA 0.009*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) 
Tender -0.003 0.000 
 
(0.524) (0.995) 
Hostile -0.001 0.028 
 
(0.955) (0.532) 
_cons -0.039* -1.023*** 
 
(0.058) (0.000) 
N 4384 4384 
R-sq 0.064 0.129 






Table 2.9 Multivariate Tests: Media Pessimism 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 11-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) and acquirer 
long run 12-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the full sample. The media coverage 
published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. The CAR is measured by using the formula 
         
 
   . The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured by using the formula            
 
   
             
 
   . After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. 
The top half are then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom half are classified as low pessimism. 
Column (1) reports the results for the media pessimism samples in the short run while Column (2) refers to the 
media pessimism samples in the long run. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the 
previous calendar year (in millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of acquirer divided by market value of 
acquirer, as of the end of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the 
takeover announcement measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by 
total capital in annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's 
earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its 
income and costs. PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market share price compared to 
its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture 
of cash and stock. Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over 
the previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 
for hostile, tender and diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The mean of CAR and BHAR are 
reported with the p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** 











Pessimism -0.004** -0.022*** 
 
(0.012) (0.002) 
STOCK 0.007 0.008 
 
(0.599) (0.886) 
CASH 0.003 0.017 
 
(0.479) (0.424) 
WRUNUP_365_7 0.007 0.084 
 
(0.442) (0.130) 
WLNMV -0.016** -0.146*** 
 
(0.019) (0.000) 
WMTBV -0.000 0.011 
 
(0.944) (0.236) 
WPE 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.399) (0.283) 
WRelativeSize 0.040* 0.103 
 
(0.063) (0.229) 
WLeverage -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.393) (0.263) 
Public -0.015* -0.011 
 
(0.097) (0.775) 
Diversification 0.004 -0.015 
 
(0.347) (0.464) 
WLNEBITDA 0.011* 0.122*** 
 
(0.090) (0.000) 
Tender 0.001 -0.009 
 
(0.895) (0.822) 
Hostile 0.019 0.048 
 
(0.246) (0.674) 
_cons -0.005 -0.629*** 
 
(0.904) (0.004) 
N 989 989 
R-sq 0.100 0.195 






Table 2.10 Robustness Tests: Media Coverage 
 
This table reports the findings of robustness checks. It reports acquirer short-run 5-day cumulative 
announcement abnormal returns (CARs) and acquirer long run 36-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) for the full sample. The media coverage published within 365 days before the takeover 
announcements. The CAR is measured by using the formula          
 
   . The buy-and-hold abnormal 
return is measured by using the formula                
 
            
 
   . Column (1) reports the 
results for the media coverage samples in the short run while Column (2) refers to the media coverage samples 
in the long run. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in 
millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of acquirer divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end of 
the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement 
measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual 
terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest 
payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its income and costs. PE 
ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market share price compared to its per-share earnings 
in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. 
Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous 
calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, 
tender and diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The mean of CAR and BHAR are reported with 















Media Coverage 0.004* 0.171*** 
 
(0.058) (0.000) 
STOCK -0.004 0.002 
 
(0.293) (0.971) 
CASH 0.004** 0.089*** 
 
(0.022) (0.000) 
WRUNUP_365_7 -0.002 0.011 
 
(0.444) (0.770) 
WLNMV -0.007*** -0.203*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) 
WMTBV 0.000 0.031*** 
 
(0.921) (0.001) 
WPE 0.000** -0.004** 
 
(0.013) (0.025) 
WRelativeSize 0.029*** -0.020 
 
(0.000) (0.807) 
WLeverage -0.000 -0.003*** 
 
(0.874) (0.007) 
Public -0.013*** 0.033 
 
(0.000) (0.444) 
Diversification 0.001 -0.072*** 
 
(0.646) (0.001) 
WLNEBITDA 0.004* 0.200*** 
 
(0.080) (0.000) 
Tender -0.007* -0.007 
 
(0.073) (0.879) 
Hostile -0.006 0.250** 
 
(0.457) (0.012) 
_cons -0.010 -1.435*** 
 
(0.501) (0.000) 
N 4384 4382 
R-sq 0.064 0.120 




Table 2.11 Robustness Tests: Media Pessimism 
 
This table reports the findings of robustness checks. It reports acquirer short-run 5-day cumulative 
announcement abnormal returns (CARs) and acquirer long run 36-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) for the full sample. The media coverage published within 365 days before the takeover 
announcements. The CAR is measured by using the formula          
 
   . The buy-and-hold abnormal 
return is measured by using the formula                
 
            
 
   . After a pessimism score is 
calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top half are then classified as high pessimism, 
while the bottom half are classified as low pessimism. Column (1) reports the results for the media pessimism 
samples in the short run while Column (2) refers to the media pessimism samples in the long run. Size is 
measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). Book-to-market 
ratio is book-value of acquirer divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end of the previous year. RUNUP 
is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. 
Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured at the year prior 
to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and 
amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its income and costs. PE ratio refers to an equity valuation 
ratio of a firm's current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed 
using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Relative size is measured as the deal 
value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and 
diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and diversifying mergers, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. The mean of CAR and BHAR are reported with the p-value in parentheses. 











Pessimism -0.001 -0.044** 
 
(0.212) (0.016) 
STOCK 0.004 -0.181* 
 
(0.680) (0.076) 
CASH 0.005 0.042 
 
(0.106) (0.256) 
WRUNUP_365_7 0.000 0.219** 
 
(0.971) (0.011) 
WLNMV -0.005 -0.243*** 
 
(0.304) (0.000) 
WMTBV -0.001 0.034** 
 
(0.273) (0.029) 
WPE 0.000 -0.006* 
 
(0.835) (0.088) 
WRelativeSize 0.040** -0.053 
 
(0.014) (0.743) 
WLeverage -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.810) (0.774) 
Public -0.017** 0.087 
 
(0.022) (0.267) 
Diversification 0.003 -0.049 
 
(0.377) (0.243) 
WLNEBITDA 0.002 0.193*** 
 
(0.734) (0.001) 
Tender 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.875) (0.997) 
Hostile 0.016 0.228 
 
(0.320) (0.309) 
_cons 0.041 -1.045*** 
 
(0.221) (0.007) 
N 989 989 
R-sq 0.089 0.255 







Table 2.12 Regression Analysis to address Endogeneity concerns 
 
This table reports the regression for testing endogeneity issue. Instrument variable analysis of UK acquirers 
engaging in cross-border M&As. Short-run 5-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) for the 
full sample. The media coverage published within 365 days before the takeover announcements. The CAR is 
measured by using the formula          
 
   .acquirer long run 12-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) for the full sample from the announcement date stratified by the target industry. The buy-and-hold 
abnormal return is measured by using the formula                
 
            
 
   . Column (1) 
reports the results for the media coverage samples while Column (3) refers to the quantity of media coverage 
and Column (3) refers to the media pessimism. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over 
the previous calendar year (in millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of acquirer divided by market value 
of acquirer, as of the end of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the 
takeover announcement measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by 
total capital in annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's 
earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its 
income and costs. PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market share price compared to 
its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture 
of cash and stock. Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over 





  iv media coverage  
iv media coverage  
quantity  iv media pessimism 







   
0.111 
STOCK -0.003 -0.004 0.044 
 
0.767 0.740 0.614 
CASH 0.001 0.001 0.394** 
 
0.831 0.818 0.015 
WRUNUP_365_7 -0.004 -0.004 -0.122 
 
0.517 0.531 0.015 
WLNMV -0.011** -0.011** -0.122* 
 
0.010 0.010 0.092 
WMTBV 0.000 0.000 0.007 
 
0.120 0.972 0.582 
WPE 0.000* 0.000 0.004 
 
0.055 0.143 0.267 
WRelativeSize 0.025 0.025* 0.071 
 
0.126 0.053 0.905 
WLeverage 0.000 0.000 0.006* 
 
0.985 0.131 0.057 
Public -0.031*** -0.030*** 0.200 
 
0.000 0.000 0.242 
Diversification 0.002 0.002 0.184* 
 
0.560 0.549 0.074 
WLNEBITDA 0.009** 0.009** 0.019 
 
0.033 0.044 0.810 
Tender 0.014 0.014 -0.299 
 
0.122 0.124 0.165 
Hostile 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 
0.795 0.799 0.840 
Constant -0.023 -0.017 0.210 







Chapter 3. Financial Media and Takeover Outcomes: Evidence 
from UK Successful and Fail Deals 
 
1. Introduction 
Research on media sentiment and its interaction with takeover outcomes is a relatively new 
area that has received substantial attention in the last few years. It is generally believed that 
financial newspapers directly impact investor sentiment concerning both individual stocks 
and the market as a whole (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Joe et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013; 
Ferguson et al., 2012; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2012; Garcia, 2013). Moreover, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) often occur due to either takeovers or tender offers and usually require 
the bidders to offer that buying the target stock at a higher price than its current market value 
of the targets (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). However, Branch et al. (2008) states that about 10% 
of announced takeover attempts fail, including those that are withdrawn by the acquirer and 
rebuffed by the target firm. Failure usually consists of either a value-destroying merger taking 
place or a value-creating merger failing to take place. Successful takeovers are contractual 
agreements in which both acquirers and targets have enough interest to agree on an offer 
(Bruslerie, 2013). This chapter examines how media coverage and media sentiment influence 
takeover outcomes in takeover deals, based on universal M&A data drawn from the UK 
market from 1981 to 2010. 
 
This chapter is the first empirical work study how media coverage and media pessimism 
affect takeover outcomes in the UK market. This chapter has several contributions for the 
research. First, little research has been undertaken that considers the influence of media 
coverage and media pessimism on the likelihood of deal success or failure. The previous 
literature considers many factors that could influence takeover outcomes. Variables that 
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increase the supply of ‘obtainable shares’, that is, the increased ownership of target firm 
shares by the bidder, are shown to increase the probability of success and variables that 
impede the tender offer decrease the probability of success (Walkling, 1985). Strategic vision 
and fit, deal structure, due diligence, premerger planning, post-merger integration, external 
factors, negotiation outcome, the nature of the recommendations of the target directors, and 
bid premium levels and offer price revisions are also shown to be important in discriminating 
between successful and failed takeovers (Henry, 2003; Epstain, 2005; Fabel and Kolmar, 
2012). However, board composition and chairperson identity of target firms and director, 
institutional investor, and external share ownership in targets have minimal effects on the 
likelihood of takeover success (Henry, 2004). This chapter considers the influence of media 
on takeover outcomes. Second, the research by Ahern and Sosyura (2014) on media coverage 
focuses on the number of news articles. Buehlmaier's (2012) research on media content 
focuses on text-based information. This chapter considers not only the media coverage but 
the media content. Third, previous research regarding financial media focuses on the US 
market (Birza and Lott, 2011; Akhtar et al., 2012); however, the UK and US media are very 
different. As Shaw (1999) suggests, the UK media are more independent, whereas the US 
media are more conformist. Fourth, this chapter considers the endogeneity resulting from the 
strategic interaction of media coverage and takeovers.  
 
Based on the literature on financial media and takeover completion, the media can influence 
takeover outcomes in two ways. First, Fang and Peress (2009) show that stocks without 
media coverage outperform those heavily covered by the media by 3% per year. Deals with 
lower media coverage lead to less investor recognition and stocks with low levels of investor 
recognition must offer higher stock returns to compensate their shareholders. Moreover, 
Asquith et al. (1983) find that gains during the takeover announcement period are larger if the 
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takeover is successful. Therefore, there is a hypothesis that deals with high media coverage 
prior to the merger announcement have a lower possibility of success than deals with low 
media coverage prior to the announcement, because the stock return will increase to 
compensate the holders if the takeover is successful. Second, Li (2006) find that compared 
with the number-based measures, text-based information is able to potentially offer a more 
independent test of market efficiency, because many of the number-based measures are 
significantly correlated so different anomalies possibly will reflect the similar empirical 
regularity. And Buehlmaier (2012) uses text-based media content and shows that news 
content is positively related to the takeover success. Moreover, Tetlock et al. (2008) also state 
that negative words convey negative information. Therefore, there is another hypothesis that 
a significantly negative interaction exists between media pessimism and takeover success.     
 
The empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses. The results show that deals with low 
media coverage have higher completion rates than deals with high media coverage. This 
finding is consistent with Fang and Peress (2009), who state that stocks without media 
coverage outperform those heavily covered by the media. They explain this is because deals 
with lower media coverage lead to less investor recognition and stocks with low levels of 
investor recognition must offer higher stock returns to compensate their shareholders, who 
are imperfectly diversified. Moreover, Asquith et al. (1983) find that gains during the 
takeover announcement period are larger if the takeover is successful. Therefore, the stock 
return will increase to compensate the holders if the takeover is successful. In addition, Liu 
and McConnell (2013) state that the media play an important role in changing shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests, this could result in the abandonment of value-reducing takeover 
attempts. Further, Joe et al. (2009) state that individual investors appear to react negatively to 




The results also indicate that deals with high market pessimism levels have lower completion 
rates than deals with low pessimism levels. The finding is in line with early investigations by 
Buehlmaier (2012), who indicates that the news content is positively related to takeover 
success. The findings are also related with those of Tetlock (2007) who state that textual 
sentiment has potentially strong impacts on stock returns and trading volumes and those of 
Tetlock et al. (2008) and Davis et al. (2011) who indicate that a highly pessimistic media 
forecast places downward pressure on market because negative words that convey negative 
information can be used to forecast low corporate earnings prices and Samuelson and 
Rosenthal (1986) who find there is a positive relation between the stock price and the chance 
of tender success. However, it is inconsistent with Vadnais (2012) and Cooke et al. (1998) 
who find no apparent relation between media sentiment and takeovers outcomes. 
 
Apart from media coverage and media sentiment, many other factors can affect takeover 
outcomes to some extent. Fishman (1989) and Branch et al. (2008) state that cash offers and 
friendly takeovers increase the likelihood of takeover success. Branch et al. (2008) find that 
takeover success is negatively related to the percentage of equity the bidding firm is seeking. 
Moreover, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find that the probability of receiving a takeover 
bid is negatively related to firm size. Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) state that an asymmetric 
equilibrium exists in financing policies, including endogenous leverage, takeover terms, and 
bankruptcy. The policies state that acquirers with the lowest leverage win the takeover 
negotiation. Capron and Shen (2007), Chang (1998), and Fuller et al. (2002) find that the 
bidding firms of private targets usually earn higher returns than those of public targets. This 




This chapter provides clear contributions to the literature. It is the first to employ M&A data 
to test the relation between media coverage (pessimism) and takeover outcomes in M&As. In 
contrast to the previous literature, which focuses on the relation between financial media and 
the entire stock market, this study specifically investigates the effect of media news on 
M&As. The large amounts of media coverage around takeover announcements could provide 
the perfect testing ground for this relation, since such an experiment would be less prone to 
selection bias from the media data. Second, given that the United Kingdom is the world's 
second largest financial centre, this study extends previous research by investigating whether 
and how the influence of media coverage and sentiment on takeover outcomes can offer new 
evidence in UK market. Third, the impact of not only media coverage but also media 
sentiment are examined. The findings have practical implications for the investor sentiment 
literature and suggest that media sentiment could be considered as an effective proxy for 
investor sentiment. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature review and presents the 
hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data and describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 
presents summary statistics and univariate and multivariate results. Sections 5 and 6 conduct 
robustness checks and endogeneity, respectively. Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Motivation of Takeovers 
During the takeover process, bidding firms aim to obtain some benefit, called synergistic gain, 
to offset the financial expenditure of the purchase. The total value obtained by the acquirers 
and targets after merging is believed to be much higher than the sum of their values as two 
separate entities. The synergy is defined as the following quote.   
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Value created by the combination of two firms, resulting in more efficient 
management, economies of scale, improved production techniques, the 
combination of complementary resources, the redeployment of assets to more 
profitable uses, the exploitation of market power, or any number of value creating 
mechanisms. (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1998, p.184) 
 
Strategic reasons sometimes lead to M&As; for example, bidders need to diversify into new 
markets or to combine expertise to better position themselves in their markets (Hillier et al., 
2013; Rumelt, 1974). One of the other main reasons for takeovers is to benefit from improved 
economies of scale, such as a boost in production capacity or larger purchases of products 
from suppliers at cheaper prices (Eckbo, 1985). Another benefit from takeovers is reduced 
capital requirements, since firms can share certain resources and save multiple costs (Fee and 
Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005). 
 
From the perspective of accounting, Cosh et al. (1989) state that the acquirer’s profitability 
and firm performance are significantly increased after the takeovers. After investigating the 
50 largest takeover deals in the US market from 1979 to 1985, Healy et al. (1992) also find 
that the cash flows and capital turnover ratios of acquirers are significantly increased as well. 
Moreover, Parrino and Harris (1999) find that acquirers’ cash flow after takeovers increases 
2.1% and post-merger performance could be better. In sum, the synergy is considered an 
important reason for post-merger performance improvement. 
 
Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell (1998) state that horizontal acquisitions often lead to 
extensive resource reorganizations between acquirers and targets. Synergy is created when 
the value of combined firms is greater than the sum of their own pre-merger values. 
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Thompson (1978) states that synergy refers to the economies of scale at the firm level and 
also comes from intangible assets such as goodwill, knowledge, and organizational 
arrangements in an industry. 
 
Gaughan (2002) classifies synergies into three types: operating synergy, management synergy, 
and revenue sharing synergy. Operating synergy refers to cost reductions resulting from 
economies of scale. Revenue sharing synergy refers the combined firm’s increase in 
capability to generate revenues after the takeover activities. 
 
Williamson (2008) finds that firms tend to undertake M&As and expand their scale to pursue, 
maintain and strengthen their monopolistic position in the market rather than improve 
efficiency. By increasing market share through M&As, competition can usually be reduced 
and greater monopoly profits obtained. Moreover, in the long run, acquirers will no longer be 
able to improve efficiency or reduce risks through takeovers, removing the incentive for 
further takeovers. Market power is generally judged in terms of industry concentration. For 
instance, a high concentration denotes the top four to eight firms together comprising more 
than 30% of the market share, a moderate concentration 15–30% of the market share, and a 
low concentration 15% of the market share. 
 
Eun et al. (1996) find both foreign acquirers and targets earn positive gains, which showing 
that cross-border M&As are synergy-creating activities. After comparing the post-merger 
performance of merged firms from different countries, the authors also find that shareholders 
of the U.S. targets earn  significant wealth gains, regardless of the acquirers' nationality. In 
contrast, foreign acquirer shareholders earn varied greatly across acquirers' countries. The 
Japanese takeovers earn the largest net wealth gains while UK firms suffer substantial 
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negative excess returns and Canadian firms are somewhere in between. Moreover, the authors 
also find after controlling for the influences of relevant economic variables, such as the 
targets' Research and development capabilities or the relative market value of targets and 
acquirers, strong differences of gains between countries become insignificant.  
 
The long-term performance of cross-border takeovers was first studied by Cosh and Guest 
(2001). They find that in the pre-takeover period, the profit returns of target firms decrease 
significantly in hostile takeovers, and have significantly negative cumulative excess returns. 
However, in the post-takeover period the profit returns of hostile takeovers increase 
significantly. On the contrary, the profit returns of friendly takeovers do not improve and the 
takeovers also experience significantly negative long-run returns. 
 
After studying cross-border takeovers in the US market, Doukas and Travlos (1988) conclude 
that the wealth of US shareholders does not increase and acquirers do not benefit from 
takeovers. After researching a large number of takeover deals where US acquirers merged 
with Canadian, British, and European firms, Oyon (1998) finds that US acquirers earn a 
negative return when they merge with Canadian and British firms and a positive return when 
they merge with European firms. 
 
2.2 The Takeover Process 
Using a unique dataset, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find that external sources of 
financing (debt and equity) are often exerted in takeovers involving cash payments. 
Takeovers with the same payment methods and distinct transaction funding sources are quite 
different. Takeovers financed with debt significantly outperform those financed with 
internally generated funds. The financing decision of a takeover is related to the acquirer’s 
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pecking order preferences, its corporate governance environment, and its growth potential. 
The choice of equity versus internal financing is also related to the acquirer’s strategic 
preferences with respect to payment methods. 
 
Ghosh and Jain (2000) state that there is a positive relation between financial leverage and 
the operating performance of takeovers. Since cash payments are more likely to lead to more 
increase of debt capacity than stock payment, there is a economically and statistically 
significant increase of firm leverage following takeovers. 
 
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) find that a failed takeover attempt always leads to a high rate 
of management turnover. They explain that a takeover attempt disseminates adverse 
information possessed by the acquirers about the performance of managers. A manager’s 
forced resignation can be either good or bad news for the firm when the board is not effective. 
Moreover, if more adverse public information is disseminated about the manager and there is 
a higher probability of an ineffective board prior to the takeover, an optimistic effect is 
expected to dominate. 
 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) examine a sample of large takeovers completed from 1971 to 
1982. The bidding firms divested around 44% of the acquired firms until 1989. The authors 
characterize divested takeovers’ success ex post and classify 34–50% divestitures as failed. 
Acquirer returns and total returns (including acquirer and acquired firms) takeover 
announcement are significantly higher for takeovers that are not divested and successful 
divestitures than for failed divestitures. Although diversifying takeovers have four times the 
likelihood of being divested than related takeovers, the results do not indicate that related 




There are many explanations for why the stock prices of acquirers decrease following the 
announcements of M&As. Roll (1986) explains that sometimes the acquirers’ managers are 
overconfident and overpay for the targets. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987) 
suggest that paying with equity can lead to negative returns. 
 
Moeller (2004) finds that firm size is one of the decisive factors that lead to negative 
abnormal returns and larger firms are more likely to yield negative returns because they 
usually pay more and their manager often suffer from hubris. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
explains that the managers of large firms may be more overconfident that those in small firms, 
since the latter are more cautious because they have fewer assets. 
 
After examining the effect of takeovers on the wealth of the acquirers’ shareholders, Asquith 
et al. (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) suggest that the returns are significantly and 
positively related to the relative sizes of the acquirers and targets. Moreover, Asquith et al. 
(1983) also find that the gains during the takeover announcement period are larger if the 
takeover outcome is successful. On the contrary, using a three-day event window, Draper and 
Paudyal (2006) find that firms with a low relative size ratio earn significantly higher excess 
returns when the acquirers are private firms. 
 
Travlos (1987) and Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) found that there is major differences in 
the excess returns between common stock exchanges and stocks exchanges that using the 
cash payment. In the US market, shareholders of bidding firms earn significant abnormal 
losses upon takeover announcements when equity is used for payment. This results are in line 
with the signalling hypothesis, which indicates that stock payment provides the negative 
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information the bidding firm is overvalued. Moreover, hostile takeovers always choose cash 
payment and earn a positive premium while friendly takeovers always earn lower premium 
and negative abnormal returns. In addition, Loughran and Vijh (1997) suggest that in the long 
run, acquirers can earn positive abnormal returns if they choose cash as the payment method 
in takeovers. On the contrary, stock payments lead to negative long-run abnormal returns. 
 
Chang (1998) finds that, when buying private targets, acquirers using stock payments earn 
positive abnormal returns and acquirers using stock payments earn zero abnormal returns, 
which is unlike publicly traded targets. Fuller et al. (2002) find that acquirers achieve 
significant positive abnormal returns when buying private targets irrespective of the payment 
method, but bidders gain the highest abnormal return when using equity. 
 
Bruslerie (2013) find that analyses of the offer premiums and payment methods should be 
performed together. Employing a sample of European takeovers from 2000 to 2012, Bruslerie 
(2013) indicates that, in a contractual empirical approach, offer premiums and payment 
methods are jointly set. In addition, there is a positive relation between the cash percentage 
and the tender offer premium; that is, higher offer premiums lead to higher percentages of 
cash payments. 
 
Mayers and Majluf (1984) show that firms prefer stock as the payment method when the 
shares of bidding firm are overvalued and cash payments when the shares of bidding firm are 
undervalued. Roll (1986) states that managers of bidding firms overpay because of hubris, 
referring to managerial overconfidence. The managers of successful firms are more likely to 





Capron and Shen (2007), Chang (1998), and Fuller et al. (2002) find that the bidding firms of 
private targets usually earn significantly higher returns than those of public targets. The 
bidders gain when buying a private target but lose when buying a public target. Moreover, the 
abnormal returns are greater when acquiring public targets and using the stock payment. 
However, the abnormal returns are significantly positive when acquiring private and 
subsidiary targets, regardless of payment methods. In this case, returns are higher for bidders 
use stock offer than for bidders use cash offer. 
 
2.3 Media Coverage and Media Sentiment 
Textual analysis is a subset of the finance literature on qualitative information. Loughran and 
McDonald (2010) find that negative word categorizations are an efficient way to measure 
media tone and show their significant correlation with other financial variables. Compared 
with the Harvard list, the Fin-Neg list has more significant correlations with stock returns 
when media articles and seasoned equity offerings are examined. Loughran and McDonald 
therefore concentrate on the Fin-Neg list’s more regular word cataloguing approach to 
measure tone. 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2010) also uncover a measurement problem in which, if the 
Harvard dictionary is used, about three-fourths of the negative word counts in 10-K filings11 
are not typically negative in a financial news context. The authors introduce two methods to 
resolve this issue: First, they generate a word list that included typically negative words in 
financial reports; second, they construct a term-weighting scheme that reduces the influence 
of high-frequency words and gives lower-frequency words greater influence. Either method 
                                                        
11 Form 10-K is an annual report required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
that comprehensively summarizes a firm’s performance. 
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can reduce the noise caused by word misclassification. Furthermore, Loughran and 
McDonald create five other word categorizations, based on positive, uncertain, litigious, 
strongly modal, and weakly modal words, respectively. 
 
Two other papers look at the role of media in corporate finance, both in the setting of initial 
public offering (IPOs). Cook, Kieschnick, and Ness (2006) investigate the relation between 
marketing efforts, including media coverage, and the success of an IPO. They find that news 
coverage significantly affects IPO outcomes. Similarly, Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2009) 
examine the role of media in IPOs and show that offerings with greater media coverage have 
higher initial returns and greater long-term value. 
 
Focusing on Russia from 1999 to 2002, Dyck et al. (2008) examine the relation between 
media coverage and corporate governance. They conclude that the lobbying of investment 
funds increases the media coverage of corporate governance violations in the 
Anglo-American press. Moreover, they also indicate that media coverage in the 
Anglo-American press boosts the chances of a corporate governance violation being reversed. 
At the beginning of the term, this influence is present even when the authors instrument 
media coverage with an exogenous determinant, the fund’s portfolio composition. The fund’s 
strategy seems to not only influence Russian firms’ reputation abroad but also force 
regulators into action. 
 
Joe et al. (2009) examine the influence of the press on the behaviour of various economic 
agents by analysing how media coverage about the ineffectiveness of a firm’s board 
influences corporate governance, stock prices, and investor trading behaviour. Their focus on 
board quality is stimulated by the strong media criticism to which corporate boards and 
101 
 
corporate America have recently been generally subjected. The results show that media 
releases of information have significant economic impacts. In particular, media coverage of 
board ineffectiveness forces acquired agents to act correctively and increases shareholder 
wealth. Individual investors appear to react negatively to media exposure, whereas 
investment firms act as if they anticipate the acquired firms’ corrective actions. 
 
Riorden et al. (2013) examine the influence of newswire messages on intraday price 
discovery, trading activity, and liquidity in an electronic limit order market. They use an 
objective measure of the message tone to examine the influences of positive, negative, and 
neutral messages on intraday price discovery and trading intensity. They find negative 
messages lead to higher adverse selection costs than neutral or positive messages do. 
Moreover, positive and neutral messages increase liquidity and negative messages decrease 
liquidity. All news increases trading activities. The results also indicate that market 
participants gather different information and that negative news is particularly informative 
and leads to stronger market reactions. 
 
By examining the data on stock prices and trading activity for acquired firms in 172 
successful takeovers in the US market between 1981 and 1985, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) 
analyse how several factors influence the market. They find that rumours in the news close to 
the beginning of a takeover are the strongest variable in explaining unanticipated premiums 
and pre-takeover runups for tender offer acquired firms. Moreover, they also report the 
attitude, whether friendly or hostile, of the takeover has no statistical significance in 
explaining unexpected returns. In addition, they find that insider trading allegations are 
positively related to unexpected returns. The influence of media speculation and of foothold 
takeovers on unexpected returns and pre-takeover runups are in line with a legitimate market 
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for information. Furthermore, the authors indicate that significant pre-takeover market 
activity is in line with no illegal and little insider trading. 
 
Basil et al. (1991) state that negative television advertising has a significant impact on 
political candidates. Their results indicate that the influences of positive and negative 
advertising differ based on the context in which the advertising appears and the criterion used 
to assess influences. In addition, advertising is most influential when matching the 
surrounding context and negative advertising can certainly alienate voters. 
 
Berry and Howe (1994) state that the arrival of public information, which measured by the 
number of news releases, is nonconstant and display seasonalities and different intraday 
patterns. The authors also find there is a moderate positive relation between public 
information and trading intensity. However, they find no relation between public information 
and price volatility.  
 
Utilizing computer-aided content analysis, Price et al.(2012) investigate the relation between 
the incremental informativeness of quarterly earnings conference calls and stock market 
reactions. The results show that conference call linguistic tone has significant predictability 
for trading volume and abnormal stock returns. 
 
To measure the effectiveness of firm press releases, Obl et al. (1995) use an agenda setting 
framework and consider the number and types of press releases against subsequent press 
clippings in terms of length and content. Both the quantity (number of column lines and 
average number of articles per firm) and quality (lead and point of view) of newspaper 
coverage are examined. Their findings indicate that how the media builds and subsequently 
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sets the public news agenda during hostile takeovers can be influenced through public 
relations-created news releases if the information in the release reflects the source’s point of 
view, is accompanied by follow-up contact, and that contact is between the firm and the 
reporter. The authors also show that newspaper content during takeovers is directly 
influenced by two factors: first, by firms’ press releases and, second, by media access to 
management. This happens during a period of public information scarcity, where the major 
source of new information for journalists is the acquirer and the target. 
 
2.4 The Relation between Takeovers and the Media 
Carretta et al. (2011) analyse the relation between the mass media and stock returns, using 
Italy’s key financial media. Their results show that stock returns are likely to increase after 
ownership news if the firm has not been profitable when the news is released; otherwise, 
returns tend to decrease. This finding means public investors react negatively to ownership 
news about profitable firms and are likely to sell their securities. The results also indicate that 
there is no statistically significant relation between the tone/content of corporate governance 
news and the cumulative abnormal returns12 (Carretta et al., 2011). The authors suggest that 
investors can determine the type of corporate governance event only prior to the news release, 
since after its publication individual investors are affected by its content and tone. Moreover, 
the authors find that stock returns are negatively influenced by news when changes occur to 
the board of directors of profitable firms. 
 
Fang and Peress (2009) investigate this hypothesis and find that stocks with no media 
coverage earn higher returns than stocks with high media coverage. However, when 
                                                        
12 The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of abnormal returns and is often calculated 




considering the media and trading in the stock market, it is crucial to distinguish between the 
impact of media reporting and the impact of the events being reported. Engelberg and 
Parsons (2011) address this question and find that local media coverage causes local trading 
activity. Ahern and Sosyura (2013) and Buehlmaier (2012) show that media content can be 
manipulated during corporate acquisitions. Dyck et al. (2008) consider corporate governance 
and find that media coverage leads to reversals of corporate governance violations. 
 
After examining 34,180 firm–years with annual report filing dates from 1994 to 2005, Li 
(2006) finds a negative relation between risk sentiment and future earnings and that the risk 
sentiment of annual reports can forecast future returns. That is, firms with a larger increase in 
risk sentiment have fewer earnings changes and less negative returns the next calendar year. 
Moreover, the author also finds that, compared with number-based measures, text-based 
information potentially offers a more independent test of market efficiency, because many of 
the number-based measures are significantly correlated so that different anomalies possibly 
reflect similar empirical regularities. 
 
Tetlock (2007) examines the relation between media content and stock market activity. The 
author suggests that a highly pessimistic media forecast places downward pressure on market 
prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals and that unusual optimism or pessimism 
predicts high market trading volume. Furthermore, pessimistic forecasts seem to have a 
particularly large negative influence that reverses itself in small stocks quite slowly. 
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) investigate the utilization of a quantitative language measure to forecast 
corporate earnings and stock returns. They present three main findings: First, within 
corporation-specific news stories, some of the negative words that convey negative 
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information can be used to forecast low corporate earnings. Second, corporate share prices 
react to such information with a short delay. Third, the predictability of earnings and stock 
returns from negative words is strongest for stories that concentrate on fundamentals. Tetlock 
et al. (2008) conclude that linguistic media content is difficult to capture to quantify aspects 
of firms’ fundamentals, which investors rapidly impound into share prices. Moreover, the 
authors show that only negative word counts have predictability and do not consider the 
effect of positive words. However, a more recent study by Jegadeesh and Wu (2012), using a 
new term-weighting scheme, discovers a significant relation between document tone and 
market reaction for positive words as well, so the authors emphasize the importance of 
choosing the appropriate term-weighting scheme. 
 
Buehlmaier and Zechner (2013) present strong evidence that information in the financial 
media is not fully impounded in security prices. They also demonstrate that media content 
influences takeover arbitrage returns but the results for media coverage are not significant. 
Moreover, media information released on the announcement day includes information proven 
to be largely unrelated to the likelihood of deal completion. The authors do not provide any 
strong evidence supporting a certification role for the media. 
 
Based on Tetlock’s (2008) findings, Garcia (2013) examines the sentiment effect on asset 
prices by investigating financial news from The New York Times in the 20th century. 
Employing the fractions of negative and positive words as a proxy for media sentiment, 
Garcia shows that the ability to forecast stock returns by using news content focuses on 
recessionary periods. Moreover, predictability is especially strong on Mondays and following 
holidays, since readers have more time to read the news before the afternoon of the trading 
day. Additionally, the author argues that the effect partially reverses after the next four trading 
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days. In sum, investor sentiment has an important impact during recessions. 
 
Kearney and Liu (2014) review the textual sentiment literature in finance by focusing on 
three main aspects: information sources, content analysis methods, and the financial models 
used to examine whether and how textual sentiment impacts people, institutions, and markets. 
They agree with Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Tetlock (2007), in that textual sentiment has 
a potentially strong impact on stock returns and trading volumes. The media-expressed 
sentiment literature demonstrates that textual sentiment has contemporaneous or short-term 
effects on stock prices, returns, abnormal returns, and trading volumes. 
 
Examining around 20,000 firm earnings announcements during 1998–2006, Demers and 
Vega (2011) use textual analysis to obtain two dimensions of managerial soft information: 
certainty and net optimism. The authors indicate that soft information has predictability for 
valuation fundamentals and that it influences asset prices both during the announcement 
period and during the two-month post-announcement period. Moreover, the authors find that 
linguistic certainty reduces the response during the post-announcement period to 
unanticipated net optimism, is in line with idiosyncratic volatility during the announcement 
period, and also forecasts future idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
Yu et al. (2013) conclude that, overall, social media has a stronger relationship with firm 
stock performance than conventional media does, while social and conventional media have a 
strong interaction effect on stock performance. More interestingly, they find that the impact 
of different types of social media varies significantly. Different types of social media also 





Recent research shows that failed tender offers can influence the share returns of acquired 
firms for two years past the announcement of the tender offer. Fabozzi et al. (1988) study 
target returns in the period from the announcement to one year after the withdrawal of the 
tender offer. After examining a sample of acquired firms that did receive any bids during the 
year following an unsuccessful tender offer, the authors find that the entire premium of the 
tender offer disappears when information of the failure is disseminated to the public. They 
also conclude that there are no excess returns in the year after the failure. They explain that 
this is probably because of the effective opposition by the acquired firms’ management and 
government intervention. 
 
Schumaker et al. (2012) find that subjective news articles are easier to predict in terms of 
price direction (59.0% versus 50.0% for chance alone) and, using a simple trading engine, 
subjective articles garner a 3.30% return. Looking further into the role of author tone in 
financial news articles, the authors find that articles with a negative sentiment are easiest to 
predict in terms of price direction (50.9% versus 50.0% for chance alone) and have a 3.04% 
trading return. Investigating negative sentiment further, they find that their system is able to 
predict price decreases in articles of positive sentiment 53.5% of the time and price increases 
in articles of negative sentiment 52.4% of the time. 
 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) view the firm as an active player, using media coverage to 
influence its own outcome. They state that firms have an incentive to manage media coverage 
to influence their stock prices during important corporate events. Using comprehensive data 
on media coverage and merger negotiations, the authors find that bidders in stock mergers 
originate substantially more news stories after the start of merger negotiations but before the 
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public announcement. This strategy generates a short-lived runup in bidders’ stock prices 
during the period when the stock exchange ratio is determined, which substantially impacts 
the takeover price. The authors’ results demonstrate that the timing and content of financial 
media coverage can be biased by firms seeking to manipulate their stock prices. 
 
Aman (2013) attempts to identify a possible linkage between stock price crashes and jumps 
and media coverage by using data from Japanese stock markets and newspaper articles. The 
evidence clearly indicates that crash frequency increases with media coverage and its 
seasonal concentration. This key finding supports the notion that intensive media reports on a 
firm provoke extremely large market reactions to corporate news. Further, by using an 
alternative measure of the scale of crash returns, the author confirms the increasing effect of 
media coverage on crashes. Aman also finds that the media effect is caused by market 
reactions, particularly to news on official disclosure information such as announcements of 
accounting results. 
 
Chan (2001) examines returns to a subset of stocks after public news about them is released. 
The author finds a major difference between the return patterns for the two sets. Moreover, 
the author also finds evidence of post-news drift, which supports the idea that investors 
underreact to information. This phenomenon is strongest after bad news. 
 
One of the first empirical studies to explore the relation between news information and stock 
prices is that of Cutler et al. (1989). Their research expresses difficulty in explaining the 
variance in stock prices, finding that only around half of the asset price volatility can be 
explained by news about fundamentals. After accounting for significant macroeconomic news, 
the authors find that news about fundamentals can explain up to one-third of stock price 
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movements and that significant world news about politics or natural disasters does have some 
effect on stock prices. 
 
By using the textual analysis program Diction, Demers and Vega (2008) find that unexpected 
net optimism in managers’ language influences abnormal returns during the announcement 
period and forecasts post-earnings announcement drift in 1998–2006. They also find that it is 
easier for the market to understand the implications of hard information (data that are easy to 
store, quantify, and transmit through impersonal means) than those of soft information (data 
that are directly verifiable only by the person who collected and produced it, that cannot be 
definitely documented) . 
 
By examining a sample including 194 firms, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) provide evidence 
of excess returns earned by investors in targets prior to the first public takeover 
announcements. The results show that impending takeover announcements are poorly held 
secrets and trading activities on this non-public information abound. In particular, the leakage 
of inside information is a serious problem at a significant level up to 12 trading days prior to 
the first public announcement of a planned takeover. 
 
By analysing the approximately 23,000 earnings press releases issued during 1998–2003 and 
by using categories based on linguistic theory, Davis et al. (2011) categorizes words into two 
groups: optimistic words and pessimistic words. They then develop a method to measure the 
managers’ net optimistic language for each earnings press release. They state that this 
measure is positively correlated with the future average of return on assets and generates a 
significant market response around the earnings announcement date in the short term. The 
results are in line with the hypothesis that the earnings press release language predicts the 
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expected future firm performance and that the market also counteracts this signal provided by 
the language. The authors explain that managers use language in earnings press releases to 
communicate valuable information about expected future returns. 
 
Since newspaper stories provide an interpretation of statistical releases, Birza and Lott (2011) 
choose newspaper stories as their measure of news. Their findings indicate that news about 
gross domestic product and unemployment does affect stock returns. Boyd et al. (2005) find 
that news about rising unemployment in contractions leads to lower expected earnings and, 
therefore, results in lower stock prices. However, in expansions, the same news about rising 
unemployment leads to lower expected interest rates on government bonds, causing stock 
prices to rise. McQueen and Roley (1993) find a similar result for industrial production index 
and unemployment surprises. In particular, they find that good news about these variables in 
expansions raises stock prices. 
 
Since newspaper stories provide an interpretation of the statistical releases, Birza and Lott Jr 
(2011) choose newspaper stories as the measure of news. Their findings indicate that news 
about GDP and unemployment does affect stock returns. Boyd et al. (2005) find that news 
about rising unemployment in contractions, leads to lower expected earnings and therefore, 
results in lower stock prices. However in expansions, the same news about rising 
unemployment leads to lower expected interest rates on government bonds, causing stock 
prices to rise. McQueen and Roley (1993) find a similar result for industrial production index 
and unemployment surprises. In particular, they find that good news about these variables in 
expansions raises stock prices. 
 
Aitken et al. (1992) show considerable evidence regarding pre-announcement price and 
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volume reactions to M&A announcements. Although insider trading could take place, much 
pre-bid trading is probably due to event anticipation. The authors document the impact when 
the print media disseminates the anticipation. Their results indicate that measures of turnover 
and unexpected returns decrease by one-third when media information is controlled for. 
 
After controlling the firm characteristics, Huang et al. (2011) find that abnormal positive tone 
(ABTONE) includes negative information about future firm fundamentals one to three years 
ahead. Moreover, there is a positive relation between ABTONE and immediate stock price 
reactions to earnings announcements and a negative relation between ABTONE and the one- 
and two-quarter delayed market reactions. In general, the evidence is in line with strategic 
tone management that disseminates incorrect information to investors about firm future 
fundamentals. 
 
By examining a trading strategy on the basis of the score measured by the tone of news 
articles, Sinha (2010) finds that the market underreacts to the tone and attitude of news 
articles. Moreover, the author also finds that the news offers a straightforward explanation for 
short-run stock return reversals: Short-run reversals do not happen when the returns are 
associated with information that matches their direction. 
 
Veldkamp (2006) relates surges in prices and cross-market price dispersion to media coverage. 
The author explains these anomalies with information market complementarities. These 
results are obtained because information is fundamentally distinct from other goods. It has a 
fixed cost of discovery and a near-zero cost of replication. High volume thus makes 
information inexpensive and low prices induce investors to buy information that others also 
buy. Veldkamp finds empirical support for the model’s prediction that asset market 
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movements generate news and that news raises prices and price dispersion. 
 
Hong et al. (2000) test the gradual information diffusion model developed by Hong and Stein 
(1999) and obtain two main findings. First, if firm size is kept constant, momentum strategies 
work better among securities with low analyst coverage. Next, the impact of analyst coverage 
is larger for securities that are past losers than for past winners. These results support the 
authors’ hypothesis that firm-specific information, particularly negative information, diffuses 
only slowly across the investing public. 
 
For all earnings announcements of Standard & Poor’s 500 Index firms, Engelburg and 
Parsons (2011) find that local media coverage strongly predicts local trading, after controlling 
for earnings, investor, and newspaper characteristics. Moreover, local trading is strongly 
related to the timing of local reporting, a particular challenge to non-media explanations. 
 
Barber and Odean (2008) propose that the buying behaviour of individual investors is more 
heavily influenced by media attention than their selling behaviour because individual 
investors only sell stocks that they already own and most hold relatively few common stocks 
in their portfolios. Moreover, the buying behaviour of individual investors is more heavily 
influenced by attention than the buying behaviour of professional investors is, because 
investors can individually consider the merits – both economic and emotional – of selling 
each stock they own and individual investors do not devote themselves to full-time stock 
research. The authors conclude that attention-driven buying is also driven by the complexity 
involved in individual investors exploring the numerous stocks they could buy. 
 
Bushee and Miller (2007) find that firms that hire investor relations firms experience an 
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increase in media coverage, institutional ownership, and valuation. Solomon (2012) shows 
that investor relations firms influence both media coverage and stock returns. Investor 
relations corporate news favourably, and bring more media coverage of positive news 
releases than negative news releases. And this spin can result in a temporary increase in stock 
announcement returns. This finding is in line with positive sentiment increasing the 
expectations of investors, while negative sentiment disappointing the investors.  
 
2.5 Media and Takeover Outcomes 
Vadnais (2012) focuses on the influence of media on pricing and the outcomes of takeovers in 
the high-tech industry. The research demonstrates a positive correlation between average 
media sentiment about mergers and the final prices of the acquirers. However, the author 
finds no apparent relation between media sentiment and takeover outcomes. 
 
Cooke et al. (1998) state that there is no evidence to show that the characteristics of defence 
documents can influence the hostile takeover outcome, which is measured as success or 
failure. It is in line with a view that defence is undertaken not to correct mispricing of the 
target firms' stock by additional news to shareholders to keep independent, but to drive up the 
purchase consideration and increase the wealth of shareholders. Moreover, the disclosures in 
defence documents have no impact on correcting market mispricing.  
 
Buehlmaier (2012) addresses the question of how important the media are in the likelihood of 
deal completion. The author uses text-based media content and shows that news content is 
positively related to takeover success. Naïve Bayes is used to develop a media measure with 
goodness of fit and a large marginal effect. The measure has since become a key explanatory 
variable. Moreover, the author states that a value-creating acquirer runs a media campaign to 
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signal to target shareholders that the deal is good, while a value-destroying acquirer has no 
incentive to run a media campaign because it is too costly. 
 
Using a large sample of merger announcements, Buehlmaier and Zechner (2013) provide 
strong evidence that information in financial media is not fully incorporated in stock prices. 
Cross-sectional regressions show that a one standard deviation increase in the media-implied 
probability of deal completion results in a 1.2% increase in the subsequent 12-day return. 
Media content information released on the announcement day contains information not 
captured by announcement day stock returns that is found to be largely unrelated to the 
probability of deal completion. The results for media coverage are much weaker. A trading 
strategy based on media content increases annualized alphas by 12.5%, while the effect of 
media coverage on alphas is statistically insignificant. Finally, the authors find weak evidence 
in favour of a certification role for the media, with the top newswire and top newspapers 
contributing more information to the market. 
 
Examining 636 large takeover attempts accompanied by a negative stock price reaction upon 
announcement (value-reducing takeover attempts) from 1990 to 2010, Liu and McConnell 
(2013) state that the sensitivity of managers to the firm’s stock price reaction around the 
takeover announcement is related to the level of media attention and the media attitude 
toward the expected transaction. The managers then decide whether to go through with the 
value-reducing takeover attempt or abandon it. The authors suggest that managers and 
shareholders have reputational capital at risk when they make corporate capital allocation 
decisions and that the level of media attention and the media attitude increase the influence of 
a value-reducing takeover on the managers’ reputational capital. The media play an important 
role in changing shareholders’ and managers’ interests, which can lead to the abandonment of 
115 
 
value-reducing takeover attempts. 
 
2.6 Factors Influence Takeover outcomes 
Branch et al. (2008) states that about 10% of announced takeover attempts fail, including 
those withdrawn by the acquirers or rebuffed by the target firms. Comparing the traditional 
logistic regression model and artificial neural network technology, the authors construct a 
takeover outcome prediction model and empirically show that spread, target resistance, deal 
structure, and transaction size are the key factors that influence the success of a takeover 
attempt. Moreover, the authors find that friendly takeover attempts have a better chance of 
success than hostile takeover attempts do. A deal also has a greater likelihood of success 
when it has less risk arbitrage spread and uses a stock payment. In addition, takeover success 
has a negative relation with the percentage of equity the bidding firm is seeking. 
 
By examining the medium of exchange, including both cash and stock payments in tender 
offers, Fishman (1989) finds that cash offers can increase the likelihood of the takeover’s 
success in tender offers, mandatory bids, competing bids, and hostile takeovers and are 
therefore preferred by bidders in such transactions. Moreover, a stock payment signals a high 
value for the acquired firm and thus has the benefit of pre-empting competition. 
 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) analyse the relation between financial leverage and takeover 
activity. They design a takeover model in which not only the financing strategies of bidding 
firms but also the timing and terms of takeovers are determined. They indicate that capital 
structure determines the outcome of takeover negotiation. Moreover, an asymmetric 
equilibrium exists in financing policies that include endogenous leverage, takeover terms, and 
bankruptcy. The policies state that acquirers with the lowest leverage win takeover 
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negotiations. According to this equilibrium, the model predicts that the leverage of the 
winning acquirer is below the industry average and that bidders should increase their leverage 
after the takeover is complete. 
 
By testing for earnings management for the UK market, which is the world’s second largest 
M&A market from 1997 to 2001, Botsari and Meeks (2008) find that Earnings management 
by bidding firms ahead of share-financed bids can play an important role in the outcome of a 
hostile takeover and have irreversible consequences for industry structure, shareholder wealth, 
and management structure. 
 
After examining the three cases of hostile takeover in Germany 1946 to present, Franks and 
Mayer (1998) find that banks play an important role in affecting takeover outcomes. In all 
three cases, the bank representatives were the chairs of their supervisory boards. Banks also 
voted many proxies in significant decisions influencing takeovers. Moreover, the authors 
report that low returns were earned by shareholders from two of the acquired firms and 
explain that the low takeover premium was due to ineffective regulation in Germany. 
 
By analysing a takeover battle as a contest between two managers, Fabel and Kolmar (2012) 
indicate that negotiation outcomes determine the likelihood of a successful takeover and the 
manager who will be the leader of the acquired firm. In addition, asymmetries in CEO 
compensation structure have influence on negotiation behaviour and outcomes. 
 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find that the likelihood of getting a takeover bid is positively 
related to tangible assets, and negatively related to firm size, to the net change in institutional 
holdings in the quarter before the announcement and to the Blank-check preferred stock 
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authorizations. However, the absolute levels of institutional shareholdings and insider have 
no significant effect on the the bid probability.  
 
 
Walking (1985) develops and tests a model for the prediction of tender offer outcomes. 
Variables that increase the supply of obtainable shares (such as increased bid premiums or 
solicitation fees) are shown to increase the probability of success. Increased ownership of 
target firm shares by the bidder also increase the probability of success. Variables that impede 
the tendering of shares (such as target management opposition or a competing bid) decrease 
the probability of success. 
 
Henry (2004) examines the influence of corporate governance and the ownership attributes of 
target firms on takeover outcomes in Australia between 1991 and 2000. The findings suggest 
that board composition and the chairperson identity of target firms and director, institutional 
investor, and external share ownership in targets have minimal effects on the likelihood of 
takeover success. The nature of the recommendations of target directors is found to be the 
most significant determinant of takeover success or failure and bid premium levels and offer 
price revisions are also shown to be important in discriminating between successful and 
failed takeovers. 
 
Epstain (2005) concludes six determinants of merger success: strategic vision and fit, deal 
structure, due diligence, pre-merger planning, post-merger integration which is vital to the 
takeover success, and external factors. Failure of any one of the six can impede the 
achievement of merger goals. Strategic vision and fit means firms must evaluate whether the 
targets are good choices as takeover partners to fulfil the strategic vision. Deal structure 
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includes two aspects: price paid and financing type. The due diligence includes the formal 
financial review of assets, revenues, liabilities, and expenses and substantiation of the 
financial records. In post-merger procedure, shareholders must blend the human resources 
management, technical operations, and customer relationships carefully and make important 
decisions. 
 
Since targets always earn excess returns around the takeover announcement date in both 
successful and failed bids, Brown and Raymond (1986) and Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986) 
find that the market can estimate the likelihood of takeover success quite well. The average 
price of successfully targeted firms is likely to increase during the takeover announcement 
period and is close to the offer price. However, the average price of failed targets is likely to 
remain below the offer price. Hutson (2000) finds that the model proposed by Brown and 
Raymond (1986) has a few weaknesses, such as it limits the share price of the acquired firm 
to a range that could be influenced by the data and could lead to huge difficulties in 
estimating a correct post-bid share price. Moreover, Hutson (2000) proposes a model that 
overcomes these weaknesses and applies it to the share price behaviour of 245 acquired firms 
in takeovers in Australia from 1980 to 1993. First, the author finds the average 
pre-announcement runup is 32% for successfully acquired firms and 39% for the targets in 
unsuccessful acquisitions. Next, the prices of firms that failed to be acquired are likely to be 
higher than those of successfully acquired firms, but not significantly so. Last, the prices of 
successfully acquired firms do not rise closely with the offer price of bid completion. The 
author also finds that, in the takeover period, trading activities in successfully targeted stocks 
are likely reduced and cease before the bid completion in many cases. The author explains 
why the dispersion in traders’ beliefs about acquired firms’ future prices is likely to collapse 




Using an event study methodology, Marcus and Singh (2011) examine not only informed 
trading but also contraire trading preceding successful takeover announcements for US 
acquired firms from 2001 to 2006. They state that on the US stock market, both contraire 
trading and informed trading exist within the period preceding successful takeover 
announcements. In addition, abnormal trading activity is reflected in abnormal trading 
volumes in both put and call options. 
 
Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986) report that the movements in the stock prices of acquired 
firms during the tender offer period are able to predict the success or failure of the tender 
offer during the period 1976–1981. There is a positive relation between stock prices and the 
chance of tender success. What is more, the authors also report that target firms are usually 
undervalued during the offer period. An optimal investment strategy possibly earn abnormal 
returns by buying undervalued targets. On the other hand, the opportunities for earning 
abnormal returns do not happen frequently. 
  
After developing a takeover success prediction model that tries to use information that is 
publicly available during the announcement period to predict the probability of a successful 
takeover and avoid risks, Branch et al. (2008) conclude that arbitrage spread, target resistance, 
deal structure, and transaction size are the vital factors that can influence takeover outcomes. 
Moreover, by comparing two models, the authors find that a feed forward neural network 
(FFNN) performs as well as logistic regression in forecasting successful takeovers and 




2.7 Hypothesis Development 
Based on the above findings, this chapter examines whether the financial media influence 
takeover outcomes. Fang and Peress (2009) state that stocks without media coverage 
outperform those heavily covered by the media. Moreover, Asquith et al. (1983) find that the 
gains during the takeover announcement period are larger if the takeover outcome is 
successful. In addition, Liu and McConnell (2013) state that the media plays an important 
role in changing shareholders’ and managers’ interests, which can lead to the abandonment of 
value-reducing takeover attempts. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: Deals with low media coverage prior to the takeover announcement have a higher 
possibility of success than deals with high media coverage prior to the takeover 
announcement. 
 
Although Cooke et al. (1998) and Vadnais (2012) find no apparent relation between the 
media sentiment and the takeover outcomes, Buehlmaier (2012) uses text-based media 
content and shows that news content is positively related to the takeover success. Moreover, 
Tetlock et al. (2008) who demonstrate that fundamental information transmitted by the 
financial news resolves the problem of information asymmetry. This leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H2: There is a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and takeover 
success. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Three types of data is included in the analysis: 1) Takeover data between November 30, 1981, 
and January 1, 2010 from Thomson One Banker Deals database, and the initial sample 
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consists of 15205 deals carried out by 2465 public UK bidders. 2) UK media data from 
LexisNexis database, which includes four influential UK media sources: the Financial Times, 
The Times, Guardian, and the Mirror. These sources released 274,201 media articles between 
November 30, 1981, and January 1, 2010, covering 251 UK firms. 3) stock price and 
accounting data between November 30, 1981 and January 1, 2010 from Datastream databases. 
These data include the FTSE All-Share Index levels, daily stock prices, book-to-market ratios, 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 13 , leverage, 
price-to-earnings (PE)14 ratios, and market values. 
 
To match the data from the three different databases, a unique identifier is required. Thomson 
One Banker and Datastream both use the Datastream code as a firm identifier. Since the raw 
media data do not have Datastream codes, manually searches for these in the media database 
were carried out to ensure each article had a Datastream code. The STATA program was used 
for the data cleaning and matching processes in this chapter. After all media firms without a 
Datastream code or an available date are deleted, the Thomson One Banker Deals and media 
databases by Datastream code are merged together. At last, media data released over 180 days 
before the takeover announcement is deleted, because only deals with media coverage are 
examined in this chapter. Of the final sample, there are 1218 deals covered within 180 days 
before the takeover announcement. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
To calculate the media pessimism for each firm prior to its M&A announcement, the words in 
each article are compared with the positive and negative word lists of Loughran and 
                                                        
13 EBITDA refers to a firm's earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from 
final accounting of its income and costs. The EBITDA of a firm show people about the current operational profitability of 
the firm's business. 




McDonald (2011). In this case, the numbers of positive and negative words and the total 
number of words are obtained.15 In the most recent version of the lists, 353 words are 
positive and 2337 words are negative. 
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) define the media sentiment score as the standardized fraction of negative 
words in each news story, measured by: 
 
    
                   
                
                                 (1) 
    
        
    
                                         (2) 
 
where      is the mean of Neg and      is the standard deviation of Neg over the prior 
calendar year. Standardization is necessary if Neg is nonstationary. The variable neg is the 
stationary measure of media pessimism that is employed in the regression analyses. 
 
Each article is given a pessimism score and an arithmetic average score is calculated for each 
bidder. Three overall article pessimism indices are calculated for the 180 days prior to the 
takeover. The similar results are attained from using other sentiment formulas, such as the 
quantity of positive words minus the quantity of negative words, divided by the sum of 
positive and negative word counts or total words (Rees and Twedt 2012). However, Henry 
and Leone (2009) and Tetlock (2007) find that negative words have a much stronger 
correlation with stock returns than positive words do. Many papers also suggest that the 
frequency of negative words in an article decides its tone (Das and Chen 2007, Davis et al. 
2011, Loughran and McDonald 2011). Therefore, the method proposed by Tetlock et al. 
(2008) are employed to measure media sentiment. Because this formula focuses on the 
                                                        
15 We used the computer program WordStat to obtain the sentiment data and Stata for the other calculation. 
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negative words, the media pessimism score stands for the level of media sentiment. 
 
To investigate the effects of media coverage quantity, news is sorted into three media 
coverage portfolios: the top 25% for high media coverage and the bottom 25% for low media 
coverage. Similarly, to investigate the effects of media pessimism, the media pessimism score 
is sorted into three media pessimism portfolios, the top 50% for high media pessimism and 
the bottom 50% for low media pessimism. 
 
Since the dependent variable is a binary one, all hypotheses are tested by employing Logistic 
regression models. Developed by David Cox in 1958, logistic regression is a regression 
model where the dependent variable is categorical in statistics. This thesis covers the case of 
binary dependent variables—that is, where it can take only two values, success and fail. 
 
To examine the relation between media coverage, the level of media pessimism, and takeover 
outcomes, the following regressions are employed: 
 
                                                               (3) 
                                                               (4) 
 
Media coverage and media pessimism are regressed for the days prior to the takeover 
announcement, and then compare them to determine which affects the stock returns most 
significantly. The key variable MC is the media coverage in the 180 days prior to the takeover 





The method of payment and market value are the main variables. Travlos (1987) reports that 
the use of equity as a payment method in takeovers signals to the market that the acquirer is 
overvalued, while an all-cash payment indicates potential undervaluation of the acquirer. 
Therefore, two payment method dummy variables are included: Stock and Cash. The stock 
variable, Stock, takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% equity to buy the target firm 
and the cash variable, Cash, takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% cash financing to 
pay for the target. Moreover, a lag in the key return predictability variables’ size (measured as 
the natural logarithm of the market value) is included, as for Tetlock et al. (2008), as well as 
the logarithm of the acquirer’s size, Ln(Size), defined as the acquirer’s market value measured 
one month before the deal announcement. 
 
In addition, the multivariate tests include a series of control variables that have a significant 
influence on acquirer returns according to previous studies. First, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
find that value acquirers (with a high book-to-market ratio) outperform glamour acquirers 
(with a low book-to-market ratio) after a takeover. This may due to ‘performance 
extrapolation’ and hubris, which lead to poorer takeover decisions by glamour acquirers. 
Second, Lang et al. (1994) report a strong negative relation between firm leverage and firm 
future growth during 1970–1989. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggest that leverage brings 
about poor investment opportunities and helps prevent firm overinvestment. Third, a firm’s 
EBITDA indicates its current operational profitability. Fourth, Travlos (1987) states that the 
relative size variable is used to account for difficulties in measuring abnormal returns due to 
the larger size of bidders relative to the size of their targets. Fifth, Brealey and Myers (1996) 
state that the PE ratio is part of the everyday vocabulary of investors in the stock market. 
Sixth, an increase in a stock’s media coverage could temporarily increase investor attention to 
this stock, resulting in a price run-up followed by a correction (Huberman and Regev, 2001; 
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Barber and Odean, 2008). Therefore, the following variables are also included: the 
book-to-market ratio (B/M Ratio), defined as the acquirer’s book value divided by its market 
value; leverage (Leverage), defined as the amount of debt used to finance a firm’s assets; 
EBITDA (EBITDA); the relative size of the transaction (Relative Size), defined as the deal 
value divided by the acquirer’s market value, measured one month before the deal 
announcement; the PE ratio (PE ratio), measured as a firm’s current share price compared to 
its per-share earnings; and the run-up stock return of the acquirer measured over a window 
from 365 to 28 days before the announcement (Run-Up). Moreover, hostile, public, tender, 
and diversification are dummy variables that take the value of one for hostile, tender, and 
diversifying mergers, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
 
4. Main Results 
4.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show summary statistics for a sample of UK acquisitions, focusing on 
media coverage and media pessimism, respectively, including the total number of 
observations, means, medians, and standard deviations of the deal characteristics and firm 
characteristics. The UK sample comprises 1,133 deals within 180 days before the takeover 
announcements, including 358 deals with high news coverage and 337 with low news 
coverage. Moreover, 566 deals are covered by high-pessimism news and 566 deals by 
low-pessimism news. 
 
The results of Table 3.1 show that the average number of media coverage for the full sample 
is 25 news articles per takeover deal. The whole sample is then split into two subsamples: 
firms with high media coverage and firms with low media coverage. The average media 
coverage for the high-coverage subsample is 72 news articles per takeover deal, while that for 
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the low-coverage subsample is only one news article per takeover deal. In Table 3.2, the 
average score of the high media pessimism subsample is around 0.04, much higher than the 
average score of the low media pessimism, which is around -0.06. 
 
In Table 3.1, the firm size of acquirers in the whole sample equals £2.04 billion, on average. 
Acquirers with high media coverage have a mean size of £4.44 billion, while acquirers with 
low media coverage have a mean size of £1.25 billion. These statistics show that the size of 
acquirers with high media coverage is much greater compared to the size of those with low 
media coverage. This result is consistent with the findings of Chan (2003) and Da et al. 
(2011), who report a positive relation between firm size and the number of news articles 
released because of the costs faced by reporters in finding information on small firms. Fang 
and Peress (2009) also find that large firms are much more likely to be covered by the media 
and firm size has a significant influence on media coverage. In Table 3.2, acquirers with high 
media pessimism have a mean size of £2.21 billion, while acquirers with low media 
pessimism have a mean size of £1.86 billion. These statistics show that the size of acquirers 
with high media pessimism is slightly greater compared to those with low media pessimism. 
 
The results of Table 3.1 show that 43% of transactions are fully financed by cash and only 4% 
are fully financed by stock. The rest of the transactions are financed by a mix of cash and 
stock. Even in the high- and low-media coverage subsamples and high and low media 
pessimism subsamples, the cash transactions are much more frequent than the stock 
transactions. Most acquirers in the United Kingdom prefer cash payments in takeovers. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) explain that announcements of equity financing in 
takeovers are supposed to bring about lower returns for the acquirer’s shareholders, since 
investors perceive an equity payment as a signal that the bidding firm’s shares are overvalued 
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and therefore decrease the share price after equity financing is announced. 
 
Moreover, Table 3.1 also shows that the average leverage with high media coverage is 33.56, 
while that with low media coverage is 28.66. It shows that the leverage of acquirers with high 
media coverage is larger than that of acquirers with low media coverage. This can be 
explained that larger firms are covered by more news articles released (Chan (2003) and Da 
et al. (2011)) and larger firms tend to be more leveraged (Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). In 
Table 3.2, the average leverage with high media pessimism is 32.70, while that with low 
media pessimism is 28.88. It indicates that the leverage of acquirers with high media 
pessimism is larger than that of acquirers with low media pessimism.  
 
The results of the runups in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 are all positive. According to Meulbroek 
(1992) and Servaes (1991), a positive runup implies that it may be caused by information 
leakage to the marketplace due to insider trading or market anticipation through rumours in 
the media. Moreover, the leverage of firms with high media coverage and high media 
pessimism is much higher than that of firms with low media coverage and low media 
pessimism. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1 Here] 
[Insert Table 3.2 Here] 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis: Media Coverage 
This section reports the empirical relations between takeover outcomes and media coverage 
in the 1981–2010 sample, based on univariate tests. The results are stratified once more 
according to known determinants highlighted by the previous literature: the method of 
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payment (i.e. cash versus stock) and acquirer size (i.e. large versus small). 
 
Table 3.3 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the takeover outcomes for the full 
samples of deals with low and high media coverage published within 180 days before the 
takeover announcement. The stocks are divided into a low media coverage subsample and a 
high media coverage subsample and their difference is analysed. The results in Panel A show 
that deals with high media coverage have an 84.4% completion rate and deals with low media 
coverage have a 91.1% completion rate. For cash payments, deals with high media coverage 
have an 85.6% completion rate, while deals with low media coverage have a 90.4% 
completion rate. For stock payments, deals with high media coverage have a 75% completion 
rate, while deals with low media coverage have a 90.9% completion rate. For mixed 
payments, deals with high media coverage have an 83.9% completion rate, while deals with 
low media coverage have a 91.6% completion rate. Moreover, the two-sample statistical 
analysis between these two groups shows that the difference between takeovers with low and 
high media coverage is -6.7% (p-value: 0.007) and statistically significant. This indicates that 
deals with low media coverage have significantly higher completion rates than deals with 
high media coverage. This finding supports the first hypothesis, that media coverage 
significantly influences takeover outcomes and deals with low media coverage prior to the 
takeover announcement have a higher possiblity of success than deals with high media 
coverage prior to the takeover announcement. Further, for mixed payments, the difference 
between takeovers with low and high media coverage is -7.7% (p-value: 0.029) and also 
significant. However, for the cash or stock payments, the differences are insignificant. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.3 indicates that firm size plays a significant role in returns to takeovers. 
Large acquirers’ takeovers with high media coverage have an 83.6% completion rate, while 
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large acquirers’ takeovers with low media coverage have a 97.6% completion rate. For cash 
payments, deals with high media coverage have an 85.7% completion rate, while deals with 
low media coverage have a 93.3% completion rate. For stock payments, deals with high 
media coverage have a 77.8% completion rate, while deals with low media coverage have a 
100% completion rate. For mixed payments, deals with high media coverage have an 81.7% 
completion rate, while deals with low media coverage have a 100% completion rate. 
Moreover, the difference shows that large acquirers’ takeovers with low media coverage have 
a 14% (p-value: 0.000) statistically higher completion rate than takeovers with high media 
coverage. Similar to Panel A, by using mixed payments, the difference between takeovers 
with low and high media coverage is -18.3% (p-value: 0.000) and also significant. However, 
for cash or stock payments, the differences are insignificant. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.3 indicates that for small acquirers, deals with high media coverage have 
an 81.8% completion rate, while deals with low media coverage have a 90.8% completion 
rate. For cash payments, deals with high media coverage have an 82.4% completion rate, 
while deals with low media coverage have an 89.7% completion rate. For stock payments, 
deals with high media coverage have a 66.7% completion rate, while deals with low media 
coverage have a 100% completion rate. For mixed payments, deals with high media coverage 
have an 83.3% completion rate, while deals with low media coverage have a 91.2% 
completion rate. However, this also shows the difference between small acquirers’ takeovers 
with high and low media coverage is insignificant, even considering the methods of payment.  
 
Moreover, Panel D shows the results of the two-sample statistical analysis of the difference 
between large and small firms. This indicates that large acquirers with low media coverage 
have a 6.8% (p-value: 0.042) higher completion rate than small acquirers with low media 
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coverage. For mixed payments, large acquirers have an 8.8% (p-value: 0.002) higher 
completion rate than small acquirers. However, for cash or stock payments, the differences 
between small and large acquirers are insignificant. Further, for acquirers with high media 
coverage, the difference is insignificant, even considering the payment methods. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3 Here] 
 
4.3 Univariate Analysis: Media Pessimism 
Table 3.4 presents the means and preliminary analysis of takeover outcomes with high and 
low media pessimism. Pessimism are assigned based on the highest 33.333% and the lowest 
33.333%. The stocks are divided into a high-pessimism subsample and a low-pessimism 
subsample and then the difference between them are computed. The results in Panel A show 
that those deals with high media pessimism has 87.5% completed rate, while those deals with 
low media pessimism has 88.1% completed rate. And with cash payment, deals with high 
media pessimism has 87.2% completed rate while deals low media pessimism has 89.2% 
completed rate. With stock payment, deals with high media pessimism has 83.3% completed 
rate while deals with low media pessimism has 82.4% completed rate. With mixed payment, 
deals with high media pessimism has 88.1% completed rate while deals with low media 
pessimism has 87.8% completed rate. However, the difference between high- and 
low-pessimism deal returns is negative 0.5% (p-value: 0.824) and not significant, even after 
considering the methods of payment. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.4 indicates that for large acquirers, deals with high media pessimism has 
86.8% completed rate while deals with low media pessimism has 89.2% completed rate. And 
with cash payment, deals with high media pessimism has 89.4% completed rate while deals 
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with low media pessimism has 84.8% completed rate. With stock payment, deals with high 
media pessimism has 80% completed rate while deals with low media pessimism has 100% 
completed rate. With mixed payment, deals with high media pessimism has 84.9% completed 
rate while deals with low media pessimism has 91.1% completed rate. However, the 
difference between large acquirers with high-pessimism news and those with low-pessimism 
news is insignificant, even if the payment method is considered.  
 
Panel C of Table 3.4 indicates that for small acquirers, deals with high media pessimism has 
93.8% completed rate while deals with low media pessimism has 88% completed rate. And 
with cash payment, deals with high media pessimism has 90.5% completed rate while deals 
with low media pessimism has 90.2% completed rate. With stock payment, deals with high 
media pessimism has 100% completed rate while deals with low media pessimism has 85.7% 
completed rate. With mixed payment, deals with high media pessimism has 96% completed 
rate while deals with low media pessimism has 86.9% completed rate. But Similar to the 
Panel B, the difference in returns between small acquirers with high- and low-pessimism 
news is insignificant, even when the method of payment is considered. 
 
Panel D of Table 3.4 shows, in the high-pessimism column, the difference between small and 
large acquirers is 6.9% (p-value: 0.066) and positively significant. In the low-pessimism 
column, the difference between small and large acquirers is negative 1.2% (p-value: 0.785) 
and insignificant, even the methods of payment are considered. These findings indicate that 
small acquirers has higher completed rate in takeovers with high-pessimism news. Moreover, 
in takeovers high media pessimism, small acquirers using mixed payment method statistically 
has higher completed rate by 11.1% (p-value: 0.031). However, the differences between small 




[Insert Table 3.4 Here] 
 
The completed rate of takeovers with low media coverage are higher, on average, than those 
with high media coverage. However, there is no evidence to show that the completed rate of 
takeovers with low media pessimism are higher, on average, than those with higher media 
pessimism, even considering the payment methods.  
 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis: Media Coverage  
Univariate analysis is unable to take more factors into account because of its inherent 
limitations and it is unable to examine the relations between different factors. Correlations or 
inversions cannot be modelled using univariate analysis. Moreover, multivariate tests can be 
expected to create more accurate predictions than univariate tests (Prezz and Witt 2003). 
Therefore, multivariate analysis with additional controls is employed to examine the relations 
between takeover returns and media coverage and between takeover returns and media 
pessimism. 
 
The results of multivariate analysis are reported in Table 3.5. This section reports the 
empirical relations between takeover outcomes and the quantity of media coverage and media 
pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample with 1,133 takeover deals, based on multivariate tests. 
All regressions include control variables for size; method of payment; the book-to-market 
ratio; runups; public deals; diversifying deals; tender offers; hostile takeovers; price–earnings 
ratios; earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization; leverage; year; and 
industry. Since winsorization replaces extreme data values with less extreme values, 





Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows the takeover outcomes of media coverage during the period of 
180 days before the takeover announcements. The key independent variable is the quantity of 
media coverage for a stock in a given period. The p-value is 0.041, which is statistically 
significant, and the estimated coefficient is -0.0014. These findings indicate that 180-day 
media coverage is negatively correlated with takeover outcome. The result is therefore in line 
with the univariate tests and the findings of Fang and Peress (2009): Financial media 
coverage has a significant impact on the stock market. 
 
These findings are also related to those of Shiller (2000), Joe et al. (2009), Fang and Peress 
(2009) and Asquith et al. (1983). As Shiller (2000) and Joe et al. (2009) show, market 
sentiment is motivated by news content and media coverage has a major impact on economic 
impacts. Moreover, Fang and Peress (2009) state that stocks without media coverage 
outperform those heavily covered by the media, because deals with lower media coverage 
lead to the less investor recognition and stocks with a low level of investor recognition have 
to offer higher stock returns to compensate their shareholders who are imperfectly diversified. 
And Liu and McConnell (2013) state that the media play an important role in changing 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests, which can lead to the abandonment of value-reducing 
takeover attempts. Therefore, the explanation is the deals with high media coverage leads to 
the lower stock returns, then this may made managers abandon the takeover attempts. In 
addition, another explanation is that the gains during the takeover announcement period are 
larger if the takeover outcome is successful. (Asquith et al., 1983). Therefore, deals with low 
media coverage can compensate their shareholders with higher stock returns by the means of 




4.5 Multivariate Analysis: Media Pessimism 
The multivariate analysis results for media coverage are reported in Column (2) of Table 3.5. 
The results show that the p-value is 0.053, which is statistically significant, and the estimated 
coefficient is -0.0561. These findings indicate that 180-day media pessimism is negatively 
correlated with takeover outcomes. Therefore, the lower the media pessimism, the higher the 
possibility of takeover success. 
 
The findings are consistent with those of Tetlock et al. (2008), who demonstrate that 
fundamental information transmitted by the financial news resolves the problem of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, financial news can provide additional information for 
investors with which to evaluate prospects in M&A deals and hence reduce information 
asymmetry. The results are in line with those of Buehlmaier (2012), who uses text-based 
media content and shows that news content is positively related to takeover success. There is 
two explanations for this result: first, textual sentiment has potentially strong impacts on 
stock returns and trading volumes (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Kearney and Liu, 2014; 
Tetlock , 2007; and Tetlock et al., 2008), and a highly pessimistic media forecast places 
downward pressure on market because negative words that convey negative information and 
decrease the expectations of investors can be used to forecast low corporate earnings prices 
(Tetlock, 2007;  Tetlock et al., 2008; and Davis et al., 2011; Solomon, 2012) while 
optimistic media raises stock prices by increasing the expectations of investors (McQueen 
and Roley, 1993). Moreover, According to the Samuelson and Rosenthal (1989), there is a 
positive relation between the stock price and the chance of tender success. Therefore, a highly 
pessimistic media leads to a lower completion rate while a lowly pessimistic media leads to a 
higher completion rate. Second, Liu and McConnell (2013) state that the sensitivity of 
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managers to the firm's stock price reaction around the takeover announcement is related to 
the level of media attention and the media attitude to the expected transaction. And then the 
managers decides whether to take the value-reducing takeover attempt or abandon it. The 
media play an important role in changing shareholders' and managers' interest, this may leads 
to the result that value-reducing takeover attempts are possible to be abandoned. However, 
the results are inconsistent with those of Vadnais (2012), who finds no apparent relation 
between media sentiment and takeover outcomes. 
 
[Insert Table 3.5 Here] 
 
4.6 Other Variables 
First, Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows that the p-value of cash payments is 0.93 and the 
p-value of stock payments is 0.275, both of them are insignificant. Column (2) in Table 3.4 
shows that the p-value of cash payments is 0.896 and the p-value of stock payments is 0.279, 
both of them are insignificant as well. The results indicate that the method of payment has no 
influence on takeover outcomes. This is inconsistent with the finding of Fishman (1989), who 
finds that cash offers can increase the likelihood of takeover success in tender offers and are 
therefore preferred by bidders in such transactions. 
 
Second, a public target is shown to be statistically negatively related to bidding firm returns. 
Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows that the p-value of the public target dummy is 0.000, while the 
coefficient is -0.6419, and Column (2) in Table 3.4 shows that the p-value of the public target 
dummy is 0.000 while the coefficient is -0.6532. This shows that when bidding firms acquire 




Third, a hostile takeover is shown to be statistically negatively related to bidding firm returns. 
Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows that the p-value of the hostile takeover dummy is 0.054, while 
the coefficient is -0.7587, and Column (2) in Table 3.5 shows that the p-value of the hostile 
takeover dummy is 0.060, while the coefficient is -0.7415.This finding indicates that hostile 
takeovers have a lower possibility of succeeding than friendly takeovers do. This is in line 
with the finding of Branch et al. (2008), who indicate that a friendly takeover attempt is more 
likely to succeed than a hostile takeover attempt is. 
 
Fourth, the size of the bidding firms is shown to be insignificantly related to takeover 
outcomes. Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows that the p-value of size is 0.181, while the 
coefficient is -0.1954, and Column (2) in Table 3.5 shows that the p-value of size is 0.265, 
while the coefficient is -0.1553. This result is inconsistent with the finding of Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992), who state that the probability of receiving a takeover bid is positively 
related to firm size. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
To increase reliability of the previous results, robustness checks for the long and short-term 
are necessary. The pre-announcement window is lengthen from 180 days to 365 days to 
further investigate the impact of media coverage and pessimism on stock returns. The results 
from 365 days are very similar with the previous results and are largely consistent with the 
main findings above when following robustness tests are employed, although several 
coefficients lose their significance. 
 
First, the media coverage for the 365 days prior to the takeover announcement are regressed. 
Column (1) in Table 3.5 shows that the t-statistics are 0.023, which is statistically significant, 
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and the estimated coefficient ˆb1 is 0.0008 and negative. These findings indicate that 90-day 
media coverage is negatively correlated with takeover outcomes. The result is therefore in 
line with the univariate tests, multivariate tests and the findings of Fang and Peress (2009) 
and Liu and McConnell (2013).  
 
Second, the media pessimism for the 365 days prior to the takeover announcement are 
regressed. Column (2) in Table 5 shows that the t-statistics are 0.339, which is statistically 
insignificant, and the estimated coefficient ˆb1 is 0.1296 and negative. This result indicates 
that the 365-day media quantity lose its significance in takeover outcomes.  
 
[Insert Table 3.6 Here] 
 
6. Endogeneity 
The analysis so far suggests a negative relation between media coverage and takeover success. 
Moreover, a negative relation between media pessimism and takeover success is also shown 
in the analysis. However, the potential endogenous relation between takeover outcomes and 
media coverage/pessimism is a concern in the analysis. Endogeneity can arise due to 
unobservable heterogeneity when unobservable firm-specific factors affect media coverage, 
media pessimism, or takeover outcomes. 
 
The instrumental variable method are applied to address endogeneity. Following prior studies 
(e.g. El Ghoul et al. 2011), media coverage published between 180 days and 730 days before 
the takeover announcements are used as the instrumental variable. The results of the 
instrumental variable approach are reported in Column (3) of Table 3.6. The p-value is 0.057, 
which is significant. Moreover, the coefficients of the fitted value of media coverage are 
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significantly negative, suggesting that the negative relation between media coverage quantity 




This chapter addresses the question of whether media coverage and media pessimism can 
influence takeover outcomes in M&As during 1981–2010 for the UK market. Controlling for 
firm size, method of payment, and acquirer/target industry, the empirical results indicate that 
deals without media coverage have higher completion rates than deals with media coverage. 
Moreover, the results show a significantly negative correlation between media pessimism and 
takeover success. That is, deals with a barely negative media attitude have significantly 
higher completion rates than those with a highly negative media attitude. 
 
The results of this chapter indicate that deals with low media coverage have higher 
completion rates than deals with high media coverage published 180 days prior to the merger 
announcement. This outperformance persists even after controlling of a number of known 
anomalies. They are related to the findings of Joe et al. (2009) who state that media releases 
of information have significant economic impacts and Fang and Peress (2009) who indicate 
that stocks without media coverage outperform those heavily covered by the media and 
Asquith et al. (1983) who show that the gains during the takeover announcement period are 
larger if the takeover outcome is successful. Moreover, it is also related to the finding of Liu 
and McConnell (2013) who state that the media plays an important role in changing 
shareholders' and managers' interests, this can leads to the result that value-reducing takeover 




Furthermore, a significantly negative interaction between media pessimism and takeover 
success is found in the empirical results. The results are in line with those of Buehlmaier 
(2012), who uses text-based media content and shows that news content is positively related 
to the takeover success. The findings are also related with those of Tetlock (2007) who state 
that textual sentiment has potentially strong impacts on stock returns and trading volumes and 
those of Tetlock et al. (2008) and Davis et al. (2011) who indicate that a highly pessimistic 
media forecast places downward pressure on market because negative words that convey 
negative information can be used to forecast low corporate earnings prices and Samuelson 
and Rosenthal (1986) who find there is a positive relation between the stock price and the 
chance of tender success. However, the result is inconsistent with those of Vadnais (2012), 
who finds no apparent relation between media sentiment and takeovers outcomes. 
 
The results indicate that media coverage and media sentiment have a statistically significant 
influence on takeover outcomes, which opens up many future research avenues. One area of 
particular interest is whether media coverage and media sentiment influence takeover 
performance. Moreover, after the quantity of media coverage is measured, another area of 
interest is whether deals with media coverage outperforms those without media coverage. In 
addition, this chapter considers only media coverage in a window of 180 days and other 






Table 3.1 Summary Statistics: Media Coverage 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample and focuses on media coverage. The media coverage variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if articles 
covering takeover news are published in a given period. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the variables with high media coverage published within 180 days before the takeover 
announcements and those with low media coverage data. This table also presents the total number of observations, means, medians, and standard deviations of the financial, asset, and 
ownership structure variables under the media coverage classifications. The total number of observations is 1133. The variable Size is measured as the average market value of 
acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book value divided by its market value, as of the end of the previous year; 
RUNUP is the acquirer’s stock performance prior to the takeover announcement, measured using CAR [-365, -7]; Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in 
annual terms and is measured in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a firm’s final accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity 
valuation ratio of the firm’s current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals financed 
using 100% stock; and Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and 
diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
All Sample High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage 
 
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N 
Media Coverage 25.33 75.59 5 1133 72.39 121.89 24 358 1.46 0.5 1 337 
Stock 0.04 0.19 0 41 0.04 0.21 0 11 0.03 0.18 0 16 
Cash 0.43 0.5 0 491 0.49 0.5 0 136 0.4 0.49 0 174 
Runup 0.11 0.29 0.08 1133 0.07 0.28 0.04 358 0.14 0.29 0.14 337 
Size 2036.52 3361.76 616.12 1133 4435.29 4650.83 2460.46 358 1251.92 58.23 330.06 337 
MTB  3.07 2.45 2.34 1133 3.06 2.68 2.19 358 3.1 2.3 2.39 337 
PE 17.24 7.88 15.4 1133 17.23 8.31 14.9 358 17.25 7.6 15.5 337 
RalativeSize 0.09 0.15 0.03 1133 0.09 0.16 0.02 358 0.09 0.15 0.03 337 
Leverage 30.8 21 28.64 1133 33.56 21.14 30.57 358 28.66 20.15 26.67 337 
Public 0.16 0.36 0 1133 0.25 0.43 0 358 0.11 0.31 0 337 
Diversification 0.47 0.5 0 1133 0.5 0.5 0.5 358 0.51 0.5 1 337 
EBITDA 11.59 1.45 11.45 1133 12.65 1.38 12.89 358 10.79 1.11 10.78 337 
Tender 0.1 0.3 0 1133 0.15 0.35 0 358 0.06 0.24 0 337 





Table 3.2 Summary Statistics: Media Pessimism 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample and focuses on media pessimism. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score, from highest to lowest. 
The top third of deals is then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third is classified as low pessimism. Table 3.2 presents an overview of the deals with high media 
pessimism published within 180 days before the takeover announcements and those with low media pessimism data. This table also presents the total number of observations, means, 
medians, and standard deviations of the financial, asset, and ownership structure variables under the media coverage classifications. The total number of observations is 1133. The 
variable Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book value 
divided by its market value, as of the end of the previous year; RUNUP is the acquirer’s stock performance prior to the takeover announcement, measured using CAR [-365, -7]; 
Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a firm’s final 
accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of the firm’s current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes 
deals financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals financed using 100% stock; and Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the 
previous calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Media Pessimism Sample High Media Pessimism Low Media Pessimism 
 
Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median N 
Media Pessimism -0.01 0.92 0.01 1133 0.04 0.12 0.01 566 -0.06 1.29 0 566 
Stock 0.04 0.19 0 41 0.03 0.17 0 17 0.04 0.2 0 12 
Cash 0.43 0.5 0 491 0.47 0.5 0 139 0.4 0.49 0 172 
Runup 0.11 0.29 0.08 1133 0.09 0.29 0.07 566 0.13 0.29 0.11 566 
Size 2036.52 3361.76 616.12 1133 2211.1 3454.53 814 566 1863.85 3262.92 477.76 566 
MTB  3.07 2.45 2.34 1133 3 2.37 2.31 566 3.14 2.53 2.38 566 
PE 17.24 7.88 15.4 1133 16.84 7.62 15.3 566 17.64 8.13 15.4 566 
RalativeSize 0.09 0.15 0.03 1133 0.08 0.14 0.02 566 0.1 0.16 0.03 566 
Leverage 30.8 21 28.64 1133 32.7 22.03 29.44 566 28.88 19.77 27.3 566 
Public 0.16 0.36 0 1133 0.17 0.38 0 566 0.14 0.35 0 566 
Diversification 0.47 0.5 0 1133 0.46 0.5 0 566 0.48 0.5 0 566 
EBITDA 11.59 1.45 11.45 1133 11.79 1.36 11.67 566 11.39 1.5 11.24 566 
Tender 0.1 0.3 0 1133 0.11 0.32 0 566 0.08 0.27 0 566 





Table 3.3 Univariate Tests: Media Coverage  
 
This table reports takeover outcomes for the full sample. Media coverage is published within 180 days before the takeover announcements. Deals are ranked by media coverage 
quantity from highest to lowest. The top 33% are classified as high media coverage, while the bottom 33% are classified as low media coverage. The variable Size is measured as the 
average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars). The deals are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large 
firms, while the bottom 33% are classified as small firms. Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals using 100% stock, and Mix denotes a mixture of cash 
and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample. Panel B relates to larger acquirers, measured as those firms in the highest half of bidders ranked by market value. Panel C relates to small 
acquirers, measured as those firms in the lowest half of bidders, ranked by market value. Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C 
minus Panel B). The p-values are shown in parentheses and are calculated using the t-test for CARs. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
  All   Low Media Coverage High Media Coverage   Differential ( High media-Low media) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixe
d Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.868 0.866 0.854 0.872 0.911 0.904 0.909 0.916 0.844 0.856 0.750 0.839 -0.067 -0.048 -0.159 -0.077 
p-Value 
            
0.007 0.192 0.279 0.029 
N 1133 491 41 601 337 136 11 190 358 174 16 168         
Panel B: Large Firm   
Mean 0.865 0.855 0.857 0.874 0.976 0.933 1.000 1.000 0.836 0.857 0.778 0.817 -0.140 -0.076 -0.222 -0.183 
p-Value 
            
0.000 0.317 0.169 0.000 
N 377 173 14 190 41 15 3 23 225 112 9 104   
   Panel C: Small Firm   
Mean 0.881 0.871 0.938 0.883 0.908 0.897 1.000 0.912 0.818 0.824 0.667 0.833 -0.090 -0.074 -0.333 -0.078 
p-Value 
            
0.158 0.480 0.423 0.350 
N 377 155 16 206 174 68 4 102 44 17 3 24   
   Panel D: Differential (Panel C-Panel B)  
Mean 0.016 0.015 0.080 0.010 -0.068 -0.036 0.000 -0.088 -0.017 -0.034 -0.111 0.016   
   p-Value 0.513 0.685 0.493 0.766 0.042 0.639 - 0.002 0.786 0.743 0.777 0.854      
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Table 3.4 Univariate Tests: Media Pessimism  
 
This table reports takeover outcomes for the full sample. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top half are classified as high 
pessimism, while the bottom half are classified as low pessimism. The variable Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions 
of dollars). The deals are ranked by size from highest to lowest. The top 33% are then classified as large firms, while the bottom 33% are classified as small firms. Cash denotes deals 
financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals using 100% stock, and Mix denotes a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample. Panel B relates to larger acquirers, 
measured as those firms in the highest half of bidders, ranked by market value. Panel C relates to small acquirers, measured as those firms in the lowest half of bidders, ranked by 
market value. Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C minus Panel B). The p-values are shown in parentheses and are calculated using 
the t-test for CARs. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  All   Low Media Pessimism High Media Pessimism   Differential ( High media-Low media) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixe
d Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.868 0.866 0.854 0.872 0.881 0.892 0.824 0.878 0.875 0.872 0.833 0.881 -0.005 -0.020 0.010 0.003 
p-Value 
            
0.824 0.587 0.948 0.926 
N 1133 491 41 601 377 139 17 221 377 172 12 193         
Panel B: Large Firm   
Mean 0.865 0.855 0.857 0.874 0.892 0.848 1.000 0.911 0.868 0.894 0.800 0.849 -0.024 0.045 -0.200 -0.06
2 p-Value 
            
0.598 0.542 0.374 0.307 
N 377 173 14 190 83 33 5 45 144 66 5 73   
 
    
Panel C: Small Firm   
Mean 0.881 0.871 0.938 0.883 0.880 0.902 0.857 0.869 0.938 0.905 1.000 0.960 0.058 0.003 0.143 0.091 
p-Value 
            
0.102 0.959 0.356 0.037 
N 377 155 16 206 175 61 7 107 96 42 4 50   
 
    
Panel D: Differential (Panel C-Panel B)   
Mean 0.016 0.015 0.080 0.010 -0.012 0.053 -0.143 -0.042 0.069 0.011 0.200 0.111   




Table 3.5 Multivariate Tests 
 
This table reports takeover outcomes for the full sample. Media coverage is published within 180 days before 
the takeover announcements. Column (1) reports the results for the media coverage samples, while Column (2)  
refers to the media pessimism samples. The variable Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers 
over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book value 
divided by its market value, as of the end of the previous year; RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer 
prior to the takeover announcement, measured using Run-up[-365, -7]; Leverage is the percentage of total debt 
divided by total capital in annual terms, measured in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is 
subtracted from a firm’s final accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio 
of a firm’s current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes deals 
financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals financed 100% in stock, and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock; 
and relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous 
calendar year. Hostile, public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, 
tender and diversifying mergers, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 





















STOCK 0.3089 0.3047 
 
(0.275) (0.279) 
CASH 0.0092 0.0135 
 
(0.930) (0.896) 
WRUNUP_365_28 -0.0114 -0.0150 
 
(0.959) (0.946) 
WLNMV 0.1954 0.1553 
 
(0.181) (0.265) 
WMTBV -0.0184 -0.0118 
 
(0.554) (0.702) 
WPE -0.0065 -0.0072 
 
(0.415) (0.369) 
WRelativeSize -0.5308 -0.5467 
 
(0.223) (0.211) 
WLeverage 0.0018 0.0019 
 
(0.548) (0.514) 
Public -0.6419*** -0.6532*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0809 -0.0674 
 
(0.477) (0.552) 
WLNEBITDA -0.1503 -0.1488 
 
(0.272) (0.272) 
Tender 0.1427 0.1705 
 
(0.521) (0.448) 
Hostile -0.7587* -0.7415* 
 
(0.054) (0.060) 
N 1128 1128 
R-sq 0.1373 0.1339 
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Table 3.6 Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports the findings of robustness checks. Media coverage is published within 365 days before the 
takeover announcements. Column (1) reports the results for the media coverage samples, while Column (2) 
refers to the media pessimism samples. Column (3) reports the endogeneity test. Media coverage published 
between 180 days and 730 days before the takeover announcements are used as the instrumental variable in the 
first-stage regression. The variable Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous 
calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book value divided by its market 
value, as of the end of the previous year; RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover 
announcement, measured using Run-up[-365, -7]; Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total 
capital in annual terms, measured in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a 
firm’s final accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm’s current 
market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash, 
Stock denotes deals financed 100% in stock, and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock; and relative size is 
measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Hostile, 
public, tender and diversification are dummy variables that take the value 1 for hostile, tender and diversifying 
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(0.057) 
STOCK 0.4256 0.4186 0.3113 
 
(0.134) (0.137) (0.271) 
CASH 0.0039 0.0083 0.0189 
 
(0.969) (0.934) (0.857) 
WRUNUP_365_28 -0.0215 -0.0252 -0.0252 
 
(0.920) (0.907) (0.909) 
WLNMV 0.1425 0.1002 0.1945 
 
(0.317) (0.459) (0.184) 
WMTBV -0.0387 -0.0317 -0.0178 
 
(0.178) (0.264) (0.568) 
WPE -0.0059 -0.0066 -0.0066 
 
(0.470) (0.419) (0.403) 
WRelativeSize -0.6123 -0.6195 -0.5309 
 
(0.150) (0.145) (0.223) 
WLeverage 0.0025 0.0025 0.0018 
 
(0.397) (0.384) (0.536) 
Public -0.5873*** -0.5968*** -0.6447*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0963 -0.0824 -0.0868 
 
(0.399) (0.471) (0.444) 
WLNEBITDA -0.1069 -0.1038 -0.1507 
 
(0.415) (0.421) (0.273) 
Tender 0.1076 0.1370 0.1377 
 
(0.624) (0.538) (0.533) 
Hostile -0.9151** -0.9004** -0.7444* 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.060) 
N 1213 1213 1128 
R-sq 0.1408 0.1366 0.1368 
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Chapter 4: Media Sentiment and M&A Performance: New 
Evidence from a Market Valuation Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
Media sentiment about announced takeovers has played an important role in the stock market 
in recent years. The last few decades of research in finance have generated a large number of 
papers concentrating on the relation between media sentiment and stock market. While some 
of these papers study the impact of media sentiment on stock market (e.g. Shiller, 2000; 
Tetlock, 2007; Buehlmaier, 2012; Ho et al., 2013), others explore merger waves and market 
valuations (Harford, 2005; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004). The goal of this chapter is to test the different impacts of media pessimism in hot and 
cold markets from 1981 to 2010. Former chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System Bernanke states the importance of confidence: ‘As in all past crises, at the 
root of the problem is a loss of confidence by investors and the public in the strength of key 
financial institutions and markets’. 
 
This paper is primarily motivated by the growing importance of media sentiment in merger 
waves. Vadnais (2012) suggests that the media not only covey information to investors but 
also have a strong influence on the financial markets. For public investors and analysts to 
make rational portfolio optimization choices, it is necessary to understand how takeover news 
events influence stock returns and the market conditions that could influence the results of 
media sentiment impact. Moreover, as Bouwman et al. (2009) suggest, takeovers during cold 
markets are very different from those during hot markets. While there is a literature 
concerning the relationship between news sentiment and takeover returns in the equity market, 
this paper is the first to consider the relation between media and returns in different market 
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valuations This is important, because both hot and cold markets have distinctive 
characteristics that can lead to somewhat dissimilar returns from those in the whole equity 
market. 
 
Much of the literature relates to the importance of different market valuations. According to 
recent debate, merger waves are highly correlated with high market valuations, usually called 
hot markets. Harford’s (2005) results support the neoclassical view of merger waves: Specific 
industry shocks that require large-scale reallocations of assets drive the occurrence of merger 
waves. In addition, the author states market timing could also be a cause of merger waves. 
The macro-level liquidity component drives industry waves of mergers to cluster in time, 
since economic motivation and low transaction costs triggering larger transaction volumes 
are two causes of merger waves. Leinweber and Sisk (2011), Riordan et al. (2013), and 
Smales (2013) state that negative news is more informative than positive news, reactions to 
negative news are more significant, and thus negative sentiment signals are more exploitable. 
Therefore, this chapter employs media pessimism to evaluate media sentiment. 
 
To explain the influences of media sentiment, human nature is considered, since it is the main 
subject of all social sciences. First, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger (1957)) is still a 
very hot issue, especially in psychology and economics, and useful in studies of consumer 
behaviour since a long time. It states that investors are subject to conflicting cognitive 
elements, including discrepancies between past decisions and empirical evidence, and they 
then alleviate their discomfort by adjusting their beliefs to conform to their actions in the past. 
Moreover, according to Telci et al. (2011), cognitive dissonance theory focuses on the 
relationships among cognitions which are people’s knowledge about their perceptions, 
behaviours, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and environments. Several researchers examine the 
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possible psychological bases for trader behaviours. Second, Frydman and Rangel (2014) 
define the disposition effect as the fact that investors tend to sell risky assets when their 
capital increases and tend to hold risky assets when their capital decreases. Third, Galariotis 
et al. (2015) define herding behaviour as the process in which market participants 
contemporaneously trade in the same direction and/or their behaviour converges to a 
consensus in financial markets. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It is the first, to the best of my 
knowledge, to test the effect of media pessimism about takeovers under different stock 
market valuations. Since the takeover quantities and media sentiment in hot and cold markets 
are quite different, the effects of media pessimism should be tested separately. This addresses 
a gap in the literature, since the previous literature never discriminates between hot and cold 
markets. Second, a section of the literature has focused on the entire stock market, but this 
chapter employs merger and acquisition (M&A) data to test the relation between sentiment 
and returns in M&As. Such M&As attract media attention and therefore both firm-specific 
information and market information are available for empirical investigation. The large 
amounts of media coverage around takeover announcements could provide a perfect test 
ground for this relation, since such an experiment would be less prone to selection bias in the 
media data. Third, given that the UK is the second largest financial centre in the world, this 
study extends previous research by investigating whether and how the influence of media 
coverage and sentiment on bidder performance can offer new evidence. Last, the impact of 
media sentiment in both the short and long run is examined. The findings have practical 
implications for the investor sentiment literature and suggest that media sentiment can be 




The principle results suggest that acquirers are subject to lower media pessimism when the 
deal is announced during a hot market valuation period. Moreover, the results show that 
acquirers obtain significantly higher short-run announcement returns for deals announced 
during hot markets with low media pessimism and significantly lower long-run returns for 
deals announced during cold markets with low media pessimism. The finding is in line with 
early investigations by Petmezas (2009), who states that managers undertaking takeovers 
during hot markets can earn positive returns in the short run and earn insignificant returns 
during cold markets. Moreover, in the long run, the returns will reverse and managers obtain 
negative returns in both hot and cold markets. These results are partly consistent with the 
findings of Bouwman et al. (2009), who find that takeovers during cold markets are very 
different from those during hot markets. Bidding firms earn significantly higher returns 
during hot markets and their announcement returns are significantly negative for takeovers 
announced in cold markets. The results are of interest to investors who wish to understand 
how net trader positions influence market returns and how this relationship can change in 
different macroeconomic environments. The results also have implications for academics and 
market practitioners seeking to understand the relationship between news pessimism and 
market movements for different market valuations. 
 
Apart from media sentiment, many other factors can affect takeover outcomes. Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004) find that acquirers obtain high returns in stock takeovers while the 
targets obtain low returns in cash takeovers. Moreover, in the long run, stock takeovers lead 
to negative returns, while cash takeovers lead to positive returns. Branch et al. (2008) and 
Fishman (1989) state that cash offers and friendly takeovers increase the likelihood of 
takeover success. Branch et al. find that takeover performance is negatively related to the 
percentage of equity the bidding firm is seeking. Moreover, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) 
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find that the probability of receiving a takeover bid is negatively related to firm size. 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) state that acquirers with the lowest leverage win the takeover 
negotiation. Capron and Shen (2007), Chang (1998), and Fuller et al. (2002) find that the 
bidding firms of private targets usually earn higher returns than those of public targets. This 
paper considers these factors as well. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background literature and 
presents several hypotheses that are empirically tested. Section 3 introduces the and describes 
the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical testing of the relation between media 
pessimism and stock returns in hot and cold markets and in the short and long run, seperately, 
and then presents summary statistics and univariate and multivariate results. Sections 5 
conduct robustness checks, respectively. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Bear and Bull Markets 
Bouwman et al. (2009) find that takeovers during cold markets are very different from those 
during hot markets. Bidding firms earn significantly higher returns during hot markets and 
their announcement returns are significantly negative for takeovers announced in cold 
markets. Moreover, bidders generate lower long-term stock and operating performance than 
what they earn during cold markets. This pattern shows short-term momentum followed by 
long-run stock price reversals. Bouwman et al. find managerial herding to be the reason for 
long-term underperformance. The authors also find takeovers with cash payments undertaken 
in the 1980s earned positive long-term abnormal returns for bidders, whereas takeovers with 
cash payments undertaken in the 1990s earned negative long-term abnormal returns due to 
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the underperformance of high-market takeovers with cash payments. This suggests that when 
stock prices are soaring during hot markets, cash payments can decrease shareholder value. 
 
Nyberg (2013) points out that bear and bull markets are predictable according to analysis of a 
US data set. In particular, allowing for a dynamic structure in the binary response model can 
increase the predictive power. Probability predictions of the US stock market can also be used 
to arrive at optimal asset allocation decisions between bonds and stocks. The author finds that, 
in statistical forecast accuracy measures, dynamic models earn higher portfolio returns than 
the buy-and-hold trading strategy. In dynamic probit models, the term spread between short- 
and long-run interest rates and the dividend–price ratio are the best predictive variables for 
future market states. 
 
Using a UK takeover sample from 1990 to 2005, Croci et al. (2010) find that the interaction 
between the different behavioural traits of managers and market valuation influences acquirer 
returns. The authors state that non-overconfident managers create greater returns than 
overconfident managers do in both high and low market valuations. They also argue that 
acquirers with non-overconfident managers obtain the highest returns in high market 
valuations and the difference in five-day CARs around the announcement date between 
takeovers by non-overconfident managers in a bull market and those by overconfident 
managers in a bear market is 3.05% and statistically significant. Moreover, even in the long 
run, the non-overconfident managers earn higher BHARs than overconfident bidders do. 
 
Fabozzi and Francis (1977) categorize bull and bear markets based on market trends. The 
sample months are divided into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsamples that place 
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most months of increasing market valuation in the bullish category. However, they classify 
months when the market rose amidst adjacent bearish months as part of the bearish subset. 
 
Employing data from the London Stock Exchange, Siganos and Chelley-Steeley (2005) 
investigate the increase in profitability of the popular momentum strategy following hot and 
cold markets. The authors define hot and cold markets according to market returns (FTSE 
All-Share) over different time horizons and find that investors can achieve greater momentum 
following downward trends. Moreover, the longer the period used to identify bear markets, 
the higher the momentum returns. The results contradict investor overconfidence theory 
(Daniel et al., 1998) and the follow-the-trend model (Kim, 2002) but are in line with the 
results of the trader hesitation model (Du, 2002). 
 
Considering intraday returns over six days and combining different phases of the Spanish 
market, Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2014) argue that negative shocks are less important than 
positive shocks, especially in bear markets, in which the authors find a significant 
overreaction that is related to the pessimism prevailing in a cold market after positive shocks. 
 
Bull and bear market cycles have received much more attention than any other economic 
phenomena and investors and analysts agree that bull markets are strongly related to 
constantly rising stock prices, investor interests, and improved financial well-being. Gonzalez 
et al. (2005) identify the turning points of bear and bull markets by identifying turning points 
and the results show that the phases of bull and bear markets are related to persistent and 
distinct mean return shifts. Moreover, the authors emphasize return evidence that 
differentiates cold markets as different investment return regimes. The authors also highlight 
the properties of hot markets that can be useful to investors, such as the persistence of return 
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differences between cold and hot markets and relationships between hot markets and investor 
interest. 
 
Researchers use Granger causality tests and principal components analysis to study the 
portfolio diversification implications of sector index co-movements in the US, UK, German, 
French, and Japanese stock markets in hot and cold markets,. Meric et al. (2008) find that, in 
a hot market, investors with domestic diversification obtain less profit than those with global 
diversification, even when they invest in the same sector in different countries. In a cold 
market, the sectors of different countries tend to be more closely related and opportunities for 
diversification are limited. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model to examine the relation between market 
valuations and takeover decisions, payment methods, bidding firm performance, and takeover 
waves. They argue that the clustering of takeovers is driven by stock market valuations. The 
fundamental assumption of their theory is that the market is inefficient and rational managers 
take advantage of this market. This theory differs from Roll’s (1986), who assumes that the 
market is efficient but managers are irrational. Shleifer and Vishny conclude that takeovers 
disproportionately favour stock payments during hot markets and cash payments during cold 
markets. They also find that acquirers obtain high returns in stock takeovers while targets 
obtain low returns in cash takeovers. However, acquirers in a stock takeover can create 
overvaluation by manipulating earnings and through insider selling. Moreover, in the long 
run, stock takeovers lead to negative returns while cash takeovers lead to positive returns. In 





According to the earlier research proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004), stock market misvaluation drives takeovers. Petmezas (2009) 
examines the relation between bidder performance and high market valuation. The author 
states that acquirer reactions to takeovers in both the short and long run are in accordance 
with forecasts of investor sentiment (optimism). Undertaking takeovers during hot markets, 
managers can earn positive returns in the short run and earn insignificant returns during cold 
markets. However, in the long run, the returns will reverse and managers obtain negative 
returns in both hot and cold markets because of misvaluations due to overestimating returns 
and pressure from the ‘urge to merge’ to profit from the overall market status. 
 
Using a bounce-back augmented Markov switching model, Zeng and Bec (2015) propose an 
empirical study of the shape of recoveries in financial markets. This model is used to estimate 
the monthly returns of stock markets within five developed countries after 1970. Their results 
indicate that the bounce-back effect is statistically significant within all countries except 
Germany. Moreover, taking rebound into account, they find that a negative influence on the 
share price index in cold markets is significantly reduced. 
 
Cheng et al. (2013) examine how the innate characteristics, such as age and gender, of retail 
futures traders and external factors, such as hot and cold markets and the security traded, are 
influenced by the disposition effect on the Taiwan Futures Exchange over a period of six 
years. Their results show a stronger disposition effect in bear markets and that both internal 
and external factors are related to the disposition effect and investor behaviour. Women 
exhibit a significant disposition effect, indicating that women are more risk averse and trade 
less actively than men do. These findings are in line with the relevant literature in psychology, 
sociology, and economics. Moreover, the results indicate that mature trades have a stronger 
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disposition effect. In addition, the authors disagree with the results of Dhar and Zhu (2006) 
and Korniotis and Kumar (2011), that older investors exhibit a weaker disposition effect. 
Cheng et al. (2013) argue that this finding is biased because the data include many more men 
than women and many more older investors than others. Furthermore, the authors find a 
trading microstructure factor in the security traded to be correlated with the disposition effect. 
Because traders have different levels of risk tolerance, they are interested in diverse products 
and their different extents of being subject to the disposition effect are reflected in the trading 
of diverse products. Additionally, Cheng et al. demonstrate that a cold market has a stronger 
and more significant disposition effect, which shows that investor behaviour can be 
influenced by market conditions. 
 
Jansen and Tsai (2010) examine asymmetries in the influence of monetary policy surprises on 
stock returns between cold and hot markets in 1994–2005 and investigate how these 
influences respond to the capability of firms to gain external finance. The authors find a 
significant large negative influence of a surprise monetary policy in a cold market, even 
across portfolio sizes. Moreover, the results show that the influence of a surprise policy 
action in a cold market is greater than in a bull market. In addition, the returns of firms in 
cold markets respond more than those of firms in hot markets after controlling for the ability 
to obtain external financing. The ability to obtain external financing is more important in a 
cold market than in a hot market, because it alleviates the greater influence of monetary 
policy in a cold market. 
 
Bradley et al. (2012) find that, when a high-value IPO is underpriced, unaffiliated all-star 
analysts from banks of high reputation issue less strong-buy advice and unaffiliated all-star 
analysts from banks of low reputation maintain their level of optimism. On the other hand, 
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unaffiliated non-star analysts from banks of both high and low reputation issue more 
strong-buy advice. Moreover, the authors consider a hot market essential for inducing the 
type of behaviour that brings about noticeable conflict. Their results also show that, in the hot 
market from 1999 to 2000, unaffiliated analysts, conjectured to be biased and with similar 
incentives as affiliated analysts, faced conflicts of interest when earnings from investment 
banking activities were high. 
 
2.2 Takeover Waves 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) state that firm-specific and market-wide 
misvaluations could cause merger waves, influence the level of takeover activity, methods of 
payment, and the final decision to be a bidder or a target. In their model of rational 
managerial behaviour and uncertainty about misvaluation sources, rational targets with 
imperfect information tend to accept takeover from overvalued acquirers during hot markets 
because the targets overestimate the takeover synergies during such periods. Moreover, 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) state that market misvaluation fundamentally influences takeover 
activity. Their results show that potential market value deviations can bring about a 
correlation between market valuation and stock merger activity. In addition, they find that 
takeover waves and cash/stock payment waves can be motivated by overvaluation and 
undervaluation periods of the stock market. 
 
Harford’s (2005) results support the neoclassical theory of merger waves: Specific industry 
shocks that require the large-scale reallocation of assets drive the occurrence of merger waves. 
Sufficient overall capital liquidity is required to accommodate the asset reallocation. 
Economic, technological, and regulatory shocks drive merger waves. In addition, the author 
states market timing could also be a cause of merger waves. The macro-level liquidity 
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component drives industry waves of mergers to cluster in time, since economic motivation 
for transactions and low transaction costs triggering larger transaction volumes are two 
causes of merger waves. 
 
2.3 Market Valuations 
Nelson (1959) and Andrade et al. (2001) find that takeovers are highly concentrated in time 
and happen more frequently during periods of high market valuation than periods of low 
market valuation and managers generally choose stock as the method of payment. In the 
1980s, 45.6% of takeovers were paid by stock, compared to 70.9% in the 1990s. After 
examining quarterly merger data from 1895–1956, Nelson (1959) concludes that stock prices 
are significantly and positively related to takeovers, but the relation between takeovers and 
industrial production is not significant. Verter (2002) also confirms the higher levels of 
takeover activity in hot markets and their correlation with greater dispersion in market 
valuations. 
 
Ma et al. (2013) examine whether takeovers create returns in the long run. The authors use an 
alternative measure of long-run economic takeover influence on the value of firms: 
post-takeover changes in intrinsic value as estimated by a residual income model. They find 
that the intrinsic value of targets suffers a decrease, on average, within three years following 
takeover completion, particularly with bidders with high initial intrinsic values. The 
fundamental reasons for the decrease in intrinsic value are the loss of expected earnings and 
increases in capital. The authors state that high pre-takeover price-to-value ratios, which are 
usually used to measure the levels of firm valuation, are highly related to increases in 
intrinsic value. On the contrary, high pre-merger price-to-book ratios, which are also usually 
used to measure levels of firm valuation, are highly related to decreases in post-takeover 
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intrinsic values in the three years after deal completion and are associated with negative 
36-month BHARs. In addition, the authors show that loss in intrinsic value rather than in 
valuation level changes leads to low post-takeover returns. They also find that higher initial 
intrinsic value is related to losses in intrinsic value over the long term. Their results suggest 
that the performance extrapolation hypothesis proposed by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
involves both an intrinsic value effect and a valuation effect. 
 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) argue that high activity periods are strongly correlated with 
high market valuations. They find that the probability of a multiple-division firm selling its 
assets is positively related to the productivity of both the assets and the industry segment. The 
probabilities of takeovers and firm sell-offs are negatively related to the productivity of the 
selling firm and positively related to industry demand shocks. Moreover, the authors find that 
the productivity of selling firms in other divisions influences the sale probability. If the 
prospects of other divisions are better, then a division has a greater probability of being sold. 
In addition, the authors suggest that the firm is more likely to buy additional assets, given its 
size and efficiency. 
 
After examining the influence of takeover momentum on the returns of acquirers in both the 
short and long run, Antonio et al. (2008) focus on high-valuation markets and sources of 
momentum and find that investors obtain significant and positive gains in the short run and 
suffer negative returns in the long run as returns are reversed because initial expectations 
could not be fully met. The results are in line with the predictions of investor overconfidence. 
Moreover, the authors find that the takeover performance of firms is an integral component of 
market-wide (mis)valuations. In addition, they state that firms that make takeover deals 
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during high market valuations perform less well than those that make takeover deals in other 
periods and, during hot markets, the motivations of managers can affect takeover decisions. 
 
GAO (2010) analyses the influence of managerial horizons on takeover activity. The main 
prediction is that acquirers managed by short-horizon managers earn higher returns at 
takeover announcements and are more likely to use cash to pay for deals, with inferior 
long-term performance after takeovers. In addition, the author indicates that long-horizon 
managers are more likely to initiate takeovers in response to high market valuations. 
 
Kimbrough (2007) states that firms that can manage at least part of their research and 
development (R&D) assets always gain advantages from the higher market valuations of their 
developed technology. Moreover, the author shows some mechanisms by which analysts can 
affect R&D market valuations. First, the earnings forecasts of analysts are included in their 
expectations of the future. This pays off for R&D and is the basis for R&D current valuations. 
Subsequently, information about a firm’s R&D activities during the preparation of earnings 
forecasts could be revealed in analysts’ commentary and analyses. 
 
Baker et al. (2008) find evidence that imperfect integration across world stock markets 
provides a role for cross-border multinational arbitrage. They find that, consistent with 
multinational arbitrage as a determinant of foreign direct investment patterns, foreign direct 
investment flows increase quickly with source-country stock market valuations. The results 
indicate a cheap financial capital channel that consists partly of the use of relatively low-cost 




2.4 Cognitive Dissonance 
Prast and de Vor (2005) examine whether there is a relation between the depreciation of the 
euro–US dollar exchange rate in 2000 and the asymmetric reactions of investors to news, 
including economic and political media coverage. The daily euro–dollar exchange rate from 1 
April 2000 to 22 September 2000 is regressed on news the euro and dollar areas. The results 
indicate that whether an asymmetry exists in the investor response to media coverage 
depends on whether the coverage comes from the euro and dollar areas. Further, the results 
show that cognitive dissonance is reduced as investors react differently to positive and 
negative news. In addition, favourable news about the real economy has a positive effect on 
the euro–dollar exchange rate. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that investors filter 
media coverage in a biased manner, since they always pay more attention to negative news 
than to positive news about the euro area. 
 
Friesen and Weller (2006) examine how psychological biases influence investor behaviour 
and stock prices. Since systematic mispricing can lead to significant resource misallocation, 
the authors state that overconfidence and limited attention probably foster investor credulity 
about strategic incentives. The authors suggest that government and private planners should 
set up rules to improve choices and make decisions more efficient. In particular, governments 
should also avoid actions that exacerbate investor bias. 
 
Friesen and Weller (2006) develop a model of analyst earnings forecasts that differentiate 
between the behaviour of rational investors and that induced by the cognitive dissonance that 
also exists in international data. In this model, analysts issue sequential forecasts by 
considering not only new information but also information contained in previous forecasts. 
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The authors employ this model to test for cognitive dissonance and quantify its magnitude. 
The results indicate that analysts are overconfident about the accuracy of the information they 
obtain because of cognitive bias; however, they can correct bias in the forecasts of others. 
The authors suggest that their overconfidence measure varies according to the 
book-to-market ratio. 
 
Many researchers have investigated why so many keep investing in poorly performing mutual 
funds. For example, Goetzmann (1997) states that cognitive dissonance may be a factor in the 
process of mutual fund evaluation and investor memories show a positive bias that is 
conditional upon previous investor choice, which is consistent with cognitive dissonance 
theory. Even well-informed investors are likely to have perceptions biased by past 
performance, since they tend to rationalize their behaviour through biased beliefs. Moreover, 
by examining economic and psychological frictions in the mutual fund industry through a 
cross-sectional study of equity mutual funds, Goetzmann finds a relation between an 
unusually high frequency of funds with low returns and investor ‘inertia’, which may be due 
to the high costs of economic change. In addition, the author suggests that if investors 
concentrate on the past performance ranking of fund firms, the best strategy is to increase the 
number of funds and individual fund volatility and decrease the cross-fund correlation. 
 
The cognitive dissonance theory proposed by Festinger (1957) states that investors suffer 
from conflicting cognitive elements, including discrepancies between past decisions and 
empirical evidence, and they alleviate their discomfort by adjusting their beliefs to conform 




Erlich et al. (1957) employ cognitive dissonance theory and investigate consumer response to 
advertising followed by the major decision of purchasing a new car. They provide evidence 
that consumers selectively notice the advertisement that can validates their choice. By 
examining the cognitive dissonance of mutual fund individuals, mutual fund firms have 
developed various sales strategies. Goetzmann (1997) concludes that advertisements may not 
be able to affect the decisions of new investors; however, they can help funds managers keep 
their current customers. 
 
According to Telci et al. (2011), cognitive dissonance theory focuses on the relationships 
among cognitions which are people’s knowledge about their perceptions, behaviours, 
attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and environments. Telci et al. (2011) analyses the application of 
theory in the fields of management, marketing, and psychology and evaluates the theory’s 
contribution to the development of knowledge. The theory of cognitive dissonance is usually 
used to explain consumer behaviour and post-purchase situations in the marketing field and 
to investigate human-related issues in management. Telci et al. (2011) investigates 
underdeveloped areas and extends the literature for theoretical and empirical research. In the 
field of management, this theory is used not only to explain employee behaviours and 
attitudes during periods of organizational change, but also to explain the psychological 
reasons for moral divergence, forecast entrepreneurial and managerial behaviour, and explain 
the reasons for individuals’ attempts at consistency. 
 
Friesen et al. (2009) propose a theoretical framework to explain the obvious success of not 
only pattern-based technical rules but also trend-following trading rules. Their model 
introduces a concept of cognitive dissonance that has been broadly used in the psychological 
literature and depicts individuals’ tendency to explain information selectively to be in line 
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with a given set of thoughts and beliefs. In the model, information is broken down into 
signals of different magnitudes and frequencies. Large and infrequently observed signals are 
explained rationally by investors. On the other hand, the explanations of investors with less 
informative and more frequent signals are biased by the recently observed large signals. 
Moreover, the model makes two empirical predictions. First, the model forecasts negative 
return autocorrelations in the very short and long term and positive return autocorrelations in 
the medium term. Second, the time series of jumps in equity price are positively 
autocorrelated. In addition, the authors use bi-power variation estimation to identify 
significant equity jumps in individual component stocks of the S&P 100 Index from 1999 to 
2005. They discover time-series equity jumps to be economically and significantly positively 
autocorrelated. Furthermore, according to the empirical work of Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), 
who indicate negative weekly autocorrelations immediately after events of extreme 
information, Friesen et al. (2009) use this model and discover that there are momentum 
profits can be made several weeks following an extreme return, up to one year. The authors 
also discover that markets react similarly to private and explicit news. 
 
Chen and Lai (2010) investigate the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual 
funds. They suggest that reputation stretching increases the net fund inflows to new funds 
that are managed by successful fund managers, increasing fund inflows to fund families. 
When investors select funds, they can assess fund managers by considering their one-year 
performance. The authors find a positive relation between the decrease in information 
asymmetry and managerial reputation that benefits investors by increasing the returns of new 
funds in the short term. The authors conclude that reputation stretching benefits not only 
investors but also fund families. Moreover, cognitive dissonance could lead to traders relying 
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on observable mutual fund attributes, such as family size and fund age, to choose mutual 
funds. 
 
2.5 Disposition Effect 
Frydman and Rangel (2014) define the disposition effect as the fact that investors tend to sell 
risky assets when their capital increases and tend to hold risky assets when their capital 
decreases. The authors employ a stock trading laboratory test to determine the possibility of 
reducing the tendency of subjects to exhibit a disposition effect by minimizing the 
information about a stock’s purchase price and therefore about capital gains and losses. They 
compare two conditions: a high-saliency condition and a low-saliency condition. The 
high-saliency condition refers to the stock purchase price being significantly displayed by the 
trading software, while the low-saliency condition refers to the software showing nothing at 
all. The results indicate that investors show a 25% lower disposition effect under the 
high-saliency condition than under the low-saliency condition. This finding indicates the 
possibility that investors reduce the disposition effect by decreasing the saliency with which 
information about a stock’s purchase price is displayed in financial statements and on online 
trading platforms. 
 
Barbarise and Xiong (2009) examine whether a disposition effect can be predicted by the 
preferences of prospect theory. They state two prospect theory implementations: First, 
preferences refer to annual losses and profits; second, preferences refer to overrealized losses 
and profits. The authors conclude that the annual profit/loss model is unable to predict a 
disposition effect; however, the realized profit/loss model can. Therefore, utility from realized 




Odean (1998) explains why investors tend to sell their stocks as a paper when they gain and 
hold the stocks when they loss. The author states that investors show a strong preference for 
realizing winners rather than losers. Moreover, their behaviour is not driven by a desire to 
avoid the higher trading costs of low-priced stocks or to rebalance portfolios. Their behaviour 
is also not justified by subsequent portfolio performance. In addition, taxable investments are 
not optimal and incur lower after-tax returns. Tax-driven selling is most apparent in 
December. 
 
Using Chinese brokerage account data, Chen et al. (2007) examine investment decision 
making in a developing market. The results indicate that Chinese investors always make poor 
trading decisions, since the stocks they buy underperform those they sell. Moreover, Chinese 
investors suffer from behavioural errors: First, in line with a disposition effect, they are likely 
to sell stocks whose price has increased; second, they are overconfident; third, they tend to 
believe that past returns can be an indicator of future returns. Moreover, generally speaking, 
Chinese individual investors are more overconfident and exhibit a stronger disposition effect 
than US investors. In addition, the authors find that, in China, experienced investors do not 
always have fewer behavioural biases than inexperienced investors. 
 
Examining the differences in the disposition effect across individuals and interpreting them 
according to underlying investor characteristics, Dhar and Zhu (2006) confirm the existence 
of a disposition effect and find that rich individuals and professionals have a lower 
disposition effect. Moreover, a higher frequency of trading is likely to diminish the 
disposition effect. In addition, according to tax considerations, individuals with a high 
disposition effect always have lower after-tax returns than those not subject to the disposition 
effect. There is a positive relation between the disposition effect and the extent of investor 
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bias. The authors suggest that non-profit organizations and policy makers should make 
individual investors aware of these biases to help them pay more attention to poorly 
performing stocks in their portfolio and make them aware of the tax benefits of realizing 
losses. In addition, their findings could help investors in brokerage firms gain higher profits. 
The brokerage firms could precisely target low-income investors in non-professional 
occupations because they are the most affected by the disposition effect. 
 
Examining US mutual funds and the disposition effect, Singal and Xu (2011) find that 30% of 
mutual funds display some degree of the disposition effect and underperform other funds by 
4–6% per year. What is more, smaller funds are more attracted to funds prone to the 
disposition effect than other mutual funds are. The results indicate that mutual fund investors 
can minimize investments in such funds. Therefore, funds prone to the disposition effect have 
considerably higher failure rates than other mutual funds and thus reduce the influence of 
such trading behaviour on stock prices. 
 
Costa et al. (2013) devise a computer program to simulate the stock market and test whether 
investing experience can reduce the disposition effect. Dividing the subjects into two groups, 
experienced investors and inexperienced investors, the authors find that, although both 
groups exhibit the disposition effect, experienced investors are less influenced by it. 
 
Employing recently published managerial ownership data, Fu and Wedge (2011) state that a 
large number of mutual funds display the disposition effect. Mutual funds with managerial 
ownership show less of a disposition effect than those without a managerial ownership and 
the extent of the effects decreases with the percentage of managerial ownership. Moreover, 
the authors find a negative relation between the disposition effect and the degree of board 
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independence and fund performance. Their results suggest that the governance of mutual 
funds could affect the disposition effect and greater managerial ownership could mitigate the 
problem. 
 
Frino et al. (2004) state that the disposition effect is not driven by rational economics but, 
rather, by psychological considerations. They find that the disposition effect exists among not 
only local traders but also non-local traders; however, it is stronger among local traders. 
Moreover, the authors find that the paper losses of local traders have a greater likelihood than 
those of non-local traders of becoming either realized or paper gains by the next trading 
period. The results indicate that locals have the privilege of knowing inside information in 
their short-term trading, which helps them make precise forecasts of the direction and 
strength of short-run market price shifts. 
 
Li and Yang (2013) propose an equilibrium model to investigate the disposition effect, 
trading volumes, and asset prices. Decreasing sensitivity can forecast a disposition effect, a 
decreased return volatility, a positive return–volume correlation, and price momentum, while 
loss aversion usually forecasts the opposite. Their model is useful in explaining a large 
number of financial phenomena and also proposes new testable forecasts. 
 
Raw (2014) examines gender differences in the disposition effect in an experiment. The 
results indicate that female investors realize fewer capital losses, exhibit significantly higher 
disposition effects, and are more loss averse than male investors. 
 
Duxbury et al. (2015) examine both the tendency of investors to exhibit the disposition effect 
and the house money effect. The authors find that these two effects coexist in a single stock 
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market and over half of the investors exhibit these two effects simultaneously. The authors 
also show the significance of differentiating prior outcomes through two dimensions: 
realized/unrealized and portfolio/stock levels. In addition, they find the house money effect 
can reduce the disposition effect, indicating that cognitive errors do not always lead to 
negative outcomes. 
 
Chou and Wang (2011) predict a positive relation between prior returns and subsequent 
trading activities, taking into account overconfidence and disposition errors. Using a database 
from the Taiwan Futures Exchange, they examine the different implications of the disposition 
effect and overconfidence hypotheses. The overconfidence models forecast an increase in 
trader aggressiveness when overconfidence levels are high. This is why overconfident 
investors always submit more aggressive orders to increase the chance of such orders being 
executed. Further, the authors examine disposition effects and overconfidence among various 
types of traders. The results show that the behavioural mistakes they display are quite 
different. Domestic institutions exhibit an overconfidence bias rather than a disposition bias, 
while individual investors show both types of bias. The results also indicate that individual 
investors are likely to have stronger behavioural biases. 
 
According to the results of a Thai individual trader survey, DeWeaver and Shannon (2010) 
argue that the disposition effect is a special case of waning vigilance, that is, traders do not 
pay enough attention to analysis and new information when making decisions about loss 
makers, which leads them to sell too slowly when arguments in favour of holding are no 




2.6 Takeovers and Media Sentiment 
Golbe and White (1987) conclude the following factors affect the observed pattern of 
takeovers: Tobin’s q, changes in economic circumstances (changes in tax regimes and in 
relative prices), greater divergences of opinion about future economic prospects, the real 
costs of capital, the size of the economy, the tax regime, and a corrective factor for the cutoff 
point bias. 
 
Smales (2014) uses commodity-specific news sentiment data downloaded from Thomson 
Reuters News Analytics to investigate the relation between news sentiment and stock returns 
in the gold futures market from 2003 to 2012. The author confirms an asymmetric response to 
news releases with negative news sentiment and a greater response in the returns of gold 
futures. Moreover, the author also states that the positions of net traders significantly affect 
the sentiment relation, their influence being greatest when holding positions opposite their 
natural position. The author explains that this may be due to constraints imposed on net 
traders according to exchange-imposed limits, credit availability, or the inventory necessary 
for a physical settlement. In addition, recession cycles and related changes in the cost of 
credit influence the sizes of net positions and the relation between news sentiment and stock 
returns. 
 
Riordan et al. (2013) explain how information is translated into market prices. They examine 
the influence of newswire messages on intraday price discovery, liquidity, and trading 
intensity in an electronic limit order market. They measure message tone to investigate the 
influences of positive, negative, and neutral messages on trading activity and price discovery. 
Their results show higher costs of adverse selection for newswire message arrivals. Moreover, 
the authors find that negative news has a greater likelihood of resulting in higher adverse 
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selection costs than positive or neutral news does. Liquidity decreases around negative news 
announcements and increases around positive and neutral news. Both the available order 
book depth and trading intensity increase around all messages. The results show that market 
investors have different information gathering and processing capabilities and that a negative 
media sentiment is more informative and results in strong market reactions. 
 
Since more and more market investors use news analytics software to measure the huge 
amounts of unstructured data from the media, Smales (2014) uses original data from 
RavenPack to examine market reactions to stock-specific news flow during an extended 
period in the Australian stock market. The key variables from 484,440 pieces of media 
content suggest distinctive responses in volatility, spreads, stock returns, and market activities. 
Smales obtains findings similar to those of previous research, indicating that the relevance of 
media coverage is critical in identifying important influences. Additionally, negative news 
has the strongest impact on market activity, volatility, and bid–ask spreads. The findings are 
also consistent after controlling for market dynamics and cross-dependencies between key 
variables in a high-frequency vector autoregression model. 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2010) find that negative words can measure media tone more 
efficiently than positive and neutral words can and are related to other financial variables. 
Moreover, to measure media tone, the authors focus on the more regular word cataloguing 
approach of the Fin-Neg list instead of the Harvard list because it reveals stronger relations 
with stock returns when examining media coverage and seasoned equity offerings. 
 
Carretta et al. (2011) find that public investors react negatively to ownership news about 
profitable firms and are likely to sell their securities. Their results also indicate that the tone 
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and content of corporate governance news are not statistically significant related to 
cumulative abnormal returns
16
 (Carretta et al., 2011). The authors suggest that investors can 
determine the type of corporate governance event only prior to the news release, since 
afterward individual investors are affected by its content and tone. Moreover, the authors find 
that stock returns are negatively influenced by news when changes take place in the board of 
directors of profitable firms. 
 
Tetlock (2007) examines the relation between media content and stock market activity. The 
author suggests that a highly pessimistic media forecast places downward pressure on market 
prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals and that unusual optimism or pessimism 
predicts high market trading volumes. Furthermore, pessimistic forecasts seem to have a 
particularly strong negative influence that reverses itself in small stocks quite slowly. 
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) investigate the utilization of a quantitative language measure to forecast 
corporate earnings and stock returns. They present three main findings: First, within 
corporation-specific news stories, part of the negative words that convey negative 
information can be used to forecast low corporate earnings. Second, corporate share prices 
react to such information with a short delay. Third, the predictability of earnings and stock 
returns from negative words is highest for stories that concentrate on fundamentals. Tetlock et 
al. (2008) conclude that linguistic news content captures difficult to quantify aspects of firms’ 
fundamentals’ that investors rapidly impound into share prices. However, the authors show 
only that negative word counts have predictability and do not consider the effect of positive 
words. 
 
                                                        
16
 The CAR is the sum of abnormal returns and is often calculated over small windows, usually only three days, 
five days, and 11days.  
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Buehlmaier and Zechner (2013) present strong evidence that information in the financial 
media is not fully impounded in security prices. They also demonstrate that media content 
influences takeover arbitrage returns but the results for media coverage are not significant. 
 
Based on Tetlock’s (2008) findings, Garcia (2012) examines the sentiment effect on asset 
prices by investigating financial news from The New York Times in the 20th century. 
Employing the fractions of negative and positive words as a proxy for media sentiment, 
Garcia shows that the ability to forecast stock returns by using news content focuses on 
recessionary periods. Moreover, the author finds that negative mood states, such as job losses 
and uncertainty about the future, change investors’ decision making abilities. Market 
participants are happy and optimistic during hot markets but fearful and anxious during cold 
markets. This indicates that market participants implement distinct decision making rules in 
cold markets more so than in hot markets because they are more sensitive to news in cold 
markets. Moreover, predictability is especially strong on Mondays and following holidays, 
since readers have more time to read the news before the afternoon of the trading day. 
Additionally, Garcia argues that the effect partially reverses after the next four trading days. 
In sum, investor sentiment has an important impact during recessions. 
 
In addition, Vadnais (2012) concentrates on the media’s influence on pricing and the 
completion of takeover transactions in the high-tech industry. The author suggests that 
average media sentiment about takeover transactions has a positive correlation with the final 
price of an acquired firm. However, the author finds no evidence that media sentiment affects 
the probability of takeovers being withdrawn or completed. Moreover, transaction size and 
the amount of media coverage strongly influence the extent to which media sentiment affects 
a takeover transaction’s pricing, with greater transaction size and news coverage associated 
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with stronger media sentiment influence. Finally, the author concludes that the media not 
only covey information to investors, but also have a strong influence on the financial markets 
and a high ability to affect the high-tech industry landscape. 
 
Schumaker et al. (2012) pair the Arizona Financial Text System, a financial news article 
prediction system, with a media sentiment analysis tool. They conclude that subjective news 
articles facilitate forecasting the direction of prices and achieve a 3.30% stock return with an 
uncomplicated trading engine. After investigating the role of author attitude among financial 
articles, they also state that news articles with a negative attitude make it easier to forecast the 
direction of prices and achieve a 3.04% return. Moreover, they note that their system is 
effective in forecasting price decreases in news articles with either positive sentiment (53.5%) 
and negative/neutral sentiment (52.4%). 
 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) suggest a firm uses media coverage to affect and manipulate its 
stock price after a takeover. They state that acquirers in fixed exchange ratio takeovers attract 
more media information when they start takeover negotiations in private before the public 
announcement. The stock exchange ratio is already established during this period. In addition, 
acquirers in floating exchange ratio indicate no apparent differences in news release issuance 
in this period. This strategy leads to short-lived increases in new coverage and the valuation 
of acquirers. The authors also find that media management has an influence on takeover gains 
and a positive relation exists between the increase in media coverage during takeover 
negotiations and a firm’s share of takeover gains. 
 
Barber and Odean (2008) argue that the buying behaviour of individual investors is more 
heavily influenced by media attention than by their selling behaviour, because individual 
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investors only sell stocks that they already own and most hold relatively few common stocks 
in their portfolios. Moreover, the buying behaviour of individual investors is more heavily 
influenced by attention than by the buying behaviour of professional investors, because 
investors can, individually, consider the merits –both economic and emotional – of selling 
each stock they own and individual investors do not devote themselves to full-time stock 
research. The authors conclude that attention-driven buying is also facilitated by the 
complexity involved in individual investors exploring their numerous stock purchase choices. 
 
Buehlmaier (2012) note a positive relation between news content and takeover success. The 
media measure constructed by naïve Bayes is the most significant explanatory variable, with 
a strong marginal effect and high goodness of fit. Ohl et al. (1995) show that relevant news 
content during M&As is influenced not only by a firm’s press releases but also by media 
access to the firm’s executives. 
 
Da, Zhi, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) state two reasons why more Google searches and 
investor overconfidence can lead to stronger stock price momentum: First, according to 
Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman (2002), many psychological studies find that people have 
more confidence if they obtain more information or expertise. Second, when people search 
Google for stock information, investors could be influenced by the same information sets and 
their private signals have greater autocorrelations. 
 
Examining evidence of post-news drift, Chan (2003) finds results in line with the idea that 
investors underreact to information. The underreaction is strongest following bad news. 
Moreover, subsequent reversals in extreme price movements are inconsistent with public 
news. Chan also notes that trading frictions, such as short-sale constraints, show a significant 
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relation with the pattern of post-bad news drift. First, stocks with negative public media 
coverage also experience negative drift; however, stocks with positive news experience little 
negative drift. The author explains that stocks prices are slow to react to negative public 
media coverage. Second, stocks without media coverage in the event month have a tendency 
to reverse the following month, even when controlling variables such as firm size, the 
book-to-market ratio, and influences of liquidity are considered. This result supports the view 
that investment practitioners overreact to the movements of spurious stock prices. This leads 
to ‘excess’ volatility and trading volumes and then reverses the stock price. In sum, slowness 
to react to information and overreactions to price movements are two major characteristics of 
investors. Moreover, investors respond more slowly to the media coverage of small stocks 
than that of large stocks. 
 
Solomon (2012) investigates how positive media coverage and negative media coverage 
influence stock prices by examining the influence of investor relations firms. The results 
show that investor relations firms ‘spin’ their customers’ news by generating more positive 
media coverage releases then negative ones and increasing returns around announcements. 
The author also reports that positive news increases investors’ expectations and negative 
news disappoints them. 
 
2.7 Herding 
Chang and Lin (2015) examine the determinants of trader decision making in stock markets 
worldwide. The results indicate that herding behaviour usually occurs amidst confusion and 
in less sophisticated stock markets. Moreover, the authors find that some national cultural 
indexes are highly correlated with the herding observations. Further, traders’ behavioural 




Choi and Skiba (2015) explore the herding behaviour of institutional traders in international 
markets. The authors use a sample that covers widespread herding in 41 countries to examine 
the relation between institutional demand and future returns and find that institutional herding 
can stabilize prices. Moreover, they explore the relation between the herding behaviour of 
institutional traders and information asymmetry levels. The degree of information asymmetry 
is measured along five dimensions: stock market development, ease of access to information, 
firm transparency, the strength of trader rights, and macroeconomic determinants related to 
the information environment. The authors find that the herding effect is stronger among 
institutional traders in markets with less information asymmetry. The results show that the 
herding behaviour of institutional traders is possibly motivated by correlated signals from 
basic information and prices adjust more quickly within a more transparent market. 
 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) define herding as simultaneously buying/selling the same stocks as 
other managers. The authors evaluate the potential effect of trading on stock prices by 
addressing two aspects of trading: herding and positive-feedback trading, which is defined as 
buying past winners and selling past losers. The results suggest that stock prices can be 
destabilized by institutions and pension managers do not always pursue these potentially 
destabilizing practices. 
 
Dasgupta et al. (2010) develop a theoretical model to examine the influence of institutional 
herding on asset prices. They conclude that institutional herding positively forecasts short-run 
returns and negatively forecasts long-run returns. Moreover, they generate new testable 





Sias (2003) states that institutional investor demand for a stock in a quarter is positively 
related with their demand in the last quarter. The author explains this phenomenon as being 
due to herding behaviour and institutional traders acting like momentum investors. Moreover, 
the results show that institutional herding is a result of inferring information from each 
other’s trades. 
 
Galariotis et al. (2015) test for the herding effect in the UK and US stock markets. Their 
results show that US traders are likely to herd following the release of significant macro data 
and herding spillover from the US to the UK existed during earlier financial crises. Regarding 
the difference in herding between US and UK markets, the authors find that traders herded 
due to both fundamentals and non-fundamentals during different crises in the US and but 
only due to fundamentals and during the dot-com bubble bursting in the UK. This suggests 
that the motivations for herding are country and period specific. 
 
Kremer and Nautz (2013) examine the causes and consequences of institutional trader 
herding behaviour by using a German security market database. The authors state that 
institutions display herding behaviour on a daily basis. Moreover, the intensity of herding 
depends on security characteristics, including volatility and past returns, in an asymmetric 
fashion. For example, rising stock volatility increases sell herding and decreases buy herding. 
The effect of volatility is asymmetric because volatility is mostly unintentional and motivated 
by ordinary reactions to risk measures that force regulated investors to buy low-volatility 




2.8 Hypothesis Development 
The first hypothesis is the following. 
H1: Acquirers should be subject to lower media pessimism when a deal is announced during 
a hot market. 
The hypothesis that media pessimism can be affected by different market valuations is 
supported by earlier empirical studies that report a direct link between news and hot/cold 
markets. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that takeovers cluster because they 
are driven by stock market valuations. The fundamental assumption of their theory is that the 
market is inefficient while managers are rational and take the advantage of market. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) state that firm-specific and market-wide 
misvaluations could cause merger waves and influence takeover activity levels, methods of 
payment, and the final decision to be a bidder or a target. In their model of rational 
managerial behaviour and uncertainty about misvaluation sources, rational targets with 
imperfect information tend to agree to takeovers by overvalued acquirers during hot markets 
because the targets overestimate the takeover synergies during such periods. Maksimovic and 
Phillips (2001) argue that periods of high activity are highly correlated with high market 
valuations. This result can be interpreted as evidence that the media tend to use more positive 
words when describing takeovers to attract investor attention in a hot market because there 
are many more takeovers in a hot markets than in a cold market, whereas in a cold market 
negative words are used more frequently because the market is in a recession and overall 
sentiment is low. Therefore, this chapter expects acquirers buying during high-valuation 
markets to be subject to lower media pessimism and those buying during low-valuation 
markets to be subject to greater media pessimism in the short run. 
 
The second hypothesis is the following. 
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H2: There is a negative relation between media pessimism and takeover returns in a hot 
market in the short run. 
This hypothesis assumes that, in a hot market, low media pessimism about takeovers results 
in higher takeover returns and high media pessimism results in lower returns in the short term. 
This is supported by the findings of earlier empirical studies. Vadnais (2012) states that 
average media sentiment about takeover transactions has a positive correlation with the final 
price of the acquired firm. Tetlock et al. (2008) demonstrate that fundamental information 
transmitted by financial news resolves information asymmetry; therefore, financial news can 
provide additional information for investors with which to evaluate their prospects in M&A 
deals and hence reduce information asymmetry. Antonio et al. (2008) focus on high-valuation 
markets and sources of momentum and find that investors obtain significant and positive 
gains in the short run. This could be due to positive news increasing the investors’ 
expectations and negative news disappointing them (Prast and de Vor, 2005; Solomon, 2012). 
Another explanation is that negative news has a greater likelihood of resulting in higher 
adverse selection costs than positive or neutral news does (Riordan et al. 2013). In addition, 
herding could take place following the news release. This argument is in line with the 
findings of Choi and Skiba (2015), who state that the herding effect is stronger among 
institutional traders in markets with less information asymmetry. The authors show that the 
herding behaviour of institutional traders is possibly motivated by correlated signals from 
basic information. In addition, Dasgupta et al. (2010) conclude that institutional herding 
positively predicts short-run returns and negatively predicts long-run returns. 
 
The third hypothesis is the following. 





Third, Andrade et al. (2001) and Nelson (1959) find that takeovers are highly concentrated in 
time and more frequent during periods of high market valuations than low market valuations. 
Verter (2002) confirm the higher levels of takeover activity in hot markets and their 
correlation with greater dispersion in market valuations. Therefore, the media coverage is 
excessive for such long periods in hot markets. Such large quantities of media coverage make 
it difficult for investors to focus on media sentiment information. Therefore, the relation 
between media pessimism and long-run returns should be insignificant in the hot markets. 
 
The fourth hypothesis is the following. 
H4: There is a insignificant relation between short-run returns and media pessimism in cold 
markets. 
Fourth, Bouwman et al. (2009) find that takeovers during cold markets are very different 
from those during hot markets. Garcia (2012) suggests that market participants are happy and 
optimistic during hot markets but fearful and anxious during cold markets. This indicates that 
market participants more likely abide by distinct decision making rules in a cold market than 
in a hot market because they are more sensitive to news in a cold market. Generally, bidding 
firms earn significantly higher returns during hot markets and their announcement returns are 
significantly negative for takeovers announced in cold markets. Petmezas (2009) states that 
acquirer reactions to takeovers, in both the short and long run, are consistent with forecasts of 
investor sentiment (optimism). Undertaking takeovers during hot markets, managers can earn 
positive returns in the short run but only insignificant returns during cold markets. This fact is 
open to interpretation, since media coverage is scant and hard for analysts and investors to 
observe in a cold market within a short period. Therefore, there should be no apparent 




The first hypothesis is the following. 
H5: There is a positive relation between media pessimism and takeover returns in cold 
market in the long-run. 
Fifth, Petmezas (2009) states that, in the long run, returns will reverse and managers will 
obtain negative returns in both hot and cold markets because of misvaluations due to 
managers’ return overestimations and the urge to merge to profit from the overall market 
status. Bouwman et al. (2009) also state that, during cold markets, bidders generate lower 
long-term stock and operating performance. Antonio et al. (2008) find that investors suffer 
negative returns in the long run, since the returns are reversed because initial expectations 
could not be fully met. Ma et al. (2013) state that the intrinsic value of targets suffers a 
decrease, on average, within three years following takeover completion due to the loss of 
expected earnings and increases in capital. This hypothesis is also supported by the theory of 
overconfidence and cognitive dissonance theory. Friesen and Weller (2006) indicate that 
analysts are overconfident about the accuracy of the information they obtain because of their 
cognitive bias. Erilch et al. (1957) employ cognitive dissonance theory to investigate 
consumer response to advertising and provide evidence that consumers selectively notice 
advertisements that rationalize their choice. Both overconfidence and cognitive dissonance 
lead price reversals in the long run. Therefore, this chapter expects a positive relation 
between media pessimism and takeover returns in a cold market in the long run. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Three types of data are included in the analysis: 1) takeover data for the period 30 November 
1981 to 1 January 2010, obtained from the Thomson One Banker Deals database; 2) UK 
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media data from the LexisNexis database, which includes four influential UK media sources 
– the Financial Times, The Times, the Guardian, and the Mirror, which released 274,201 
media articles between 30 November 1981 and 1 January 2010 – covering 251 UK firms; and 
3) stock price and accounting data from the Datastream databases. The data include daily 
stock prices; book-to-market ratios; earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA);
17
 leverage; price-to-earnings (PE)
18
 ratios; and market values. All 
of the data were from 30 November 1981 to 1 January 2010 and the FTSE All-Share Index 
level data were from 30 November 1981 to 31 December 2012. These periods are three years 
longer than for the other data, because the 36-month BHARs are calculated in the 36 months 
following takeover announcements. 
 
A unique identifier is required to match the data from the three different databases. Thomson 
One Banker and Datastream both use the Datastream code as a firm identifier. Since the raw 
media data do not have Datastream codes, they were manually sought in the media database 
to ensure each article had a Datastream code. Stata was used for the data cleaning and 
matching processes in this chapter. After all media firms without a Datastream code or an 
available date were deleted, the Thomson One Banker Deals and media databases were 
merged by Datastream code. Finally, media data released over 90 days before the takeover 
announcement were deleted. The final sample covers 751 deals within 90 days before the 
takeover announcement. 
 
                                                        
17
A firm’s EBITDA refers to its earnings before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are 
subtracted from the final accounting of its income and costs. It indicates the firm’s current operational 
profitability. 
18
 The PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm’s current market share price compared to its 




To calculate the media pessimism for each firm prior to its M&A announcement, the words in 
each article are compared with the positive and negative word lists of Loughran and 
McDonald (2011). In this case, the numbers of positive and negative words and the total 
number of words are obtained.
19
 In the most recent version of the lists, 353 words are 
positive and 2337 words are negative. 
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) define the media sentiment score as the standardized fraction of negative 
words in each news story, measured by 
 
    
                   
                
                                               (3.1) 
    
        
    
                                                        (3.2) 
 
where      is the mean of Neg and      is the standard deviation of Neg over the previous 
calendar year. Standardization is necessary if Neg is nonstationary. The variable neg is the 
stationary measure of media sentiment that was employed in the regression analyses. 
 
Each article is given a pessimism score and an arithmetic average score is calculated for each 
bidder. Because this formula focuses on negative words, the media pessimism score 
represents the level of media pessimism. Three overall article pessimism indices are 
calculated for the 90 days prior to the takeover. Similar results are obtained by using other 
sentiment formulas, such as the number of positive words minus the number of negative 
words, divided by the sum of positive and negative word counts or the total number of words 
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(Rees and Twedt, 2012). However, Henry and Leone (2009) and Tetlock (2007) find that 
negative words have a much stronger correlation with stock returns than positive words do. 
Many papers also suggest that the frequency of negative words in an article decides its tone 
(Das and Chen, 2007; Davis et al., 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Therefore, the 
method proposed by Tetlock et al. (2008) is employed to measure media sentiment. 
 
To investigate the effects of media pessimism, the entire merger sample is split into two 
subsamples, one for high media pessimism and one for low media pessimism. To examine the 
effects of media pessimism, the media pessimism score is sorted into three media pessimism 
portfolios, the top third for high media pessimism and the bottom third for low media 
pessimism. 
 
All hypotheses are tested through ordinary least squares regression models. To examine the 
relation between the level of media pessimism and stock returns and to test whether the 
media data have any stock return predictability in different market valuations, the following 
regressions are employed: 
High Media Pessimism Group: 
CAR i,t = β1+β2Media Pessimism+β3Market Valuation Dummy+β4Controls                        (3.3) 
BHAR i,t = β1+β2Media Pessimism+β3Market Valuation Dummy+β4Controls                       (3.4) 
Low Media Pessimism Group: 
CAR i,t = β1+β2Media Pessimism +β3Market Valuation Dummy+β4Controls                        (3.5) 
BHAR i,t = β1+β2Media Pessimism+β3Market Valuation Dummy+β4Controls                       (3.6) 
 
Media pessimism is regressed for the days prior to the takeover announcement and then 
compared to determine which pessimism affects the stock returns most significantly. The key 




Different methods are used to classify periods of low, neutral, and high market valuations. 
The key classification method is based on the P/E ratio of the FTSE All-Share Index. Since 
the market P/E gradually increases over the sample period, it is detrended first to make sure 
that low-/high-valuation markets do not correspond only to the first (or second) half of the 
period from 1981 to 2010. An alternative classification method split the market valuation into 
two subsamples, high and low, with the top 25% representing high market valuation and the 
bottom 25% representing low market valuation. The results are generally similar. 
 
The sample period is split into times of high, neutral, and low market valuations and the 
performance of firms that announce acquisitions under these different market circumstances 
is compared. This chapter uses several stock and operating performance measures. This 
chapter examines acquiring firms’ short-run stock performance (with three-day CARs) and 
long-run stock performance (with two-year BHARs and calendar-time portfolio returns) to 
see whether the market’s initial reaction is consistent with acquirers’ long-run stock 
performance. The performance of acquisitions during periods of high, neutral, and low 
market valuation is examined in a univariate setting and in a multivariate regression 
framework in which other factors that could affect acquisition performance are controlled for, 
including the method of payment, the acquisition type (tender/merger), the relative size of the 
acquisition, and the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Both approaches yield similar results. 
 
The method of payment and market value are the main variables. Travlos (1987) reports that 
the use of equity as a payment method in takeovers signals to the market that the acquirer is 
overvalued, while an all-cash payment indicates potential undervaluation of the acquirer. 
Therefore, two payment method dummy variables are included: Stock and Cash. The stock 
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variable, Stock, takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% equity to buy the target firm 
and the cash variable, Cash, takes the value of one if the bidder uses 100% cash financing to 
pay for the target. Moreover, a lag in the key return predictability variables’ size (measured as 
the natural  logarithm of the market value) is included, as for Tetlock et al. (2008), as well as 
the logarithm of the acquirer’s size, Ln(Size), defined as the acquirer’s market value measured 
one month before the deal announcement. 
 
In addition, the multivariate tests include a series of control variables that have a significant 
influence on acquirer returns according to previous studies. First, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
find that value acquirers (with a high book-to-market ratio) outperform glamour acquirers 
(with a low book-to-market ratio) after a takeover. This may due to ‘performance 
extrapolation’ and hubris, which lead to poorer takeover decisions by glamour acquirers. 
Second, Lang et al. (1994) report a strong negative relation between firm leverage and firm 
future growth during 1970–1989. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggest that leverage brings 
about poor investment opportunities and helps prevent firm overinvestment. Third, a firm’s 
EBITDA indicates its current operational profitability. Fourth, Travlos (1987) states that the 
relative size variable is used to account for difficulties in measuring abnormal returns due to 
the larger size of bidders relative to the size of their targets. Fifth, Brealey and Myers (1996) 
state that the PE ratio is part of the everyday vocabulary of investors in the stock market. 
Sixth, an increase in a stock’s media coverage could temporarily increase investor attention to 
this stock, resulting in a price run-up followed by a correction (Huberman and Regev, 2001; 
Barber and Odean, 2008). Therefore, the following variables are also included: the 
book-to-market ratio (B/M Ratio), defined as the acquirer’s book value divided by its market 
value; leverage (Leverage), defined as the amount of debt used to finance a firm’s assets; 
EBITDA (EBITDA); the relative size of the transaction (Relative Size), defined as the deal 
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value divided by the acquirer’s market value, measured one month before the deal 
announcement; the PE ratio (PE ratio), measured as a firm’s current share price compared to 
its per-share earnings; and the run-up stock return of the acquirer measured over a window 
from 365 to 28 days before the announcement (Run-Up). Moreover, hostile, public, tender, 
and diversification are dummy variables that take the value of one for hostile, tender, and 
diversifying mergers, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 indicates summary statistics for the whole sample of UK acquisitions, focusing on 
media pessimism and market valuation, respectively, including the total number of 
observations, means, medians, and standard deviations of abnormal returns and deal and firm 
characteristics. After all takeovers not covered by the media are deleted, the sample 
comprises 751 deals. Within 90 days before the takeover announcements, 250 deals are 
covered by the news with high media pessimism and 250 deals are covered with low media 
pessimism. After classification of market valuation as high or low, 251 takeover deals are 
found to have been completed in a hot market while only 154 takeover deals took place in a 
cold market. The results show that more takeover deals are made in hot markets than in cold 
markets, consistent with the findings of Nelson (1959), Andrade et al. (2001) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003). They find that takeovers are highly concentrated in time and more frequent 
during periods of high market valuation than periods of low market valuation. Maksimovic 





In Table 4.1, the firm size of acquirers is £1.495 trillion, on average. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
indicate that the average firm size of acquirers in a hot market is £1.346 trillion and £1.390 
trillion in a cold market. The results indicate that the number of deals is higher but the 
average size is smaller in a hot market, while the number of deals is smaller in a cold market 
but the average size is larger. This suggests that more large firms make M&A deals in a cold 
market than in a hot market. This can be explained by the fact that, in a cold market, only 
competitive acquirers, which are generally large firms, tend to make M&A deals. 
 
The results of the run-ups in Tables 4.1 to 4.3 are all positive. According to Meulbroek (1992) 
and Servaes (1991), a positive run-up implies possible information leakage in the 
marketplace due to insider trading or market anticipation due to rumours in the media. 
 
[Insert Table 4.1 Here] 
[Insert Table 4.2 Here] 
[Insert Table 4.3 Here] 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis: Media Pessimism 
This section reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and media coverage in 
the 1981–2010 sample, based on univariate tests. The results are stratified once more 
according to known determinants highlighted in the previous literature: the method of 
payment (i.e. cash versus stock), market valuation (i.e. hot market versus cold market), and 
media pessimism (i.e. high versus low). 
 
Table 4.4 presents the means and preliminary analysis of the three-day CARs for the full 
samples of takeover deals in hot and cold markets in the short term. The stocks are divided 
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into hot and cold market groups and their differences analysed. Moreover, the stocks are 
divided into a high media pessimism subsample and a low media pessimism subsample and 
their differences analysed. The results in Panel A show 323 deals were paid in cash and only 
23 deals were paid in stock in the whole sample; that is, 43% of transactions were fully 
financed by cash and only 3.06% were fully financed by stock. The rest of the transactions, 
comprising 53.93% of deals, were financed by a mix of cash and stock. The results are almost 
the same for the hot and cold markets. This finding indicates that most UK acquirers prefer 
cash payments in takeovers. This finding is consistent with that of Gao (2010), who analyses 
the influence of managerial horizons on takeover activity. The main prediction is that 
acquirers managed by short-horizon managers earn higher returns at takeover announcements, 
are more likely to use cash to pay for deals, and exhibit inferior long-term performance after 
the takeovers. 
 
Moreover, the results in Panel A of Table 4.4 also show that, over the three-day event window, 
deals with low media pessimism earn returns of 0.7% (p-value: 0.004) and deals with high 
media pessimism earn returns of 0.8% (p-value: 0.000). Deals with low media pessimism 
earn returns of 0.7% (p-value: 0.052) and deals with high media pessimism earn returns of 
0.9% (p-value: 0.013) through cash payments. Deals with low media pessimism earn returns 
of 0.7% (p-value: 0.029) and deals with high media pessimism earn returns of 0.8% (p-value: 
0.010) by using mix payments. Cash and mixed payment deals earn positive returns in the 
short run. However, the statistical analysis between these two subsamples shows that the 
difference between takeovers with high and low media pessimism is -0.1% (p-value: 0.669) 




Panel B of Table 4.4 indicates that, in a hot market over a three-day event window, deals with 
low media pessimism earn returns of 1% (p-value: 0.032) and deals high media pessimism 
earn returns of 0.5% (p-value: 0.283). That means takeover deals with low media pessimism 
earn lower returns in the short run. However, the statistical analysis between these two 
subsamples shows that the difference between takeovers with high and low media pessimism 
is 0.5% (p-value: 0.470) and insignificant in the short run, even considering payment 
methods. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.4 indicates that, in a cold market, takeover deals paid by stock with high 
media pessimism earn 9.9% (p-value: 0.002) returns in the short run. Panel C also shows the 
results of the statistical analysis of the return difference between high pessimism and low 
pessimism takeovers and they indicate that acquirers with high pessimism outperform those 
with low pessimism in the short run for stock payments. 
 
Panel D of Table 4.4 shows the results of the statistical analysis of the difference between the 
hot and cold markets and they indicate that takeover deals in a hot market outperform those in 
a cold market in the short run. The results also show that deals with low pessimism in a hot 
market outperform those in cold market. Furthermore, deals with high pessimism in a cold 
market outperform those in a hot market for mixed payment deals. 
 
[Insert Table 4.4 Here] 
 
Table 4.5 presents the means and preliminary analysis of long-run performance with high and 
low pessimism in hot and cold markets over a 24-month holding period after the 
announcement of takeovers. The results of Panel A show that deals with low media 
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pessimism earn announcement returns of 6.1% (p-value: 0.038) and announcement returns of 
13.5% (p-value: 0.003) for cash payments. Moreover, under the condition of cash payment, 
the statistical analysis between these two groups shows that takeovers with low pessimism 
statistically outperform takeovers with high pessimism by 5.3% (p-value: 0.000), on average, 
in the long run. That is, greater media pessimism leads to lower takeover returns. This finding 
is consistent with those of Carretta et al. (2011), Henry (2008), and Tetlock (2007), who argue 
that high media pessimism leads to low investor sentiment, decreasing stock prices. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.5 shows that, in a hot market, deals with stock payments experience an 
average loss of 19.4% (p-value: 0.073), while, in a cold market, deals with cash payments 
experience an average loss of 1.02% (p-value: 0.089). Panel D shows the results of the 
two-sample statistical analysis of the difference between hot and cold markets and they 
indicate that takeover deals in a hot market outperform those in a cold market in the long run. 
However, in this table, none of the differences are significant. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5 Here] 
 
Table 4.6 presents the means and preliminary analysis of media pessimism for high and low 
market valuations. The results of Panel A show that deals in a cold market lead to a 
pessimism level of 1.8% (p-value: 0.093), while deals in a cold market lead to a pessimism 
level of 1.1% (p-value: 0.000) for mixed payments. Panel B indicate that, for large firms, 
deals in a cold market lead to a pessimism level of 1.5% (p-value: 0.000) for mixed payments 
and deals in a hot market lead to a pessimism level of 1.7 (p-value: 0.000) for cash payments. 
Panel C indicates that, for small firms, deals in a hot market lead to a pessimism level of 1.4% 




[Insert Table 4.6 Here] 
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis cannot take more factors into account because of its inherent limitations 
and it cannot examine the relations between different factors. Correlations or inversions 
cannot be modelled using univariate analysis. Moreover, multivariate tests could be expected 
to make more accurate predictions than univariate tests (Preez and Witt, 2003). Therefore, a 
multivariate analysis with additional controls is employed to examine the relations between 
takeover returns and media coverage and between takeover returns and media pessimism. 
 
Table 4.7 reports the results of a short-run and long-run multivariate analysis. This section 
reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and media pessimism including 
periods of pessimism of 90 days in the 1981–2010 sample in hot markets, based on 
multivariate tests. The media coverage takes place within 90 days before the takeover 
announcements. The 90-day media pessimism periods include 251 deals. All regressions 
include variables for size, method of payment, the book-to-market ratio, run-ups, public deals, 
diversifying deals, tender offers, hostile takeovers, PE ratios, EBITDA values, leverage, year, 
and industry as controls. Accounting variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to 
mitigate the influence of outliers. 
 
First, the three-day CAR(-1, 1) values in a hot market are computed for 90 days of media 
coverage during the period one day before the takeover announcement to one day after. The 
key independent variable is the media pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (1) in 
Table 4.7 shows that the p-value is 0.003, which is statistically significant, and the estimated 
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coefficient is 0.0463 and negative. These findings indicate that 90-day periods of media 
pessimism are negatively correlated with short-run firm returns. The results are therefore in 
line with the univariate tests and with the findings of Durnev and Mangen (2011) and Tetlock 
(2007), who state that high media pessimism forecasts a decrease in future stock returns. In 
addition, using textual analysis software to quantify the tone of press releases, Davis and 
Tama-Sweet (2012) make similar findings, that higher levels of pessimism are associated 
with lower future returns on assets. 
 
Table 4.7 also reports the results of a long-run multivariate analysis. This section reports the 
empirical relations between takeover returns and media pessimism for 90-day periods of 
media pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in hot markets, based on multivariate tests. First, 
the 24-month BHAR values in a hot market are computed for 90 days of media coverage 
during a period of 24 months after the announcements. The key independent variable is the 
media pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (2) in Table 4.7 shows that the 
p-value is 0.757, which is insignificant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.0486. These 
findings indicate that there is no relation between 90-day periods of media pessimism and 
returns in the long run. 
 
[Insert Table 4.7 Here] 
 
Table 4.8 reports the results of a short-run and long-run multivariate analysis. This section 
reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and media pessimism during 90-day 
period of media pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in cold markets, based on multivariate 
tests. First, the three-day CAR(-1, 1) values in a cold market are computed for 90 days of 
media coverage during the period one day before the takeover announcements to one day 
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after. The key independent variable is the media pessimism for a stock in a given period. 
Column (1) in Table 4.9 shows that the p-value is 0.214, which is insignificant, and the 
estimated coefficient is 0.0208 and negative. 
 
Table 4.8 reports the results of a long-run multivariate analysis in a cold market. This section 
reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and media pessimism for 90-day 
period of media pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in cold markets, based on multivariate 
tests. First, the 24-month BHAR values in a cold market are computed for 90 days of media 
coverage during the period 24 months after the announcements. The key independent variable 
is the media pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (2) in Table 4.8 shows that the 
p-value is 0.017, which is statistically significant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.4285 and 
positive. Moreover, the market-to-book ratio is positively related to long-run firm returns, 
with a p-value of 0.077 and a coefficient of 0.0573. The variable Hostile is also positively 
related to long-run firm returns, with a p-value of 0.005 and a coefficient of 0.6520. 
 
[Insert Table 4.8 Here] 
 
Table 4.9 reports the results of a pessimism analysis. This section reports the empirical 
relations between market valuation and media pessimism during 90-day, 180-day, and 
365-day periods of media pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample, based on multivariate tests. 
The key independent variable is the market valuation dummy in a given period. Column (1) 
in Table 4.11 shows that the p-value is 0.017, which is statistically significant, and the 
estimated coefficient is 0.4285 and positive. Moreover, the PE ratio is positively related to 
pessimism, with a p-value of 0.079 and a coefficient of 0.0025. The market-to-book ratio is 
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also negatively related to long-run firm returns, with a p-value of 0.072 and a coefficient 
of -0.0047. 
 
[Insert Table 4.9 Here] 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
This section briefly describes a number of robustness tests and explores alternative 
explanations. As different event windows, the analysis employs a short-run 
pre-announcement window from three days to five days and a long-run window from 24 
months to 36 months. The results from the five-day short-run window and the 36-month 
long-run window are very similar to the previous results and are consistent with the main 
findings above when the following robustness tests are employed. 
 
First, Table 4.10 reports the results of a short-run multivariate analysis in hot markets. This 
section reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and 90 days of media 
pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in hot markets, based on multivariate tests. First, the 
five-day CAR values in a hot market are computed for 90 days of media coverage during the 
period of five days around announcements. The key independent variable is the media 
pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (1) in Table 4.10 shows that the p-value is 
0.054, which is statistically significant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.0399 and negative. 
The result shows a negative relation between the five-day CAR and media pessimism in a hot 
market, consistent with the result of the three-day CAR. Moreover, the variable Stock 
payment is also negatively related to short-run firm returns, with a p-value of 0.032 and a 
coefficient of 0.0344. In addition, the variable Hostile is positively related to long-run firm 




Second, Column (2) of Table 4.10 reports the results of a long-run multivariate analysis in a 
hot market. This section reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and 90 days 
of media pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in hot markets, based on multivariate tests. 
First, the 36-month BHAR values in a hot market are computed for 90 days of media 
coverage during the period 36 months after the announcements. The key independent variable 
is the media pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (2) in Table 4.10 shows that the 
p-value is 0.448, which is insignificant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.1480 and positive. 
The result shows no relation between the 36-month BHAR pessimism in a hot market and 
this result is consistent with that of 24-month BHARs. 
 
Third, Table 4.10 reports the results of a short-run multivariate analysis in a cold market. This 
section reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and 90 days of media 
pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in cold markets, based on multivariate tests. First, the 
five-day CAR values in a cold market are computed for 90 days of media coverage during the 
period five days around the announcements. The key independent variable is the media 
pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (3) in Table 4.10 shows that the p-value is 
0.202, which is insignificant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.0284 and negative. The result 
shows no relation between the five-day CAR and pessimism in a cold market, consistent with 
the results for the three-day CAR. 
 
Fourth, Table 4.10 reports the results of a long-run multivariate analysis in a hot market. This 
section reports the empirical relations between takeover returns and 90 days of media 
pessimism in the 1981–2010 sample in cold markets, based on multivariate tests. First, the 
36-month BHAR values in a cold market are computed for 90 days of media coverage during 
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the period 36 months after the announcements. The key independent variable is the media 
pessimism for a stock in a given period. Column (4) in Table 4.10 shows that the p-value is 
0.057, which is statistically significant, and the estimated coefficient is 0.4677and positive. 
The result shows a positive relation between the 36-month BHAR and media pessimism in a 
hot market, a result consistent with that of the 24-month BHAR. Moreover, the 
market-to-book ratio is also positively related to long-run firm returns, with a p-value of 
0.086 and a coefficient of 0.0786. In addition, the variable Hostile is also negatively related 
to long-run firm returns, with a p-value of 0.026 and a coefficient of 0.5892. 
 
[Insert Table 4.10 Here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper addresses whether media coverage and media pessimism can influence bidder 
returns in M&As during 1981–2010 for the UK market. Controlling for firm size, method of 
payment, and acquirer/target industry, the empirical results indicate that acquirers should be 
subject to lower media pessimism when the deal is announced during a hot market. Moreover, 
the results show that media pessimism about takeovers affects stock returns differently 
between hot and cold markets. 
 
The empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses. First, the results indicate a negative 
relation between media pessimism and takeover returns in a hot market in the short run. This 
could be explained by the finding of Tetlock et al. (2008), who state that fundamental 
information transmitted by financial news resolves information asymmetry. Moreover, 
positive news increases investors’ expectations and negative news disappoints them (Prast 
and de Vor, 2005; Solomon, 2012). An alternative explanation is that negative news has a 
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greater likelihood of resulting in higher adverse selection costs than positive or neutral news 
does (Riordan et al. 2013). In addition, a herding effect could exist following the news release 
and it is stronger among institutional traders in markets with less information asymmetry 
(Choi and Skiba, 2015). This result is in line with the findings of Antonio et al. (2008) and 
Dasgupta et al. (2010), who suggest that investors obtain positive gains in the short run and 
institutional herding positively forecasts short-run returns. 
 
Second, the results also show a positive relation between media pessimism and takeover 
returns in a cold market in the long run, because the returns will reverse and managers will 
obtain negative returns in a cold market over a long period (Petmezas, 2009). In addition, 
bidding firms earn significantly higher returns during hot markets and their announcement 
returns are significantly negative for takeovers announced in cold markets (Bouwman et al., 
2009). This hypothesis can be explained by the overconfidence theory and cognitive 
dissonance theory. Analysts are overconfident about the accuracy of the information they 
obtain because of their cognitive bias (Friesen and Weller, 2006). Both overconfidence and 
cognitive dissonance lead to a price reversal in the long run. 
 
Third, the relation between long-run returns and media pessimism in hot markets is 
insignificant, as is the relation between short-run returns and media pessimism in cold 
markets. These results can be explained that because of the higher levels of takeover activity 
in hot markets, the media coverage is excessive during long periods in a hot market. Such a 
large quantity of media coverage usually makes it hard for investors to focus on media 
sentiment information. However, in a cold market and in the short run, media coverage is low 
and hard for analysts and investors to observe. The finding is in line with early investigations 
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by Petmezas (2009), who states that managers undertaking takeovers during hot markets can 
earn positive returns in the short run but only insignificant returns during cold markets. 
 
The results indicate that media sentiment has a different and statistically significant influence 
on takeover returns between hot and cold markets, which opens up many future research 
avenues. This chapter considers only media coverage in a 90-day window and other windows, 
such as windows of 180 days and 90 days, can be examined and compared in future research. 
 
The findings of the thesis suggest that financial media is a effective way to predict merging 
firms short-term and long-term performance. It is generally believed that the financial media 
plays an important role in disseminating information to financial market participants. This 
media have a direct impact on investor sentiment concerning either the further earning 
perspectives of the bidding firm or short-term market fluctuation regarding the merger deals 
itself. Therefore, this paper have a direct implication that managers should keep close 
communication with financial media to make sure the all firm information is unbiasly and 
effectively covered by financial media.  
 
For risk arbitrager, financial media might serve as an effectively way to get public 
information and taking position on the media sentiment subtracted from this information.  
 
To sum up, the main implication we draw from the thesis for bidding firms as well as the 
target firms is to design a well-structured media campaign before and after the merger 
announcement, not only to draw a attention from vast majority investors but also to attract 





Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample and focuses on media coverage and media 
pessimism. The media coverage variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if articles covering 
takeover news are published in a given period. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score, 
from highest to lowest. The top third of deals is then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third is 
classified as low pessimism. Table 4.1 presents an overview of the variables with high and low media pessimism. 
This table also presents the total number of observations, means, medians, and standard deviations of the 
financial, asset, and ownership structure variables under the media pessimism classifications. The total number 
of observations is 751. including 250 deals with high pessimism and 250 deals with high pessimism. The 
variable Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions 
of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book value divided by its market value, as of the end of the 
previous year; RUNUP is the acquirer’s stock performance prior to the takeover announcement, measured using 
CAR [-365, -7]; Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured 
in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a firm’s final accounting of its income 
and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of the firm’s current market share price compared to its 
per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals financed 
using 100% stock; and Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer 





Mean SD Median N 
HighVSLow MV 0.62 0.49 1.00 405 
High Pessimism 1.00 0.00 1.00 250 
Low Pessimism 0.00 0.00 0.00 250 
High Market Valution 1.00 0.00 1.00 251 
Low Market Valution 0.00 0.00 0.00 154 
Media Coverage 11.85 33.28 3.00 751 
Media Pessimism 0.02 0.12 0.01 751 
Stock 0.03 0.17 0.00 751 
Cash 0.43 0.50 0.00 751 
Run-up 0.12 0.34 0.10 751 
Size 1495.20 1846.38 628.77 751 
Market-to-book  3.08 2.60 2.34 751 
PE 18.16 11.45 15.30 751 
RalativeSize 0.09 0.16 0.03 751 
Leverage 29.18 19.24 27.85 751 
Public 0.13 0.33 0.00 751 
Diversification 0.48 0.50 0.00 751 
EBITDA 11.54 1.38 11.49 751 
Tender 0.10 0.29 0.00 751 





Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the hot market sample and focuses on media coverage and media 
pessimism. The media coverage variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if articles covering 
takeover news are published in a given period. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score, 
from highest to lowest. The top third of deals is then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third is 
classified as low pessimism. Table 4.2 presents an overview of the variables with media pessimism published 
within 90 days before the takeover announcements. This table also presents the total number of observations, 
means, medians, and standard deviations of the financial, asset, and ownership structure variables under the 
market valuation classifications. The total number of observations is 251, including 76 deals with high 
pessimism and 87 deals with high pessimism. The variable Size is measured as the average market value of 
acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book 
value divided by its market value, as of the end of the previous year; RUNUP is the acquirer’s stock performance 
prior to the takeover announcement, measured using CAR [-365, -7]; Leverage is the percentage of total debt 
divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is 
subtracted from a firm’s final accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio 
of the firm’s current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes deals 
financed using 100% cash; Stock denotes deals financed using 100% stock; and Relative size is measured as the 
deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. 
 
 
Mean SD Median N 
High Market Valuation 1.00 0.00 1.00 251 
High Pessimism 1.00 0.00 1.00 76 
Low Pessimism 1.00 0.00 1.00 87 
Media Coverage 13.02 40.23 4.00 251 
Media Pessimism 0.02 0.15 0.01 251 
Stock 0.05 0.21 0.00 251 
Cash 0.43 0.50 0.00 251 
Run-up 0.11 0.39 0.06 251 
Size 1345.67 1502.28 569.91 251 
Market-to-book  3.53 2.66 2.59 251 
PE 19.82 11.14 16.70 251 
RalativeSize 0.09 0.14 0.02 251 
Leverage 28.84 18.25 29.02 251 
Public 0.17 0.37 0.00 251 
Diversification 0.50 0.50 1.00 251 
EBITDA 11.40 1.39 11.30 251 
Tender 0.14 0.35 0.00 251 






Table 4.3 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the cold market sample and focuses on media coverage and media 
pessimism. The media coverage variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if articles covering 
takeover news are published in a given period. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score, 
from highest to lowest. The top third of deals is then classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third is 
classified as low pessimism. Table 4.3 presents an overview of the variables with media pessimism published 
within 90 days before the takeover announcements and those without media coverage data. This table also 
presents the total number of observations, means, medians, and standard deviations of the financial, asset, and 
ownership structure variables under the market valuation classifications. The total number of observations is 838, 
including 52 deals with high pessimism and 57 deals with high pessimism.. The variable Size is measured as the 
average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market 
ratio is the acquirer’s book value divided by its market value, as of the end of the previous year; RUNUP is the 
acquirer’s stock performance prior to the takeover announcement, measured using CAR [-365, -7]; Leverage is 
the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms and is measured in the year prior to the deal 
announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a firm’s final accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers 
to an equity valuation ratio of the firm’s current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; 
Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash; Stock denotes deals financed using 100% stock; and Relative size 
is measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. 
 
 
Mean SD Median N 
Low Market Valuation 0.00 0.00 0.00 154 
High Pessimism 0.00 0.00 0.00 52 
Low Pessimism 0.00 0.00 0.00 57 
Media Coverage 16.19 36.14 4.00 154 
Media Pessimism 0.02 0.13 0.01 154 
Stock 0.03 0.18 0.00 154 
Cash 0.42 0.49 0.00 154 
Run-up 0.06 0.28 0.08 154 
Size 1389.60 1399.29 817.69 154 
Market-to-book  2.61 1.66 2.20 154 
PE 14.81 5.99 13.40 154 
RalativeSize 0.07 0.12 0.03 154 
Leverage 28.89 19.08 28.94 154 
Public 0.17 0.38 0.00 154 
Diversification 0.53 0.50 1.00 154 
EBITDA 11.74 1.26 11.83 154 
Tender 0.09 0.29 0.00 154 
Hostile 0.01 0.11 0.00 154 
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Table 4.4 Univarite Tests: Short-run 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 3-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample. The CAR is measured by using the formula      
    
 
   . The media coverage published within 90 days before the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to 
lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third are classified as low pessimism. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over 
the previous calendar year (in millions). Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample 
(Full Sample); Panel B relates to hot market; Panel C relates to cold market; and Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C 
-Panel B). The p-Value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for CARs. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively.   
 
  All   Low Pessimism High Pessimism   Differential ( Low -High) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007* 0.006 0.007** 0.008*** 0.009** 0.006 0.008*** -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.877 0.000 0.004 0.052 0.733 0.029 0.000 0.013 0.782 0.010 0.699 0.700 0.995 0.854 
N 751 323 23 405 250 98 11 141 250 104 9 137         
Panel B: Hot Market   
Mean 0.009*** 0.009** 0.000 0.010*** 0.010** 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.005 0.006 -0.019 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.032 0.002 
p-Value 0.001 0.015 0.999 0.009 0.032 0.188 0.573 0.120 0.283 0.388 0.434 0.320 0.470 0.686 0.314 0.799 
N 251 107 12 132 87 30 7 50 76 35 4 37   
   
Panel C: Cold Market   
Mean 0.000 -0.003 0.020 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.033 -0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.099*** 0.005 -0.009 0.005 -0.132** -0.009 
p-Value 0.999 0.475 0.585 0.837 0.257 0.654 0.170 0.541 0.440 0.355 0.002 0.452 0.191 0.594 0.014 0.334 
N 154 64 5 85 57 24 3 30 52 19 2 31   
   
Panel D: Differential (Panel C-Panel B)   
Mean -0.009** -0.012** 0.020 -0.009 -0.015*** -0.012 -0.046 -0.014 -0.001 -0.013 0.118** -0.002   
   







Table 4.5 Univariate Tests: Long-run 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the full sample. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured using the formula 
               
 
            
 
   .The media coverage published within 90 days before the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are 
ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third are classified as low pessimism. Size is measured as the average 
market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions). Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel 
A relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates to larger acquirers as measured as those firms in the highest one third of bidders once ranked by their market 
value(Large Firms); Panel C relates to small acquirers as measured as those firms in the lowest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Small Firms); and 
Panel D relates to the differential performance between small and large bidders (Panel C -Panel B). The p-Value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for 
CARs. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively.   
 
  All   Low Pessimism High Pessimism   Differential ( Low-High) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.045*** 0.069** -0.109 0.035 0.061** 0.135*** -0.043 0.018 0.008 0.014 -0.130 0.013 0.053 0.121* 0.087 0.005 
p-Value 0.010 0.011 0.406 0.140 0.038 0.003 0.877 0.662 0.776 0.757 0.404 0.754 0.220 0.059 0.713 0.934 
N 751 323 23 405 250 98 11 141 250 104 9 137         
Panel B: Hot Market   
Mean -0.006 -0.025 -0.194* 0.027 0.060 0.115 -0.102 0.050 -0.051 -0.075 -0.332 0.002 0.111 0.189 0.230 0.047 
p-Value 0.851 0.581 0.073 0.502 0.249 0.198 0.820 0.487 0.317 0.398 0.124 0.974 0.128 0.120 0.468 0.628 
N 251 107 12 132 87 30 7 50 76 35 4 37   
   
Panel C: Cold Market   
Mean -0.052 -0.102* -0.106 -0.012 -0.043 -0.070 -0.253 0.001 -0.013 -0.017 0.114 -0.018 -0.030 -0.053 -0.367 0.018 
p -Value 0.172 0.089 0.858 0.828 0.496 0.457 0.884 0.995 0.865 0.893 0.787 0.858 0.135 0.727 0.864 0.894 
N 154 64 5 85 57 24 3 30 52 19 2 31   
   
Panel D: Differential (Panel C-Panel B)   
Mean 0.335 -0.076 0.088 -0.039 -0.103 -0.185 -0.151 -0.049 0.038 0.057 0.446 -0.020   
   





Table 4.6 Univariate Tests: Market Valuation 
 
This table reports the difference between the cold markets and hot markets. The media coverage published within 90 days before the takeover announcements. After a 
pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third are classified as low 
pessimism. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock. Panel A relates to the full sample (Full Sample); Panel B relates 
to larger acquirers as measured as those firms in the highest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Large Firms); Panel C relates to small acquirers as 
measured as those firms in the lowest one third of bidders once ranked by their market value(Small Firms); and Panel D relates to the differential performance between small 
and large bidders (Panel C -Panel B). The p-Value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for CARs. Significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% levels is 
denoted ***, ** and * respectively.   
 
 
  All   Cold Market  Hot Market   Differential ( Cold -Hot) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Firms   
Mean 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.028 0.014*** 0.018* 0.028 0.024 0.011*** 0.015 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.003 0.011 0.017 -0.003 
p-Value 0.000 0.005 0.118 0.009 0.093 0.293 0.225 0.000 0.113 0.195 0.247 0.326 0.819 0.706 0.370 0.816 
N 751 323 23 405 154 64 5 85 251 107 12 132   
   
Panel B: Large Firms   
Mean 0.018*** 0.022** 0.009 0.016* 0.025 0.035 0.022 0.015*** 0.015 0.017*** -0.001 0.014 0.011 0.018 0.023 0.000 
p-Value 0.004 0.020 0.240 0.078 0.160 0.315 0.480 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.920 0.544 0.631 0.598 0.461 0.988 
N 440 192 12 236 92 48 3 41 140 52 5 83   
   
Panel C: Small Firms   
Mean -0.002 -0.029 0.013 0.009** 0.004 0.002 0.026 -0.001 -0.015 -0.104 0.006 0.014** 0.020 0.106 0.019 -0.015 
p-Value 0.847 0.469 0.179 0.033 0.709 - 0.509 0.957 0.599 0.420 0.129 0.043 0.530 - 0.591 0.356 
N 68 21 6 41 11 1 2 8 29 7 4 18   
   
Panel D: Differential (Panel C-Panel B)   
Mean -0.020 -0.051 0.004 -0.006 -0.021 -0.033 0.003 -0.015 -0.030 -0.120 0.007 0.000   




Table 4.7 Multivariate Tests in Hot Markets 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 3-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) in the hot 
market. It also reports the acquirer long-run 24-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) in the 
hot market from the announcement date stratified by the target industry. The media coverage published 
within 90 days before the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked 
by score from highest to lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third are 
classified as low pessimism. The CAR is measured by using the formula          
 
   . The 
buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured by using the formula                
 
        
 
   
    . Column (1) reports the results for the 90 days samples in the short run while Column (2) refers to the 
long run. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in 
millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of acquirer divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end 
of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement 
measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in 
annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's earnings 
before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its 
income and costs. PE ratio refers to a equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market share price compared 
to its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a 
mixture of cash and stock. For additional variables noted in the literature, only the cases of acquisitions of 
publicly listed targets and acquirers are considered. Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by 
the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. The mean CAR and BHAR are reported 








90pessimism -0.0463***  0.0752 
 
(0.003) (0.603) 
STOCK -0.0108 -0.1598 
 
(0.491) (0.444) 
CASH 0.0020 -0.0936 
 
(0.741) (0.154) 
WRUNUP_365_7 -0.0233* 0.0063 
 
(0.075) (0.967) 
WLNMV 0.0071 -0.2953*** 
 
(0.482) (0.004) 
WPE -0.0002 -0.0001 
 
(0.703) (0.989) 
WRelativeSize 0.0454 0.4357 
 
(0.251) (0.205) 
WLeverage -0.0001 -0.0028 
 
(0.527) (0.235) 
WMTBV 0.0002 0.0481** 
 
(0.918) (0.030) 
Public -0.0002 0.0443 
 
(0.989) (0.737) 
Diversification -0.0022 -0.1114* 
 
(0.705) (0.075) 
WLNEBITDA -0.0092 0.2426** 
 
(0.354) (0.015) 
Tender -0.0096 -0.1790 
 
(0.497) (0.289) 
Hostile 0.0036 -0.3161* 
 
(0.798) (0.060) 
_cons 0.0948 -1.5047* 
 
(0.249) (0.068) 
N 251 251 
R-sq 0.120 0.237 





Table 4.8 Multivariate Tests in the Cold Markets 
 
This table reports acquirer short-run 3-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns (CARs) in the cold 
market. It also reports the acquirer long-run 24-month Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) in the 
cold market from the announcement date stratified by the target industry. The media coverage published 
within 90 days before the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked 
by score from highest to lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third are 
classified as low pessimism. The CAR is measured by using the formula          
 
   . The 
buy-and-hold abnormal return is measured by using the formula                
 
        
 
   
    . Column (1) reports the results for the 90 days samples in the short run while Column (2) refers to the 
long run. Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in 
millions). Book-to-market ratio is book-value of acquirer divided by market value of acquirer, as of the end 
of the previous year. RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement 
measured using the CAR [-365, -7]. Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in 
annual terms and is measured at the year prior to the deal announcement. EBITDA is a firm's earnings 
before interest payments, tax, depreciation, and amortization are subtracted from final accounting of its 
income and costs. PE ratio refers to a equity valuation ratio of a firm's current market share price compared 
to its per-share earnings in one year. Cash is deals financed using 100%, Stock is 100% stock and Mix is a 
mixture of cash and stock. For additional variables noted in the literature, only the cases of acquisitions of 
publicly listed targets and acquirers are considered. Relative size is measured as the deal value divided by 
the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. The mean CAR and BHAR are reported 








90pessimism -0.0208 0.4285** 
 
(0.214) (0.017) 
STOCK 0.0210 -0.1255 
 
(0.383) (0.620) 
CASH -0.0040 -0.0714 
 
(0.539) (0.372) 
WRUNUP_365_7 -0.0182 0.2710 
 
(0.291) (0.150) 
WLNMV 0.0001 -0.0479 
 
(0.987) (0.731) 
WPE 0.0008 -0.0129 
 
(0.274) (0.197) 
WRelativeSize -0.0385 0.2091 
 
(0.217) (0.592) 
WLeverage 0.0000 -0.0036 
 
(0.884) (0.243) 
WMTBV -0.0064*** 0.0573* 
 
(0.002) (0.077) 
Public -0.0222* -0.0858 
 
(0.070) (0.608) 
Diversification 0.0084 0.0992 
 
(0.235) (0.269) 
WLNEBITDA -0.0030 0.0647 
 
(0.729) (0.625) 
Tender 0.0171 -0.1505 
 
(0.284) (0.459) 
Hostile 0.0039 0.6520*** 
 
(0.874) (0.005) 
_cons 0.0582 -0.5220 
 
(0.345) (0.615) 
N 154 154 
R-sq 0.363 0.468 





Table 4.9 Multivariate Tests 
 
This table presents media pessimism for merger portfolios of all, high- and low-valuation acquirers. The 
media coverage published within 90 days before the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is 
calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest to lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, 
while the bottom third are classified as low pessimism. Column (1) reports the results for the news samples 
in 90 days before takeover announcement. The variable Size is measured as the average market value of 
acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s 
book value divided by its market value, as of the end of the previous year; RUNUP is the stock performance 
of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement, measured using Run-up[-365, -7]; Leverage is the 
percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual terms, measured in the year prior to the deal 
announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a firm’s final accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio 
refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm’s current market share price compared to its per-share earnings in 
one year; Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash, Stock denotes deals financed 100% in stock, and 
Mix is a mixture of cash and stock; and relative size is measured as the deal value divided by the market 
value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted 


























































Table 4.10 Robustness Tests 
 
This table reports the findings of robustness checks. The media coverage published within 90 days before 
the takeover announcements. After a pessimism score is calculated, deals are ranked by score from highest 
to lowest. The top third are classified as high pessimism, while the bottom third are classified as low 
pessimism. Column (1) reports the results for deals in hot market and returns in the short run, column (2) 
refers to deals in hot market and returns in the long run, and column (3) refers to deals in cold market and 
returns in the short run. column (4) refers to deals in cold market and returns in the long run. The variable 
Size is measured as the average market value of acquirers over the previous calendar year (in millions of 
dollars); the book-to-market ratio is the acquirer’s book value divided by its market value, as of the end of 
the previous year; RUNUP is the stock performance of the acquirer prior to the takeover announcement, 
measured using Run-up[-365, -7]; Leverage is the percentage of total debt divided by total capital in annual 
terms, measured in the year prior to the deal announcement; EBITDA is subtracted from a firm’s final 
accounting of its income and costs; the PE ratio refers to an equity valuation ratio of a firm’s current market 
share price compared to its per-share earnings in one year; Cash denotes deals financed using 100% cash, 
Stock denotes deals financed 100% in stock, and Mix is a mixture of cash and stock; and relative size is 
measured as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer over the previous calendar year. 






1 2 3 4 
 
Short&Hot Long&Cold Short&Cold Long&Cold 
     Media Pessimism -0.0399* 0.1480 -0.0284 0.4677* 
 
(0.054) (0.448) (0.202) (0.057) 
STOCK -0.0344** -0.3047 0.0342 -0.1555 
 
(0.032) (0.183) (0.181) (0.601) 
CASH 0.0046 -0.1035 -0.0065 0.0275 
 
(0.538) (0.146) (0.452) (0.784) 
WRUNUP_365_7 -0.0133 0.1002 0.0141 0.3667 
 
(0.413) (0.576) (0.504) (0.128) 
WLNMV 0.0075 -0.2705** 0.0123 -0.1337 
 
(0.561) (0.017) (0.372) (0.467) 
WPE -0.0008 -0.0072 -0.0004 -0.0088 
 
(0.281) (0.330) (0.674) (0.477) 
WRelativeSize 0.0311 0.3364 -0.0366 0.2156 
 
(0.496) (0.272) (0.432) (0.612) 
WLeverage -0.0001 -0.0028 0.0003 -0.0015 
 
(0.626) (0.314) (0.403) (0.695) 
WMTBV 0.0003 0.0435* -0.0094*** 0.0786* 
 
(0.857) (0.089) (0.002) (0.086) 
Public 0.0028 0.3707** -0.0180 0.0596 
 
(0.902) (0.027) (0.232) (0.797) 
Diversification -0.0045 -0.1130 0.0145 0.0840 
 
(0.542) (0.117) (0.141) (0.451) 
WLNEBITDA -0.0081 0.1865* -0.0178 0.1323 
 
(0.512) (0.088) (0.198) (0.443) 
Tender -0.0084 -0.3008 0.0023 -0.3062 
 
(0.660) (0.148) (0.915) (0.258) 
Hostile 0.0453*** -0.7378*** 0.0100 0.5892** 
 
(0.009) (0.001) (0.739) (0.026) 
_cons 0.1031 -0.8813 0.1652* -1.7239 
 
(0.298) (0.299) (0.084) (0.221) 
N 251 251 154 154 
R-sq 0.133 0.288 0.312 0.471 





Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis examines the interaction between the financial media and market reactions to 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in three different settings. Chapter 2 examines the 
correlation between media pessimism/media coverage and bidder performance. Acquiring 
firms with media coverage in the pre-merger period are expected to outperform those 
without media coverage. And firms with low media pessimism in the pre-merger period 
outperform with high media pessimism. These outcomes are predicted by both the 
information and sentiment hypotheses. The results of the first chapter are consistent with 
the hypothesis. Chapter 3 looks into the impact of financial media on M&A outcomes and 
finds that deals with high media coverage/low pessimism have higher completion rates 
than deals with low media coverage/high pessimism. This finding is consistent with those 
of Fang and Peress (2009), who state stocks with no mass media coverage outperform 
those heavily covered by the media. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by examining 
the market valuation hypothesis together with media impact on takeover deals. The 
results show that acquirers obtain significantly higher announcement returns for deals 
announced during high-valuation markets in conjunction with low media pessimism, and 
for deals announced during low-valuation markets in conjunction with high media 
pessimism. 
 
This thesis builds on the financial media literature, which shows that either media 
pessimism or media coverage affects firm performance. However, the literature has 
neglected the media effect on M&As. This thesis addresses the issue and fills in the gaps 
by showing clear evidence that the financial media can indeed alter investors’ 
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expectations towards bidder’s future earning abilities and eventually change market 
reactions to a merger deal. 
 
While most financial media studies focus on the US market, this thesis contributes to the 
literature by using UK data. As Shaw (1999) suggests, the UK and US media are very 
different, with the UK media being more independent and the US media more conformist. 
 
Overall, this thesis provides empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the general 
pessimism of the financial news released during the pre-announcement period strongly 
affects the reactions of the financial market to takeover deals. It shows that the increasing 
level of media pessimism in the pre-announcement time window significantly reduces 
acquirers’ five-day announcement abnormal returns. This hypothesis still holds in a 
cross-sectional multivariate analysis after controlling for various known factors. This 
relationship seems to hold in the longer run, supporting the information release 
explanation of financial media news rather than the sentiment hypothesis. In addition, 
media coverage can serve to alleviate information asymmetries and the difference in 
announcement performance between cash and stock deals is more pronounced for 
acquirers subject to low media coverage. In conclusion, irrespective of the sentiment, 
positive or negative, of the financial media, high media coverage conveys more 
information to acquirers’ investors. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that media coverage and media pessimism 
have a statistically significant influence on takeover outcomes, which opens up many 
218 
 
future research avenues. One area of particular interest is whether media coverage and 
media pessimism in a series of merger deals influence future takeover performance. 
Moreover, after the quantity of media coverage is measured, another area of interest is 
whether deals with intensive media coverage for a short period outperform those without 
such media coverage, since intensive media coverage could suddenly raise investor 
attention and therefore temporarily drive up bidder prices. Furthermore, target managers 
could also use financial media to raise such investor recognition and drive up the target 
price to gain a better position in deal negotiation. All the above-mentioned ideas require 
further investigation and could provide new insight to the literature. 
 
The main contribution of this thesis to the literature is a comprehensive study of the 
financial media’s role in M&As as an effective supplement to media research. In addition, 
the relation between the media and M&As has implications for future research. For 
instance, the diversity of media sentiment between various news stories is a potential 
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